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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates Toni Morrison’s engagement with tragedy in her 
novel Beloved.  In opposition to late twentieth-century interpretations of Beloved, 
which see this novel as reordering or revisiting history in order to establish in its 
characters a sense of self-worth, this thesis understands Beloved as the narrative 
which calls a halt to the search for a worthy sense of self in a prescribed history.  It 
argues that the form of this novel is designed and arranged in order to present in 
dramatic time a conception of a consciousness recognisable as already and 
always existing in African American individuals: that is, before, during and after 
slavery.  This thesis contends that an engagement with tragedy is crucial in the 
achievement of this end. 
In an engagement with Morrison’s Nobel Lecture (1993), Chapter One 
argues that the significations of cultural authority are the result of a process in 
which negotiations of difference take place (Bhabha 2005).  In a study of 
Morrison’s engagement with Du Bois’s (1897) theory of double consciousness, 
Chapter Two researches the complex nature of true fulfilment for the marginalized.  
Du Bois’s difficulty in establishing a simple claim to equality is contrasted with 
Morrison’s rejection of the discourses of difference, exclusion and marginalization 
(Morrison 1993).  Chapter Three develops this line of enquiry to include Morrison’s 
adaption of ancient, tragic drama to the demands of African American writing.  
Morrison’s innovatory use of the separate and external configuration of human 
sensibilities in the form of Beloved is carefully considered in this chapter.  Chapter 
Four engages with theories concerning the imposition of difference and the 
material conditions of appropriation, and the signifying system it spawns 
(Guillaumin 1995).  It discusses Morrison’s aesthetic engagement with the 
master/slave relationship.   
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Introduction 
 
 James Berger (1996), in considering Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved (1987), 
feels that it returns to an essentially liberal view of the traumatic effects of 
‘institutional racism’ (408), positioning this novel in the discursive contexts of the 
decade of its publication.  His perception of the ‘liberal position’ (415) is developed 
within a critique of ‘Reaganist’ conservatism of the 1980s, and the oppositional 
forces of ‘black nationalism’ and the New Left. 
 Neo conservative polemics thrived within conservative denials that race was 
a ‘continuing, traumatic and structural problem in contemporary America’ (Berger 
1996: 408).  The conservative view of race ‘attributed the poverty and violence of 
urban [African American] ghettos to individual moral deficiencies’ (411).  In this 
context racial injustice was thought to have little influence on life in the slums.  
Berger points out that ‘the few negative reviews’ (411) of Beloved ‘emerged’ from 
this position (411) and perceived the African American community as an 
underclass which consisted of ‘single mothers on welfare, drug addicts and gang 
members’ (411).  In this way, American racial trauma became ‘submerged’ and 
‘disguised’ (412) within a debate which concentrated more and more on problems 
concerning ‘crime, welfare and the underclass’ (412). 
 Berger contextualizes this debate as one of the consequences of Daniel 
Moynihan’s report which, in the 1960s, ‘strongly endorsed investment’ (412) in 
employment and housing in African American communities.  This report cited as 
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the reason for this support the fractured family life and family structure in the 
community which it saw as a continuing cause of poverty.  Berger points out that 
Moynihan was ‘particularly critical’ of what he believed was the matriarchal 
organization of black families (412).  The report, he believes, ‘severed’ the links 
between ‘liberal activists and thinkers’ and encouraged African American feelings 
of militancy that were to arise within black nationalism (412). 
 In contrast, the 1970s witnessed a vigorous attack on the idea that ‘there 
was nothing of value in the black community’ (413) and Berger points to the 
growing belief in the extraordinary powers within African American communities to 
absorb the racialized criteria foisted on them and to establish a firm base from 
which to develop an African American culture (Berger 1996).  In these terms, the 
new left ‘denied any dysfunction within African American communities’ (414). 
 In light of these arguments Beloved is placed as an ‘intervention’ in the 
debates which preceded but were also associated with its inspiration.  Challenging 
ideas of moral deficiency and environmental deprivation, and the inability of ‘white’ 
America to recognise the insidious presence of racism at the centre of the debate, 
Berger claims that Morrison’s view is that ‘power and official knowledge continue to 
violate African American lives’ (411).  And more than that, he claims that Morrison 
in Beloved ‘revives traditional liberalism by insisting on African American personal 
and cultural agency and a powerful role for women’ (415). 
 In Ashraf Rushdy’s opinion, it is recollection which serves and conserves a 
sense of self.  In Beloved, he says, Morrison has presented a story ‘in which 
memory is the crucial device of being’ (1990:307).  The joining of recollection and 
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sense of self is achieved, he believes, through the construction of ‘primal scenes’ 
(303) whose significance is manifested in their recollection during a second critical 
event.  The primal scene, he argues ‘need only be of such significance that an 
individual would recollect it’ and not another at a moment in time ‘when driven to 
re-evaluate her or his life’ (303).  Consequently, a primal scene is an occasion 
which facilitates self-discovery through ‘memory and through what Morrison 
felicitously calls “rememory” ’ (303).  
 It is the presence once again of Paul ‘D’ in Sethe’s life that triggers thoughts 
of their slave past and the memories they share.  This is the catalyst, according to 
Rushdy, which leads to the events which cause both characters to remember the 
traumas of their past lives as part of the same story, their story.  In this way, 
memory is neither ‘stable’ nor ‘personal’ but is a ‘communal property of friends, of 
family, of a people’ (321).  In Morrison’s novels, Rushdy sees the ‘magic of 
memory’ as ‘interpersonal’ (322) and fundamental to the beneficial relationships 
between people who have been subjected to disturbing experiences and who also 
remember.  In this context, memory is a personal thing but its sharing assists 
healing and self-discovery within the individual in the community: Sethe’s and 
Paul’s became ‘communal property’ as ‘re-memories’ (322). 
 Two years later, Rushdy (1992) was still very interested in how the past is 
remembered.  He labels Morrison’s efforts to relate events from the past as ‘this 
black aesthetic of remembering’ (568).  Not only does Morrison use a theory based 
on an inherited culture, an ‘inherited history’, but she ‘delicately yet resolutely’ 
takes up ‘the task of reviving the very figures of that history’ (568).  It is the search 
to represent the compellingly human dilemma of the slave which prevents 
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Morrison’s work from forming a ‘master plot of victim and victimizer’, he says (568).  
In ‘articulating this critical and hopeful feminist voice’ (568), Rushdy believes that 
what Morrison does is to revise history around subjective characters whose 
experiences are able to signify on the accepted readings of the past.  Their 
experiences as slaves are perceived as crimes against the individual because they 
demean and disregard what are seen as self-evident, human values.  However, it 
is noteworthy that if the past is to be revised it means that history is to be 
implicated in the successful, or otherwise, presentation of the African American 
character.  And, critically, this would mean an encroachment into a history made in 
America by white Americans.  
 James Baldwin (1988) has also spoken in terms of the aesthetic concerning 
Morrison’s work.  ‘Her gift is allegory’ but ‘her books and allegory are not always 
what they seem to be about’.  In acknowledging this Baldwin feels that ‘Beloved 
could be about the story of truth’ (284).  But the truth he refers to, he feels, is not 
wholly achievable in a revision of history or a revival of the characters who took 
part.  He points out that ‘whites want black writers to mostly deliver something as if 
it were an official version of the black experience’ (285).  However, ‘no true account 
really of black life can be held, can be contained, in the American vocabulary’ 
(285).  Within these views it is possible to detect differences between Rushdy’s 
black aesthetic of remembering and Baldwin’s mistrust of the representation of 
experience within a language where the ‘allegedly inferior are actually made so’ 
(Baldwin 1995: 25).  Lynn Scott (2006) encapsulates Baldwin’s argument when she 
says that ‘even well-intentioned “protest” literature reifies racial oppression through 
a theology of whiteness that denies the complexity of black experience’ (2006: 90).  
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And when Baldwin describes Morrison’s allegory as ‘horrifying’ (1988:284), we get 
a sense of its remove from revision and revival.  It becomes something other than 
a position from which to reify difference through a revision of history.  
 Rushdy (1992), however, establishes that in this revision of history and in 
inscribing hope into the narrative, ‘Beloved is not the most important character’ 
(571).  That character is Denver and, ‘if Beloved is the embodiment of the past’, 
then Denver is ‘the daughter of history’ (571).  However, this thesis argues that 
Beloved is the embodiment of Sethe’s need to develop self-worth through an 
instinctive engagement with an elusive past.  Beloved is the source of Sethe’s 
longing made up as a person.  Denver’s intimate relation with Beloved 
encapsulates these longings, but that relation is also the catalyst which renders 
self-consciousness a revision of longing.  Sethe, we can say, has come to the end 
of her tether, and Denver, having been born waving free, so to speak, embodies a 
sense of movement away from the source to which Sethe was irrevocably drawn.  
The implication here is that the sense of loss incumbent in the figure of Sethe is 
conceivable in Denver’s movement away from the source of Sethe’s enthralment.  
The impossibility of Sethe fulfilling her need is the motif for its transmission from 
longing into existence.   At the moment of Beloved’s flight, the source of longing is 
revised into the presentation of an idea conceivable in the figure of Denver. Not 
history revised, but the truth manhandled out of a history which could no longer 
sustain it.   
Lorraine Liscio (1992) describes Beloved as the effort by Toni Morrison to 
reinvent a past in order to establish a racial memory (36).  In this context the novel 
is able to ‘honour’ the real life experiences of those who endured the trauma of 
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slavery and provide a medium for their voices.  She says that this is achieved 
through the narration and enactment of the mother/daughter bond which supplies 
expression and disrupts the language of the ‘father’ (35).  This is to say that 
Sethe’s story avoids the assumptions made about her which are present in white 
patriarchal language: a language that does not recognise or represent her.  
Morrison’s novel, she says, is able to point out that male narratives are not 
representative ‘of all blacks in slavery’ (34). 
 Carol Henderson (2006) likens this to the ‘memorial haunting’ that 
precipitates familial and ancestral recovery (149) of the human condition of the 
enslaved.  Morrison, she says, is ‘keen in fleshing out the dynamics of human 
relationships’ (150) to ensure that some wounds should be seen, ‘manifested in the 
flesh so that one’s spiritual essence can be reconnected with the lost self’ (150).  
This is fulfilled in the presence of Beloved who facilitates this ‘reconciliation of body 
and spirit’ (150).  In this way, the ‘private longings of a people’ are made public 
(150).  Henderson, too, refers to Morrison’s aim as one of ‘clearing space for the 
recovery of this past’ (150) in order to focus on the interior lives of the enslaved.  In 
this reading, knowledge of the past is connected to the yearning for maturation: the 
importance of racial memory allied with spiritual essence. 
 However, ‘fixing in language a past that can never be adequately named’ 
(35) is problematic according to Liscio (1992).  The target, Liscio points out, is this 
‘white patriarchal narrative oppressive to blacks’ (36) and represented in the 
actions of schoolteacher and his perceptions of Sethe.  Nonetheless, this ‘entails 
some hazards’ (35), as presenting Sethe within a maternal discourse risks denying 
her the status of a speaking subject and becoming ‘objectified in others’ narratives’ 
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(35): and in light of the narrator’s opinion that ‘this is not a story to pass on’, Liscio 
believes that ‘no metaphor can satisfactorily represent these people’ (36).  This 
means that in attempting to write what has been stolen from Sethe, ‘her mother’s 
milk’ (45), in a narrative where white patriarchal assumptions are undermined by 
establishing the ‘black mother-infant daughter bond’ (39), Sethe’s experience, her 
story, forever remains within the significance of the power of schoolteacher 
because her defiance is expressed on the site of schoolteacher’s knowledge and 
power and, as such, her reaction is the action of a slave and not a human being.  
For Liscio, the narration of the mother/daughter bond is the narration of the 
‘symbolic’ and the ‘semiotic disruption’ (36) of a full presence into an empty place 
where the object retains its original shading, because ‘the narration of what has 
been stolen cannot be written’ (45). The symbolic suggests the presence of a 
known unity based on a ‘body of knowledge’ (Tambling 2010: 118) which can be 
expressed symbolically.  Consequently, for Liscio, its failure disrupts that unity into 
a void where the ex-slave remains bereft.  Nevertheless, in dramatic time, that 
which remains after disruption we argue, is a fragment able to retain the smallest 
semblance of the original unity.  The symbol expresses Sethe’s humanity; its 
fragmentation, disruption, means that this can continue to be expressed as an idea 
in another form.   
This is significant because it can be argued that the point is precisely that 
she is forever under the power of schoolteacher and forever the slave.  This is not 
in question, but the suggestion for consideration is that her sensibilities as a human 
being and her awareness of her condition as a slave must be apparent in any 
situation in which she is written.  Liscio is correct in saying that no metaphor can 
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satisfactorily represent these people.  The representation of the humanity they 
have lost is expressed in the fragmentation of a symbol whose meaning was 
established through the use of metaphor and allegory. Terms such as ‘her mother’s 
milk’ provide allegorical connotations which, it is argued, cannot be judged as 
means to an end.  Allegory has no consequences and, in this context, it is the 
medium capable of sounding a place which is cognizant of the pull of culturally 
hegemonic language and the forming of the symbolic.  To think otherwise is to 
reject the aesthetic and the role of language within it.  Henderson’s (2006) point 
that Beloved facilitates the reconciliation of body and spirit is a point in question, 
because it can be argued that the allegorical formulation of Beloved ensures the 
exact opposite is made public.  Beloved is neither symbol nor metaphor but the 
incarnation of the longing whose context is an unknown and irrecoverable history.  
As she flees, Sethe’s loss is confirmed, and our perception is changed.  It is not a 
matter of history anymore, but of a human right denied.  It is everyman’s idea of 
human dignity as a fragment in dramatic time.        
 Caroline Rody (1995) congratulates Toni Morrison for writing a novel which 
the African American canon ‘had long lacked.’  It is, she says, the story of the 
African Americans who ‘survived slavery’ and is about filling ‘historical gaps’ in 
what is a ‘historical novel’ (93) in a mythic creation of ‘black history’ (93). In her 
reading of Beloved, Rody registers the influences of ‘magic realism’ in Morrison’s 
attempt to relate a ‘prehistory of the present’ (93).  She acknowledges those 
‘poststructuralist critics’ who read Beloved as more a novel that takes its place 
within the historical discourse which deals with ‘the problem of writing history in the 
complicated moment in which we tell the past’, but establishes that within the novel 
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there remains the ‘burden’ of communicating ‘an authentic truth’ (94).  This burden 
is a result, she says, of the ‘inherited conviction’ of ‘slavery’s evil’ which still 
registers in the perceptions of the individual in the present day.  This provides a 
moral purpose to the quest for authentic voices and the need to put ‘authority back 
into the hands of the slave’ (94). 
 Even though the slave history novel may well involve questions of memory, 
knowledge and identity and seek out an authoritative voice, the ‘awesome 
authority’ given to Sethe is problematic for Caroline Rody (1995) in this reading of 
the novel.  She asks ‘what logic does the plot of child murder serve late twentieth-
century ideological interest; and how is authority served in such an act of violence’ 
(94)? 
 The answer to these enquiries, she points out, is in the novel’s extraordinary 
‘psychological reach’.  In this context, historical writing cannot be judged solely in 
terms of ‘ideologies of representation’.  The reach of this novel points towards an 
effort to link the reimagined past with the complexities of the present.  Rody 
articulates this as ‘an emotional implication of present and past’ and suggests that 
we ‘integrate an ideological reading of historical fiction with a psychological project 
of re-imagining an inherited past’ (95). 
 Rody articulates an aesthetic where integration acknowledges the 
connection between the individual and his/her group and the group’s development 
of ‘the authority or cultural need to represent its history’ (114).  Part of this, 
however, is rejected by Hannes Bergthaller who claims that Morrison’s aim to 
make Beloved ‘a personal experience for the reader’ is, of course, ‘a manifest 
13 
 
impossibility’ (Bergthaller 2006/7: 3).  The reasons for this are the ‘limitations’ of 
literature itself and the fact that in order to provide a slave within the text an 
element of ‘personhood’ that character must be at a ‘temporal remove’ from their 
own experience of slavery (3).  This seems to say that personal experience in a 
slave ‘narrative’ is a ‘consequence’ of the character’s inability to communicate 
autonomously as a slave through the medium of a text: he/she cannot display 
human sensibilities as both a slave and a ‘person’.  For Bergthaller, this makes 
Beloved not so much a novel about slavery as one ‘about its effects on those who 
live in its wake’ (3). 
 In this context he reads Beloved as the reclaiming of a community through 
‘a ritual of healing’ (3).  Each character has a part in this and ‘refigures’ their 
experiences in the quest for an identity which finally ‘inaugurates’ them and their 
reader in a ‘shared experience’ (3).   Denver’s relationship with Beloved is cited to 
reinforce this reading.  Beloved is seen as someone with whom Denver 
communicates sufficiently to enable a bond of ‘intimacy’ to become established 
which is indicative of this healing process in the search for ‘origins and 
genealogies’ (4).  Bergthaller is then able to point out that Beloved provides the 
medium through which the process of healing is ‘dramatized for the reader’ and 
‘literature’ is the ‘catalyst’ for the ‘reproduction of a community’ (2), and the novel 
facilitates the enactment of a communal healing process. 
 However, the healing process entails the characters forgetting those 
experiences which are capable of overwhelming them and mentally breaking them, 
and represented in the text by the ‘eponymous character’ of Beloved.  Beloved’s 
fate, then, is to ‘literalize’ the fears of dismemberment which must be forgotten if 
14 
 
the community is to reinvent itself (2).  In this reading a community is empowered 
to form and re-establish itself through the act of jettisoning its recent history.  
However, a historical connection must be maintained.  The idea of a community 
reinventing itself through rejecting its recent history is prevalent in much of late 
twentieth century criticism of Beloved.  And yet Morrison has repeatedly confirmed 
the importance of the ancestor in her work: ‘nice things don’t always happen to the 
totally self-reliant’, she says, ‘if there is no conscious historical connection’ 
(1984:344).  Consequently, the importance of the individual’s relationship with the 
community is central to many interpretations.  However, it is important here to 
stress that the loss of any ability to be autonomous has to be written as an 
individual loss in order for that loss to resonate beyond the context of its 
suppression.  The community as a group recognize that loss because it has 
happened to each of them.  This communal recognition identifies the intolerable 
loss of one individual as an affliction of a whole group of people.  It is not as if they 
are stranded in time, but that they are stranded in a moment of recognition of the 
enormity of their loss.  This moment of recognition resonates in the figure of 
Denver.  As we shall see, Morrison’s use of the ancestor provides her with the 
images which facilitate her use of symbolism, but the presence of the ancestral 
community is necessary in order for her to conflate individual sensibilities with that 
community.     
 Nevertheless, both Bergthaller (2006/7) and Rody’s (1995) views on 
community are echoed in Betty Powell’s opinion that Morrison initiates ‘the 
possibility of coherence and recognition for the characters in Beloved through 
freedom and alliance with community’ (1995: 143).  However, the idea that 
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Beloved’s departure is the catalyst which enables other characters to ‘connect with 
one another’ (153) simplifies Sethe and her community’s continuing isolation as ex-
slaves.  They must remain in their state of recognition in dramatic time because a 
loss of such magnitude has been configured as semblance in order for that which 
has been lost to be conceivable in another form.  They can only be remembered as 
human beings in our recognition of what they have lost.  They are allied in loss. 
 Denise Heinze (1993) is able to claim that this outsider, insider status is not 
always resolved but Morrison has achieved ‘a rare accommodation of two 
competing literary selves’ in her own work that may point to ‘irresolution as a 
motivating factor in the… struggle for wholeness’ (5).  Heinze (9) explains this as 
the ability to combine ‘political consciousness with aesthetic sensibility’ in that both 
blacks and whites are ignited into ‘political action’, while elevating ‘through art the 
beautiful… in the human condition’.  Here the arguments concerning allegory and 
its uses have been transformed into an aesthetic framework, something Conner 
terms the unyielding connection between the work of art and life as it is (2000: ix). 
Nancy Peterson (2008) points out that in Beloved none of the characters are 
wholly good or bad.  She cites as example Sethe who, among other things, is 
interpreted as heroic, rash, strong, and ‘completely absorbed in her own 
explanations’ (96).  Coming to terms with these characters, she says, ‘offers keen 
insights into narrative point of view’, and especially into the desires and conflicts 
they may experience at a subconscious level (97).  The result of the readers’ 
endeavours is their involvement ‘with complex layers of interiority’ and the extent of 
the individual’s ability to ‘recognize and articulate’ the ‘deepest desires, fears, and 
dreams of his or her innermost self’ (97). 
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  Within this context, Peterson is able to discuss how Morrison is able 
to pay ‘a great deal’ of attention to individual consciousness in her aim to reveal 
what ‘constitutes a particular character’s subjectivity’ and the making or forming of 
that individual’s humanity (97).  Her thorough engagement with character leads to 
her conclusion that ‘if we listen carefully to the voices’ in the novel, we as readers 
become aware that ‘all truths are partial and relational’ and by this we develop ‘an 
awareness of our own potential complicity’ in the story of slavery (95).   Similar to 
Sethe’s heroic struggle to be rid of schoolteacher’s evaluation of her, we too are 
haunted by the shift in our own consciousness. 
 Our coming to terms with these characters, the insights into narrative points 
of view, and our involvement with complex layers of interiority are strong 
indications of the power of the aesthetic to neutralize those insinuations which are 
active in the history of racial superiority.  It also implies that the reader’s 
involvement with a character’s subjectivity is an involvement with the agency of the 
aesthetic: the method for producing meaning. 
 Morrison’s emergence as an author of significance corresponded with the 
ongoing debate concerning ‘the contested ideas of the relations between the work 
of art and the political arena’ (Connor 2000: x).  This is an area in which Ralph 
Ellison (1953) questioned the claims that black artists should in the first instance be 
acclaimed as just that, black; and the value of their work judged by the extent to 
which it shunned white literary strategies and as a consequence earned its place 
within a black literary canon.  ‘Through the display of black intelligence and artistic 
versatility, it was believed, whites would come to a new understanding of African 
Americans’ (Rampersad 1992:xvi).  In opposition to this Ellison, along with James 
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Baldwin, argued that, even though they agreed that a writer should write from 
within his own experience, the ‘sociology of his existence’ should not mean his 
work should simply be a protest against those conditions (Ellison 1972:111).  In a 
telling insight into the writing strategies of those authors whose work necessarily 
must address the situation of the marginalized, Ellison points out that how much of 
the sociology of existence is present in his work ‘depends upon how much of his 
life the individual writer is able to transform into art’ (111-12).  In this context, 
political and sociological considerations are taken from the lived experience of the 
author and transposed into the immediate experience of his/her characters.  We 
can say that the function of the content of the aesthetic, in these terms, must be to 
incorporate and shape the conditions of existence within the human condition.  
 Importantly, Ellison goes on to say that there are aspects of his role as 
writer ‘which do not depend primarily upon [his] racial identity’ (125).  He points out 
that in order to ‘fulfil the writer’s basic responsibilities of his craft’ he/she must 
‘maintain a certain precision in language, a maximum correspondence between the 
form of a piece of writing and its content’ (125). He extends this ‘to include the 
importance of a correspondence between words and ideas… and the processes of 
[the] world’ (125).  This correspondence can be likened to Oscar Wilde’s ideas 
concerning art and the writer: ‘Truth in art is the unity of a thing with itself… the 
outward expressive of the inward: in which form reveals’ (Wilde 1982:160-161).  He 
also stresses that ‘an idea is of no value until it becomes incarnate and is made an 
image’ (171).  Wilde and Ellison’s theories of the aesthetic production of truth are, 
then, similar and concerned, within a particular form, with a correspondence 
between ideas and sociological experience.   Baldwin’s point that Beloved could be 
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the story of truth is conducive with Ellison and Wilde’s theories on the aesthetic 
production of sociological experience.  But, as Ellison points out, this is achieved 
by a precision in language and a correspondence between form and content but 
not with racial identity.  This should be balanced by what Wilde calls the 
‘individualism of art’ (1982:36) in that ‘the artist selects his own subject, and treats 
it as he chooses’.  As a consequence we can say that the writer’s ideas and 
themes may well be influenced by his/her sociology of existence but their 
successful correspondence with their chosen form is dependent upon the language 
used by the writer in fusing form and content.  This is to argue that language and 
not the ideology of the aesthetic will dictate the theoretical, critical approach 
because the writer’s language in which his/her theme is developed within the form 
of the work, in an act of correspondence, subsumes all other considerations.  It is 
ironic that the search for the truth regarding the situation of the African American 
should involve the cessation and subsumption of any classification of the author’s 
racial identity.  In light of these considerations, it is pertinent to argue that the 
aesthetic is the conduit through which the situation of the marginalized is made 
palpable, and the main area of consideration for interpreting and understanding the 
author’s themes as opposed to the context in which they were written.    
 In line with this, Valerie Smith (1987:7) has said that within literature ‘we can 
discern politics and its relation to ideology only through close analysis of its 
language’.  This is particularly telling in light of the inquiries into the ideology of the 
aesthetic by Terry Eagleton (1990).  With reference to Rousseau’s ‘law of the 
totality’ (25), Eagleton bases his discussion of the ideology of the aesthetic in the 
‘anxiety’ of ‘a class wedded in its robust individualism to the concrete and 
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particular’ (25).  That is, ‘individuals woven into intimate unity with no detriment to 
their specificity’ (20).  In this context, the aesthetic intervenes here ‘as a dream of 
reconciliation’ between an ‘abstract totality’ and ‘the flesh-and-blood reality of the 
individual being’ (25).  For Eagleton, ‘the mystery of the aesthetic object is that 
each of its sensuous parts, while appearing wholly autonomous, incarnates the 
‘law’ of the totality’ (25).  This is reminiscent of Ellison’s understanding of the 
sociology of experience and its necessary contribution to the formulation of the 
aesthetic: immediate experience of an existence within the totality which questions 
the idea of the attainment of a robust individualism.  However, Eagleton remains 
within the framework of an intimate unity in his belief that ‘each aesthetic particular, 
in the very act of determining itself, regulates and is regulated by all other self-
determining particular’ (25).  This would seem to say that the content brought to the 
aesthetic form, even as it is transposed into an art form, retains its original 
connotations and inferences which influence and are influenced by any other 
material garnered from the everyday world.  The result of this, Eagleton confirms, 
may be, ‘politically speaking’ that ‘what appears as my subordination to others is in 
fact self-determination’ or the more cynical view where ‘my subordination to others 
is so effective that it appears to me in the mystified guise of governing myself’ (25).  
It perfectly frames the dilemma of a society who covets a burgeoning sense of self-
determination within the controlling material and moral framework of the group.  
However, what becomes plain is that this explanation of the aesthetic cannot 
encompass the experience of those that society marginalizes and whose rejection 
provides confirmation for the group of its own idea of itself.  Connor (2000) likens 
this to a ‘desire’, on the part of the ‘Western cultural aesthetic’ to ‘conceal its own 
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political ideology beneath the innocent façade of art’ (xvii).  In contrast to this 
Western aesthetic, we can say that Morrison’s use of the aesthetic is to transcend 
the presence of ideology in art.  Morrison’s aesthetic, operating at the margins of 
society in dramatic time, is denied access to the political ideologies out of which 
western art manifests reconciliation between an abstract totality and material 
being.  Because of this it must deliver autonomy for its characters within an 
aesthetic that is able to communicate a unity found to be unpresentable in the 
material world, something, for all intents and purposes, which is not considered to 
be there.  In this postmodern game of hide and seek, speaking the unspeakable 
involves the use of an aesthetic which presents, as a conceivable idea, that which 
already exists.  The form which gives flesh to the unspeakable, then, must survive 
its own presentation only as an idea.  In Lyotard’s (1986) explanation, ‘it is our 
business not to supply reality, but to invent allusions to the conceivable which 
cannot be presented’ (81).  The form, in our case Sethe, must incorporate, to the 
exclusion of everything else, the truth which cannot express itself in that form. 
 If, as Connor says, art and ideology coalesce in the western aesthetic, then 
it becomes plausible to believe that Morrison’s aesthetic, or a black aesthetic, is a 
form of opposition in that its sources are embedded in the black community and in 
that community’s cultural essence.  This would be a mistake because this belief 
could result in a concentration on that essence and those sources to the detriment 
of the aesthetic: ideology as art and, unfortunately, that is where we came in.  
However, the stance taken in this thesis is to interpret the novel in line with 
Benjamin’s claims that the enabling conditions of its production are indeed to be 
found integrated, assimilated or insinuated within it.  With this in mind, the author’s 
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task is to transcend this content within an aesthetic which is able to manifest a 
unity, a resolution, between the philosophical enquiries whose aim is to apportion 
credence to their own enquiries (Benjamin 1919-1920a).  If we consider the claims 
made for the black aesthetic as different from the western or European aesthetic, 
the claims made for the language used and the respective traditions of each are, 
more often than not, the grounds for discussion.  Connor has pointed out that when 
approaching the African American text from ‘the perspective of western aesthetics, 
we must attend to how the literature signifies upon and transforms our sense of the 
aesthetic tradition’ (2000:xx).  Similarly, Gates says that ‘a mode of reading to 
explicate a black text changes both the received theory and received ideas about 
the text’ (1984:9).  On the one hand is the transformation of the aesthetic tradition, 
and on the other, the challenge to received theory and received ideas.  We 
understand the latter as a conglomeration between political, ideological and 
aesthetic considerations.  Gates’s assertion, that if ‘theory and practice...aid the 
critic in responding to the multifarious demands of the texts of our tradition...then 
the critic must embark on their mastery’ (4), encapsulates the doubts concerning 
an aesthetic as tradition, that is, what it is, and in achieving a resolution to the 
multifarious conditions thought to influence the production of texts.  We reiterate 
our position that an aesthetic approach is an art form ‘in which the ideal of the 
philosophical problem makes itself manifest’ (Benjamin 1919-1920a:218), that is, a 
unity in place of the problems arising from an engagement with the text based on 
received theories and ideologies.  Additionally, if we consider that, in Morrison’s 
terms, the artist must kill off, as it were, her chosen form for the incorporation of the 
unspeakable, then we begin to understand that the rules for any aesthetic must 
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transcend the content, that is the received ideas and traditions, out of which the 
form emerged.  The transcendence of this content will involve the use of an 
aesthetic whose application will be governed, in our case, by the artist’s chosen 
technique for providing a conception of the existence of the unspeakable.  We 
cannot in these terms speak of a mastery of theory and practice aimed at the 
demands of the text, but rather of a mastery of the aesthetic, which is the method 
the artist uses to transcend the received theories and ideas which are the 
conditions of the novel’s production and its content.  The rules of Morrison’s 
aesthetic are formulated through the demand for the demise of the form.                        
 It can be agreed, then, that the close reading of language and its treatment 
of external influences is crucial to aesthetic analysis.  In response to Eagleton’s 
argument concerning the influence of political ideology on the aesthetic, Conner 
(2000) has said that ‘subsuming the aesthetic to the political… refuses to see the 
potentially liberating effects of art’ (x).  However, the argument will be taken further 
to embrace Wilde’s theory of the unity of art, Ellison’s correspondence, and the 
relation of the image incarnate to the social influences which make up its interior 
and exterior.   
 Morrison’s engagement with the aesthetic will be discussed further in 
Chapter Two in a comparison between her novel Sula (1973) and Beloved (1987).  
The aim of this analysis is to compare the result of Morrison’s aesthetic, that is the 
marginalized individual’s conscious realisation of their true situation, with 
Morrison’s determination to expose the ‘rank illusion’ of delineating human 
experience, individual or collective, in racial terms (Winant 1997: 89).  In Morrison’s 
own words, the dilemma is ‘how to enunciate race while depriving it of its lethal 
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cling’ (1997: 5)?  The answer will involve ‘questions of concept’ and of ‘language’, 
and although her commitment to them has been ‘fierce, fitful and constantly… 
evolving, they remain in her thought,’  Morrison says ‘as aesthetically and politically 
unresolved’ (5). 
 This revelation by Morrison will be discussed in relation to her use of the 
aesthetic and its affinity with the production in language of a consciousness which 
seeks self-definition and self-expression in a society which retains the power to 
marginalize and reject the outsider.  However, this enquiry will go further to claim 
that tragedy is the necessary framework in which to provide the denouement of the 
character whose form must be overtaken by the idea which sustained it.  In the 
briefest of terms, if Sula is the novel in which the concept of the unspeakable is 
never fully realised, then Beloved is the novel where this is resolved through 
tragedy. 
 This is in opposition to Tessa Roynan’s research (2013), which investigates 
the classical tradition and its use by western artists.  Roynan argues that the 
‘Greek and Roman tradition’ has been used to ‘purify’ white history in a ‘fabrication’ 
in which narratives of American history have become idealized (3).   Similar to 
some of the critics in this review, Roynan believes that Morrison’s aim is a revision 
of the past but that this is done through a radical deployment of the classical 
tradition (4).  This rewriting of America’s past, according to Roynan, is visible in 
Beloved and its framing within Greek tragedy. 
 However, this thesis differs from this point of view.  Whereas Morrison’s 
imagery and symbolism does emanate from the past, her use of tragedy, we 
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believe, is to diminish the influence of the past, and its insinuations concerning 
African American identity.  Her use of tragedy enables Morrison to draw a line 
under the events that her use of imagery and imagination has brought to the novel.  
Tragedy not only brings the character to an intensely public and anguished fall, it 
also parades for all to see the most personal and intimate suffering.  This is an 
important consideration in Beloved because from this point, Sethe’s tragic demise, 
we get little else than personal reflection on the human condition as history is 
pushed to one side.  Imagery, symbolism and tragedy are manipulated to provide 
the smallest totality of semblance of the consciousness left bereft through 
afflictions of slavery.  It is this fragment which is brought forward and instilled in the 
consciousness of another: a product of the past but not careful of it.  In this sense, 
tragedy is the manipulator of the character and not the context of her situation.  
The argument here is that any revision of events would involve an intellectual 
commitment to those events by Morrison, which they hardly deserve.  Through an 
engagement with Hegel’s theory of tragedy, Chapter Three of this thesis will 
explicate Morrison’s use of tragedy in her determination to write, as it were, out of 
context.  We can say, then, that a study of Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved reveals 
that African American writing is the attempt to be done with a past not worthy or 
representative of the African American.  Tantalizingly, a covenant, between the 
beneficial pride and dignity derived from a relationship with those who came 
before, and the consciousness conceivable in the character of the present of 
dramatic time, is maintained.  Because of this we encounter a fully recognizable 
human being whose facility is the product of a relationship with a community of the 
past.    
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Chapter 1. 
Morrison’s Nobel Lecture, the archaic demands of culture, and the appropriateness 
of tragedy in the postmodern presentation of the unspeakable 
 
‘Nothing is poorer than a truth expressed as it was thought.  Commited to writing in 
such a case, it is not even a bad photograph.  And the truth refuses (like a child or 
a woman who does not love us), facing the lens of writing while we crouch under 
the black cloth, to keep still and look amiable.  Truth wants to be startled abruptly, 
at one stroke, from her self-immersion, whether by uproar, music, or cries for help.  
Who could count the alarm signals with which the inner world of the true writer is 
equipped?  And to “write” is nothing other than to set them jangling.  Then the 
sweet odalisque rises with a start, snatches whatever first comes to hand in the 
melee of her boudoir (our cranium), wraps it around her, and-almost 
unrecognizable-flees from us to other people.  But how well constituted she must 
be, how healthily built, to step in such a way among them, contorted, rattled, and 
yet victorious, captivating!’ 
Benjamin, Walter (1978:480) 
Although African American literature is classed as being written by 
Americans of African descent who reside in the United States of America, it is 
widely accepted among commentators that its beginnings are not to be found in 
Africa: its ‘recent vintage’, neither ‘pressed on the African continent nor bottled 
during the slave era’ (Warren 2011:1).  Rather, to follow the gist of this point of 
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view, it is considered a ‘postemancipation phenomenon’ that developed and 
cohered within ‘a social order’ which lawfully sanctioned decades of ‘violence and 
intimidation.’  Not only one sanctioned in law, but ‘buttressed’ by ‘scholars, 
scientists, artists, and writers’ as well as ordinary citizens (1).  However, in this 
reasoning, we would have a literature which is the product of a context from which 
it had been shunned and marginalized.  This can only make sense if we consider 
its motivation as simply a protest at being marginalized by the controlling forces 
and institutions of that order. 
As a phenomenon, Warren likens African American writing to an 
‘undertaking’ defined by the system of ‘Jim Crow’ segregation; and the legal 
demise of that system corresponded, ‘imperceptibly’, with the ‘erosion’ of African 
American literature as a coherent enterprise (2).  Such an historical framing is 
possible only in a concentration on events and their contextual situation.  
Nevertheless, a literature, seeking to express in human terms the human 
consequences of segregation, is not confined, in selecting its subject matter, to any 
period; neither should it be defined as writing out of a period: that is, that its 
motivation is that period and its powerful institutions.  The point to be made here is 
that African American literature, whose form and subject matter are chosen by the 
author, strives to express a singular knowledge derived from an understanding of 
the causes and effects of the injustices arising from prejudice and marginalization.  
In this sense, it is able to be expressed as a personal projection of a 
consciousness which is not the result of a certain set of events or situations, but 
one derived from a human understanding of the human condition in relation to 
those events.  ‘The work’s truth content is the more relevant the more 
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inconspicuously and intimately it is bound up with its subject matter’ (Benjamin 
1924-25:10), and the consciousness we speak of fulfils this intimacy because, in 
Morrison’s hands particularly, it is a projection of a knowledge present within the 
limitations of subordination, which is the novel’s subject matter, and the reactions 
of a human being in relation to that matter.  It is the projection of knowledge 
suffocated in an intimate relation with slavery and the positioning of the human 
subject in relation to that. 
‘My evolution in consciousness about being black in the world is my first 
thematic level’.  These are the words of Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1995:111), and 
they refer to ‘the specialness’ for him ‘of black culture when no white people are 
around’ (109).  He is referring to the intimacy of family life, its secrets and 
revelations, and its imitation in his writings in order to express a sense of self that 
has, as its bottom line, ‘myself’ (109).  It is the private and personal memoir of a 
human being’s development within the bounds of family and community life.  
Nonetheless, he records the risks of ‘lifting the family veil’ and telling not only its 
secrets but also its ‘racial and ethnic secrets’ too (109).  We can speculate that 
these are classified because they are vulnerable to an interpretation from outside 
and their classification as racial traits, and as applicable to all black families and 
black individuals.  Frederickson comments that ‘the consciousness of race as a 
basis of personal identity...is difficult to eliminate’, because, ‘so deeply rooted in the 
white psyche...it often seems impervious to rational argument’ (1972:331-2).  Not 
only rational argument, but in this case, can the vital and personal consciousness, 
which emerges in Gates’s writing, withstand the revelatory risks taken in the 
interests of writing the truth of his own consciousness?  They are grist to the mill 
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for a controlling white society whose perception is that the black individual is the 
representation and expression of the traits of the mass. 
We can begin to see in Gates’s writing a shift in emphasis from that which 
Warren describes as an erosion of African American literature consequent on the 
demise of the ‘Jim Crow’ system. Warren seems unwilling to conceive of a 
framework that is not reliant on a single period in time and whose motivations lie 
elsewhere.  Gates implies that the context for his writing is his family and 
community.  However, it must also be considered as the vehicle of his choice for 
expressing a consciousness which is readily understood by and associative with 
other African Americans.  As such, it is writing that emanates from a chosen 
situation, one where there are no white people, but one defined by an outside, 
debilitating force.  Consequently, similar to the subordination of the ‘Jim Crow’ 
years, its subject matter is primed in a void, in exclusion; and because of this its 
content risks being defined by its need to sideline white culture, and in this it 
cannot avoid the juxtaposition of exclusion and subordination with the family life of 
African Americans.  The crux of the matter is that the consciousness which Gates 
wishes to express as private and personal cannot maintain its isolation as it 
emerges into a wider context.  It will be constantly impinged upon by the shadow of 
the controlling society standing over it, and its context defined by the exclusionary 
powers of the controlling majority.  And this is where Warren’s enquiries begin: 
African American writing as cohesive only in the context of its protestations and in 
its telling of its own subordination.  However, we argue that the essence of African 
American writing is the coherence and cohesion it demonstrates in its efforts to 
express its human sensibilities in the contextual unreality provided by a controlling 
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society.  This is a method of writing whose content reduces the events of its time to 
the effects they have on human beings. That is, to what ‘the writer makes of them’ 
in the effort to imbue them with ‘human value’ (Ellison 1972:145): a situation where 
the preference of the author is to select events rather than writing out of them.  And 
the more striking these events, and the more they jar on the perceptions of the 
reader, the more useful they are as the vehicle for the ‘transfiguration’ of the ‘futile 
elements of the real’ (Arendt 1999:11).  In contrast with Gates’s development of a 
themed consciousness in the absence of white people, the point of view taken in 
this thesis is that, as a result of ‘watching and interpreting the historical process 
that brings about such magical transfiguration’ (Arendt:11), Morrison projects a 
consciousness into dramatic time in order to present a black consciousness within 
a society controlled by white people.        
The sense being sought here is of a literature which is not seeking to 
express personal experience of intimidation and subordination at the hands of 
white people, or knowledge of the intimidation of loved ones or acquaintances or 
deceased relatives, including, importantly, those distant relatives known or thought 
to have been slaves.  Because it is literature written from outside the source of its 
intimidation, its words will seek to be framed within an ‘unmolested language’ 
which cannot risk being discredited in blaming or in the hubris of ‘a self-ravaged 
tongue’ (Morrison 1993:187).  At the very beginning of Morrison’s novel Beloved 
(2004 [1987]), before the foreword written by her and before the text, a whole page 
is given over to four words, ‘Sixty Million and more’.  These words refer to the 
people who lost their lives to slavery.  Their significance as a memorial is increased 
in light of Morrison’s comments concerning Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address: 
30 
 
he ‘refused’ she says ‘to encapsulate the reality of 600,000 dead men’, and in 
‘refusing to monumentalize...his words signal deference to the uncapturability of 
the life it mourns’ (Morrison 1993:186-7).  And if we juxtapose the sixty million and 
more with Morrison’s comments on Lincoln’s address, her meaning becomes 
apparent in her choice of life and not lives: there is no reality which can 
encapsulate sixty million dead, but the destruction of life itself is to be mourned.  
‘Language can never pin down slavery...nor should it’ because ‘its force, its felicity 
is in its reach toward the ineffable’ (187), its reach toward the dignity and sanctity 
of life.  We can say that the real juxtaposition is the encapsulation of life within the 
context of subordination.  However, the challenge for Morrison’s language is to 
avoid any link between the two: the motivations for slavery and prejudice must 
remain elsewhere if the language is to retain its felicity. 
 The reason for this language of appropriate expression can be examined in 
Morrison’s (1993) story, in her Nobel Lecture, of the transportation of slaves from 
the auction house to their new master’s plantation.  Their journey in an open 
wagon is halted at an inn while the ‘driver and his mate’ eat and rest inside.  
Eventually, a boy and girl emerge and give the slaves bread, meat, warm cider; 
and ‘a look’, and the slaves ‘look back’ (190).  The framing of the ‘look’ in this story 
is reminiscent of Benjamin’s ‘little hunchback’ (1968), who is always present when 
something is dropped, spilt or broken.  For the child, the ‘hunchback’ of the nursery 
rhyme is the cause of things crashing to the floor and the mess at the child’s feet, 
because the child has looked at him.  However, for the adult Benjamin, he is 
changed into simply the observer and not the sign or instigator of misfortune: the 
debris at the child’s feet is the misfortune.  For, ‘anyone whom the little man looks 
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at pays no attention; not to himself and not to the little man.  In consternation he 
stands before a pile of rubble at his feet’ (1968 cited in Arendt 1999:12).  Inflicted 
by misfortune, the self and the observer are forgotten as the individual surveys the 
chaos of his situation, the mess which surrounds him.  The boy and girl who tend 
to the slaves have stepped from the ‘light’ of the inn into the darkness of the wagon 
full of slaves.  The context is one of intimidation and subordination, but also of the 
unknown.  The look in this sense is a look of enquiry, of observation, and in the 
context of the wagon, it is the effort to understand the mystery of blackness.  The 
look back is simply that: a response uncomprehending of a dogma whose primacy 
is the cause of so much misery, and a response not in any sense blaming of itself.  
Although surrounded by misery, the look and the look back evoke, respectively, a 
detachment indicative of the extent to which society’s myths control its individuals; 
and a detachment able to reject any sense of connection with an incomprehensible 
context: one transfixed in the light of its own superiority, and the other dismayed by 
its situation.  This contrast between light and darkness ensures that the dignity of 
life is preserved in its contemplation of the rubble at its feet.  Unconcerned with 
itself, that self remains inviolate and separate from the rubble.  This is the sense 
inherent in an unmolested language which can only speak of intimidation as 
intimidation, and not of intimidation of itself if it is to preserve its dignity.  It must 
remain consistent in its occupation of the space it opens up between lives and life.   
 Commenting on the work of James Baldwin and Toni Morrison, Anna 
Kerchy points out that the creative processes in these authors’ works are able to 
‘transgress conventional discourse’ and go ‘beyond the ideologically prescribed 
subject position’ (2006:58).  Their processes provide an escape ‘from the prison 
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house of language’ in order to avoid the usual ‘subject-in-process’ development 
(58).  Consequently, the subject of Kerchy’s insight is already formed in his own 
position because of his isolation in his concentration on the chaos around him.  His 
position is formed in his helplessness and in his consternation at his situation.  
Those who look are the creators of the debris, and those who look back come to 
know it.  And their transition from object to subject is achieved in Morrison’s 
unmolested language because, finally, the object will become subjective in an 
understanding of the truth of his position in a white environment.  Their look 
provides Morrison’s subject with the quality of being a person but that quality, 
isolated in silence, is not enough to change his situation.  Morrison’s reason for this 
is that, being the darkness, her characters risk playing the mythical roles assigned 
to them by the controlling power.  In order to remain separate from the myth, that 
is, not be defined by it, she must write her characters a consciousness which is not 
a result of isolation or protestations, but one which has adapted to its isolation.  
Unmolested language is language for the conception of the individual’s own 
subjectivity.  
 Although Walter Benjamin is not normally associated with race and slavery, 
his use of imagery and allegory is applicable to Morrison’s search for an 
unmolested language.  The depth and scope of the allegorical concept in 
Benjamin’s contemplations become accessible if we consider his flaneur, 
sandwichman, gambler and whore as dialectical images which, although being 
individual images for contemplation, are simply ‘incarnations’ of the prototype 
image which set the allegorical intention in motion (Buck-Morss 1991:306).  The 
commodity as an allegorical object is prominent in Benjamin’s thinking and 
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illustrative of the emptiness he perceived at the heart of modernity.  Whether we 
view the commodity form as the symbol of the separation of human labour from its 
production of the ever same, or as its transformation into ‘the souvenir and 
collector’s item,’ Benjamin’s point is that, as object, the commodity is ‘not a 
metaphor for...emptiness’.  Rather, as allegory, it stands ‘for what the commodity 
has made out of the experiences that people...have’ (cited in Buck-Morss 
1991:188-9): the commodity as affecting ‘the most basic biological drives’ (Buck-
Morss 1991:188).  This means that Benjamin’s allegorical vision has rendered 
personal experience a commodity, the commodity as the source of emptiness.  The 
flaneur is closely involved with this empty time of modernity.  Although he can look 
through the glass roofs of the arcades at the moon and stars, he is unmistakably 
inside, and his reactions to the crowds are as commodified as theirs.  And at this 
point, and as the allegorical image degrades, the sandwich man replaces the 
flaneur.  As the flaneur circulates his commodified views in writing or in actions, he 
becomes a purveyor, a conduit, for the commodified experience of modernity.  In 
Benjamin’s terms, he becomes one of ‘the strewn implements with which allegory 
has so disfigured and mauled the material world that only fragments remain as 
objects of contemplation’ (cited in Buck-Morss 1991:188).  Hence, the flaneur now 
advertises, as the sandwich man, the benefits of his commodified experience to the 
masses he lives with.  Disfigured and mauled, the flaneur becomes ‘the first to fall 
victim to that which has since blinded many millions’ (Buck-Morss 1991:307).  As 
the incarnation of the flaneur, the sandwich man now peddles as real the myths 
garnered from his observations.  However, as a fitting example of the allegoric in 
Benjamin’s dialectic images, the sandwich man undergoes a further change.  In a 
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disturbing image, he appears escorted by storm troopers in a Munich street 
carrying the sign, ‘I am a Jew, but I have no complaint about the Nazis’ (312: 
image 9.25).  Having undergone a further metamorphosis, the flaneur is now 
‘advertising the state’, and acknowledging as normal the corrupting power of a 
controlling majority.  In following a society’s transition from its absorption in 
consumer capitalism to its immersion in a ‘political phantasmagoria’ (312), 
Benjamin’s images, degrading ceaselessly into fragments, are now emotive ‘less of 
new political possibilities than of recurring political dangers’ (304). 
 Morrison’s recourse in her tale is the provision of a character marginalised 
by an overbearing culture for no reason other than ideology.  In order to do this she 
conjures events from the past, but always with the present in mind.  Although ‘the 
flaneur’s object of inquiry is modernity itself’ (304), his projection from the past, as 
collaborator with the present of modernity, is allegorical in that, in Benjamin’s 
words, ‘he takes the concept of being-for-sale for a walk’ (cited in Buck-Morss 
1991:306).  The images discussed above, in this sense,  must be thought of as 
conducive to the ideal reality of the present time in which the past is complicit.  
They are not to be thought of as causes, because ideology is not a context but a 
state of mind; and the allegorical, in its effect on the realm of thoughts in dramatic 
time, is, we argue, Morrison’s method for juxtaposing the concept of an isolated 
consciousness with the concept of white superiority.  Her images originate in the 
past in order to join up with themselves in the present.  Their presentation, as 
shadows of their former selves in the dramatic time of the present, marks the cost 
to the individual of living in that present, and severs dramatic time from history and 
its contextual situations. 
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 The shifting emphases, brought about by the changing images of the 
flaneur, have resulted in the reduction of an apparent knowing individual into one, 
not only embroiled in that which he thought himself apart, but also active in 
promoting it.  The boy carrying a lamp and a jug of warm cider in Morrison’s story 
‘will have a gun in three years’ (Morrison1993:190), and in this we sense the 
movement of the allegorical image which undermines the unity established in 
young white children caring for those oppressed by their elders.  If we think of the 
symbol as having a ‘natural significance’ in that it evokes ‘eternal truths’, and holds 
‘certain values as natural...and as having an essential, unchanging existence’ 
(Tambling 2010:16-17), then we can say that the allegorical image destroys the 
totality presented by the symbol.  The ideology that is present in the performance 
of the white children outside the inn is exposed as the ideas and values with which 
their society has awarded itself.  Far from natural, their actions appear stilted and 
affected, and framed elsewhere.  
 Here we are consciously aware of the powerful and insidious presence of a 
cultural performance whose significance is its failure to recognise the humanity of 
those it enslaves.  The look into the eyes of the slaves which communicates 
nothing preserves the slave’s isolation.  Not only that, Morrison’s representations of 
white power, the two children, exhibit an ability to differentiate whose meaning is 
not grasped ‘in relation to some un-said or polysemy’ (Bhabha 2005:186), but in its 
relation to a power which is not present.  As such, white power is caught outside its 
historical signification, ‘outside the hermeneutic of historicism’ (186).  The symbol 
cannot work here because, stripped of its eternal truths and natural significance, 
white power degrades and becomes exposed to Morrison’s allegory.  In its role as 
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authority with no reason, the image of the children renders white society 
meaningless other than in its own ideology.  Tambling (2010) describes the 
allegorical in this situation as ‘the ruin of thoughts which think themselves whole 
and entire...self existent’ (119).  This means that any idea of a totality disappears 
leaving behind the allegorical image as a fragment of the former whole.  In 
opposition to the fusion of the ‘object, or the emotion, and its representation’ (120) 
in the symbol, in the allegorical image ‘any one thing can represent any other, no 
special unique value can be given to either the object or its representation’ (120).  
As with the degraded image of the flaneur, and thoughts of a progressive modern 
society as a narratable story, the values white society has accumulated for itself 
over time become incomplete and unsustainable within the original idea.  Because 
of Benjamin’s flaneur and Morrison’s image of the white children, modernity and 
white superiority can no longer occupy the places we constructed for them in our 
thoughts. 
 The importance of the allegorical image for our argument is its ability to 
reduce a given unity to a fragment of its former self.  This is central in Morrison’s 
intent to produce writing whose form, in its mastery of the narrative, has the 
capability ‘to shape an untenable reality, mould it, sing it’ from ‘a knowing so deep 
it’s like a secret’ (Morrison 2008:32). Morrison has said that ‘slavery and silence’ 
are ‘hell’s twins’, and we can say this describes  precisely the situation of the slave 
in her story, and the writer whose task is to give voice to the untenable reality of 
the human being enslaved.  In Morrison’s story the slave is the individual she has 
chosen as the conduit through which to develop a language incapable of being 
molested by any controlling majority.  Her slave is juxtaposed with an ideological 
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presentation of white superiority in order to present to the imagination the hidden 
consciousness of the slave.  She has chosen a framework in which silence 
registers human sensibilities in the presence of fragmented whiteness.  Morrison 
registers this discourse as so ‘devastating that “civilisation” could not risk engaging 
in it lest it lose the ground it stomped.  All claims to prescience disintegrate when 
and where that discourse takes place’ (32).  This suggests that the ground of white 
superiority is vulnerable to the formation of a consciousness whose form is 
maintained in the isolation forced upon it.  It is becoming evident that should this 
silence be broken by the slave expressing a sense of her humanity, what would be 
deemed an equivalence, she would, by speaking the unspeakable, risk 
fragmenting the wholeness that silence affords her.  Here we are seeing Morrison 
establishing the beginnings of her language that will resist contextualization.  
Addressing female black artists she says that the devastating power of this 
language is to be found ‘in your silence’ (32).   Apart from the danger, then, it is in 
silence that the artist can become ‘the touchstone by which all that is human can 
be measured’ (33).  We understand by this that humanity is to be preserved in 
silence, because in the slave’s silence, the artist finds the means to fragment 
whiteness. 
 We are engaged here in an interpretation of a literary method which draws 
on the enforced silence of slaves, and the consequent inability to express their 
worth.  Because of this silence and its accompanying isolation, this method is able 
to formulate an understanding, a knowing, of the false premise of white superiority.  
It is this knowing which provides Morrison with the framework with which to 
establish a fully fledged human being whose humanity is self-evident in dramatic 
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time in the context of her silence.  This framework, we argue, is the key in 
achieving the unmolested language of which Morrison speaks.  However, it can 
only remain so in silence, because its secret is unspeakable.  This means that in 
not engaging with any given context, that is white ground, the unity achieved 
between knowing and humanness in the slave can be preserved in a symbol and 
referred to as a given, providing meaning and validation to that which the language 
wishes to give visual form.  Drawing on the experience of the slaves’ inability to 
express their humanity under subordination, Morrison has woven the reality of 
slavery into the untenable reality of an individual consciousness under slavery. 
 However, because this reality is untenable, it can never be presented other 
than symbolically, and the unity on which it relies cannot exist in anything other 
than silent isolation.  In this situation it fulfils Morrison’s need for a language which 
gestures towards the ineffable, avoiding the arrogant pinning down of slavery.  
Nevertheless, in emphasizing life over a life, and the effect of slavery on the silent 
individual, the consciousness of the slave becomes representative of life; its 
presence in silence.  In this situation the presence of humanity achieves ideal 
status in opposition to the degraded image of the fragment.  However, in the words 
of Lawrence Danson (1998) ‘a new oppositional meaning can only be 
accomplished by keeping the old meaning in circulation’ (3).  This would imply that 
Morrison’s language would be of little use in a setting other than the past, because 
the theme would always be slavery.  If there is no slavery, the question becomes 
not, as in Williamson’s terms, what is there now to write about, but rather in what 
framework or form can the knowledge and humanity of African Americans be 
expressed?  Morrison already stands accused of perpetuating black history as a 
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slave history (see Chapter 3 of this thesis), and thereby of weakening the unity of 
diverse peoples obtained in the notion of a shared past.  Briefly, here, this is 
unacceptable for the artist and citizen whose compensation is membership at a 
price not of their choosing.  We should reiterate here that Morrison’s recourse to 
the past is for the conception, the mental representation, of a human being who 
has become enslaved.  She requires this conceptual image in order to make up the 
fabric of the present of dramatic time.  We can understand this in the present if we 
remember that her characters came to slavery as human beings, and remained 
human beings as they became defined within their roles as slaves.  We have here 
been discussing Morrison’s method for fending off that definition, and now we are 
able to conceive of life confronted with enslavement.    
 However, blackness as a representation of humanity is the measure of the 
many because it is framed in opposition to that which it displaces, whiteness.  Its 
strength is in its idealized separation from the situation of its present moment.  If 
this symbol is to retain its self-evident humanity outside the slave narrative, and 
white signification, then it must make the transition from the measure of the many 
to that of the individual.  This is a necessity because the fragment of whiteness 
evident in Morrison’s story cannot survive in a context where it is disowned by 
white people, that is, in a context of its telling where slavery no longer exists.  
Margaret Mead confronts James Baldwin (1971) with just such an argument when 
she tells him, ‘I will not accept responsibility for what other people do because I 
happen to belong to that nation or that race or religion.  I do not believe in guilt by 
association’ (225).  Baldwin’s argument is that the past and present are the same, 
that is, human behaviour is not concomitant with the changing events which 
40 
 
surround it.  This means that human behaviour is responsible for events and not 
that the events elicit human responses: ‘I am an American citizen, and the crimes 
of this Republic, whether or not I am guilty of them, I am responsible for’ (225).  
Baldwin’s position is to engage with life as a mass noun, and in so doing he 
demonstrates an individual response while promoting a collective awareness.  On 
the one hand we have Baldwin’s ability to recognise the presence of the past in the 
present, and on the other Mead’s individual dissociation from a collective 
awareness although expressing a tacit relationship with it.  The contradictions we 
sense in both responses are an indication of the complexity surrounding the 
individual’s relationship with past events.  As an African American, Baldwin exhibits 
a profound and intense understanding of the barbarism absorbed into the fabric of 
the society with which he must engage (Gikandi:2014).  However, within this 
engagement, his knowledge is evidence of his dissociation from that view of the 
past which, ‘in the name of progress’, renders the outrages of the past as ‘historical 
norms’ (Benjamin 1999:249).  Similarly, Mead’s refusal to accept guilt by 
association is an indication of a strong denial on her part of her society’s ability to 
assimilate the wrongs of the past. 
 However, if we claim that Mead is a product of her society, that is, that her 
ideals have been framed and tested within its framework, then we must also say 
that Baldwin is a by-product of it.  As an educated white woman Mead would be 
sure of her ground and the forces and traditions open to her progression within that 
society, but, as an educated African American, Baldwin would never be sure of his 
acceptance or of his access to those same traditions.  In this juxtaposition we 
become aware of the subtle differences between them in their attitudes towards the 
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past and their relative positions in the present time.  Mead’s view of the past can 
be conceived within her determination to reject that part of her society which is not 
representative of her value base.  As such, she expects Baldwin to feel the same.  
However, as a by-product of her society his perceptions are as a result of an 
intimate knowledge of those forces rejected by his friend.  His individual awareness 
is not the result of being one of the collective but of having survived that collective, 
and of knowing its true colours.  Contrastingly, Mead’s perspective is framed in her 
opposition to the forces at work in her society which means she has become the 
datum for her own values.  And their conversation convolves around this particular 
datum, which is the measure by which the individual is able to absorb the barbaric 
into perceptions of a progressive timeline which leads to the civilization of the 
present.  The moral certainty on view in this position can never change the 
situation from which it derives its motivations, and nor is it meant to.  It only 
requires that you agree with it.  And because of this, it requires of Baldwin his 
acceptance into the scheme of things, that is, his commitment to a moral certainty, 
and a conception of history which feeds it.  Notwithstanding that this would go 
against the grain of an individual consciousness gained elsewhere, immersion in 
such a culture, which may reject him anywhere and everywhere if it chooses, 
would be further evidence for him of the value of the ‘unique experience with the 
past’ his consciousness affords him (Benjamin 1999:254).  This means that 
Baldwin has not bought into the moral certainty lodged in the scheme of things in 
the present.  He is aware that the claims for it are framed as constituting a political 
achievement, and as such tempt him to disregard, in Benjamin’s words, his 
‘enslaved ancestors’ and instead rely on an image of enlightened, ‘liberated 
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grandchildren’ (252).  However, Baldwin’s understanding of his situation is an 
understanding of his ancestors’ situation.  For him, time is not progress.   Now that 
slavery is over, and whiteness has recovered a unity of purpose in opposition to its 
former fragmented self, Baldwin appears as the individual consciousness able to 
question that unity.  He is the example for this introduction of that which Morrison’s 
language seeks to express.  And it must be an individual in order to express that 
which has been taken from the individual by slavery.  A loss of universal proportion 
brought about in an individual consciousness: a conception of life outside the 
influence of white signification. 
 Stephen Greenblatt (2017), in relation to his interpretation of the Merchant 
of Venice, has spoken of the insistence by a society that those people considered 
as outsiders or different should embrace the framework and nuances of the culture 
in which they find themselves.  However, outside the demarcations of law and 
human rights, he says, ‘there is no assumption of shared values, and no presumed 
equality’ (38).  In this case, assimilation into a dominant society appears to require 
a concerted effort to be the same while being considered as alien.  Shakespeare’s 
plays, he points out, offer us ‘the possibility of an escape from the mental ghettos 
most of us inhabit.’  He is referring to ‘the conferral of life’ as one of ‘the essential 
qualities of the human imagination’ (39), achieved by Shakespeare in his 
formulation of his characters.  The quality of life of which he speaks ‘is to some 
degree democratically shared’ (39), and by that we understand that each individual 
is aware of that quality as a prerequisite for being fully and recognisably human.  
The reason why our ability to enter into the experience of another ‘is often limited’, 
he says, is ideology, and Shakespeare’s plays, although not offering ‘practical 
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solutions to the dilemmas they so brilliantly explore, awaken our awareness of the 
human lives that are at stake’ (39).  The effect is that ‘in dramatic time, the distance 
between native and stranger collapses; walls wobble and fall; a ghetto is razed’ 
(39).  Because it is in dramatic time that walls wobble and ghettos are raised, and 
that ideology is the reason we cannot enter into the experience of another, then 
dramatic time is the site of the artist’s engagement with ideology, that which 
‘persuades men and women to mistake each other, from time to time, for gods or 
vermin’ (Eagleton 1991:xiii).  If ideology is a system of beliefs, ideals, and ideas 
embraced by a group or individuals, and responsible in the first place for the 
subordination of other human beings, the extent to which it persists as the 
framework through which the outsider’s assimilation is conducted will render 
assimilation as simply a progressive, controlling, ideological exercise. 
 The framework of which we speak is that cultural place of deep-seated 
underlying assumptions that provides ideology with its identification as discursive 
human truth.  The suspicion is that the outsider will be assimilated into a system 
which, in its responsibility for the demise of outsiders, will continue to protect its 
assumptions by acknowledging them as those particular truths relevant to ‘the 
frozen world of idealist and essentialist categories’ which render them self-evident 
(Bennet 1979:169-70).  The outsider, we can say, is perceived as belonging to a 
category which is defined, to some extent, by its lack of those criteria which the 
controlling majority has awarded itself.  The ability to differentiate gains its authority 
simply from the augmentation of its own values and ideals in private.  The 
contradiction here is that, although the outsider is recognisably more human than 
stranger in that he shares in the artistic embodiment of the universally recognised, 
44 
 
he is not able in his role to acquire any determinacy over the augmented values at 
work in the main group.  This is because those deep-seated human truths not only 
define the group, but also the individuals that make it up.  They acquire their 
consistency in their particularization in each individual.  In the case of the isolated 
character, the abstract conceptions of universal thought never come to be 
particularized in him/her as sources of individual purpose because he/she is not a 
member of the group.  There is no situation afforded in dramatic time sufficient for 
their expression, as individuals, of the unity of thought and deed available in that 
place occupied by their detractors, and so they remain isolated. 
 In a similar vein to Mead’s rejection of guilt by association, Keith Byerman 
(2005) discusses Morrison and her novel Beloved as either the proof of her belief 
‘that the past can be manipulated to one’s own ends’ or, conversely, ‘that the past 
is so powerful that one has no responsibility for the present’.  He argues that ‘the 
first of these positions is taken by whites generally, and by black conservatives’.  
The second, he points out, is the ‘mainstream position’ in that ‘the past has little 
meaning other than as a commodity’, and, consequently, is ‘a separate reality from 
the present’. With this in mind he is able to sum up mainstream opinion as 
believing that ‘whites do not have responsibility for what occurred in some distant 
time’ (33).  Here we are hearing the familiar conclusion that the moral certainty of 
the present owes its existence to the elevated status of those who occupy it, and 
who exist in a progressive timeline of their own making.  Byerman acknowledges 
the phenomenon when he points to the American ‘grand narrative’ in which 
conceptions of prosperity and deprivation are understood within the framework of 
‘individual achievement in defiance of the odds’ (4).   
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 His point is that Morrison disrupts the narrative with a slave story, and the 
trauma associated with it, in order to prevent African Americans from being ‘caught 
within the dominant discourse’, and to undermine the perceptions through which 
the dominant culture regards itself.  Presenting ‘the past specifically as historical’ 
enables ‘present conditions’ to be seen as fundamentally different from those 
presented within the narratives of individual achievement.  And if American history 
can be understood as the promotion of black suffering on a huge scale, then 
‘success is as much the product of national denial of history as it is the result of 
individual effort’ (4).  However, the narrative to which Byerman draws our attention 
is an indication in itself that conceptions of individual achievement rely on a 
selective but specific history.  Nonetheless, if African Americans are considered 
different, despite, as Byerman says ‘a post-race national discourse’ in the present, 
then that difference ‘continues to exist as a definer of social reality’ (4). This 
reasoning regarding Morrison’s novel Beloved is sufficient to motivate Byerman in 
his research on the ways in which African American authors ‘manoeuvre through 
this discursive situation which potentially implicates them in black suffering’ (5).  
That is, African American narratives as the recreation of ‘endless black suffering’, 
and this conception of history serving as ‘the meaning of race in these fictions’ (6).  
In this reasoning, this is the price African American authors like Morrison pay for 
writing slavery as specifically a historical event.    
However, a selective history manifests the personal elevation of those who 
are responsible for that selection.  Those who are excluded from that history then 
become different, not, in Byerman’s view, because of exclusion, but because they 
simply offered an alternative to a selective history. Social reality, in this case the 
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dominant narrative, is a hidden false history sustained by a rejection of those 
people who are forced to live at its margins.  History is, then, the definer of social 
reality at the expense of the excluded, and not the excluded and their efforts to 
transcend it.  Those who revel in a social reality of their own making become 
entangled in notions of history because they are unable or unwilling to 
countenance the worth of those events they have rejected.  Morrison has called 
this, ‘the self-conscious but highly problematic construction of the American as a 
new white man’ (1992:39).  As a result of his sojourn in Paris, James Baldwin has 
criticized the formulation of American history, and articulated his perceptions of that 
history and his exclusion from it.  He is ‘assured’ he says, ‘by his country and 
countrymen that he has never contributed anything to civilization-that his past is 
nothing more than a record of humiliation gladly endured’ (1963:679).  This, then, 
is an example of the reading of the past usually offered to African Americans. 
However, Baldwin’s aim is to point out its false assumptions.  American history is 
nothing less than ‘the total, and unwilling, alienation of entire peoples from their 
forebears’ (1995:131).  He is referring to the history of the past lived on the 
American continent.  It is the past he blames for the ‘troubling role’ lived out by the 
American people, one that has created ‘an entirely unprecedented people’, who 
have turned away from their other past ‘irrecoverable on the shores of Europe’ 
(130).  The past lived out on the American continent is, then, only half the story.  It 
is a past which requires of its present a framework sufficient to embrace the events 
of five-hundred years ago, or those of fifty years ago, in the production of an 
identity.  Baldwin found that in Paris, the American student had nothing to sustain 
the idea of this unique past unless he embraced this other European past.  This 
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would bring to an end ‘the alienation of the American from himself’.  It is ‘from the 
vantage point of Europe’ that the American ‘discovers his own country’ (131).  In 
light of claims such as these, the sense is that artists such as Morrison, and their 
attempts to step outside the self-proclaimed cocoon of American history, will face 
the strongest criticism from those who are embedded in it.   The ‘conscious 
necessity for establishing difference’ (Morrison 1992;39), manifest in a selected 
history, must persist as long as that history’s progressive timeline holds sway.  The 
construction of difference is concomitant with the white construction of black 
subjectivity, a ‘fabrication of the African persona’ (17).  And in that prescribed 
subjectivity is to be ‘found not only the not-free, but also...the projection of the not-
me’ (38).             
In this context, and as ‘a writer in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century’, Morrison stresses the importance of writing the ‘interior life’ of the 
not-me (1987:191).  This exercise is critical, she says, ‘for any person who is 
black...for, historically, we were seldom invited to participate in the discourse 
even when we were its topic’ (191).  She points out that the precise problem 
with the ‘discourse that proceeded without us’ is the absence in it of any 
reference to the interior life of black people (192).  The idea that ‘no text is 
generated in some purely aesthetic realm’ (Byerman 2005:5), and the 
corresponding effort to place the production and interpretation of African 
American writing of the latter twentieth century within a context of present day 
ideological  and cultural elements, is sharply undermined by Morrison.  
Byerman’s statement that ‘Morrison...cannot be understood as a writer who 
stands outside her historical moment and produces transcendent works of 
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literature’ is, indeed, an argument levelled at many authors.  However, to 
suggest that ‘she must’, consequently, ‘use the discourse available’ (7) jars 
with her own experience of being, historically and currently, left out of it.  We 
understand from this that the topic, whose concern is the context for literary 
production, in this case excludes the artist and replaces her with someone 
who is recognisable only within the parameters of the discourse available.  In 
her contemplations of the not-me, Morrison has delivered an insight into the 
obsessions with the social realities of the present of those who are most 
intimately bound up with their complexities.  And in her exclusion, she can 
clearly see how the search, within the present, for a unified answer to the 
vagaries resultant of a selective past, is detrimental to her quality of life.  
Byerman has pointed out that no text is generated in some purely 
aesthetic realm; rather it is the product and producer of the discursive 
systems and social realities of the time (2005:5).  However, in opposition to 
this, we are able to point out that ‘works of art are ways in which the ideal of 
the philosophical problem makes itself manifest’ (Benjamin 1919-20a:218).  
Social realities in this case provide the complexity out of which the ideal is 
conceived.  The ideal in this sense is not manifest in the ability of the art work 
to solve the complexity of social reality, but rather conceived in the 
‘transcendent content of its solution’, provided by the artist: ‘the concept that it 
possesses a unified answer to the problem’ (218).  This means that the social 
realities of any context can be perceived as providing the vehicle which 
contains the truth of the artist’s intent.  The artist’s provision of the content to 
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be transcended, social reality, contains the truth which in the artist’s hands 
will become universally recognisable in the present.   
Benjamin is saying that the artist must deal with the unreality of our 
reality in order to bring to that reality the concept of a unified answer, an ideal 
answer, to the problem which is the content of her novel: ‘a work of art is the 
virtual possibility of the formulation of its contents as a philosophical 
problem’(218).  He is pointing out that ‘every great work has its siblings in the 
realm of philosophy’ (219).  We take our meaning for this from his observation 
that ‘the philosophical problem can be discovered in every work of art’ (218).  
This would mean that the realm of philosophy is the harmonizing influence 
under which works of art and their siblings achieve a sense of the ideal in 
relation ‘to certain authentic philosophical problems’ (218).  The conceptions 
of the philosophical realm become available to the senses through the artist’s 
ability to transcend the content used for the solution of the problem.  It is not 
‘the immanent form of the problem’ (218) in the chosen content that provides 
the unity of the ideal, but the transcendence of the content chosen to provide 
the solution to the problem.  We argue that the argument concerning the role 
of ideology and cultural elements in the production and reception of texts has 
become fixated on interpreting the formulation of the content of the problem, 
and not the artist’s aesthetic in transcending her chosen content.  This means 
that the ideologies of race, superiority, and selective histories are considered 
the means by which to investigate their own norms.          
In juxtaposition to the claim that she writes out of her time, that is ‘the 
patterns of the past quarter century that have shaped African American narrative 
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practice’ (Byerman 2005:5), Morrison’s perceptions of this period are quite 
different.  ‘I...am deadly serious about fidelity to the milieu out of which I write and 
in which my ancestors actually lived’ (1987:192), she writes.  Here, she registers 
her commitment to writing out of the social environment of her ancestors and her 
own imagination.  ‘Infidelity to that milieu-the absence of the interior life’ (192), is, 
at heart, an obsession with the social realities of the present.  Morrison is succinct 
concerning the effort to critique her work within the context of when and where it 
was written.  It is, she says, the ‘oh yes, this is where she got it from school’, which 
then derives ‘its own credibility from excavating the credibility of the sources of the 
imagination’ (193).  It is pressing here to link the credibility, or otherwise, of the 
sources to the need to establish their meaning within the discourse resultant of a 
selected history.  Morrison will then fit the subjectivity prescribed within the 
available discourse.  For her, it is ‘the nature of the imagination’ (193) that is able 
to facilitate her access to the inner life of her characters and to the milieu out of 
which she writes.  In addition, it provides an intensely personal response to the 
remains which still linger among her recollections of the milieu she has chosen.  
Already outside the historically created moment in time, it is her personal response 
to the construction, in the present time, of the not me, and to a social discourse, 
existing within a system of appraisal, that must believe that her history has no 
place within that discourse other than as an indication of difference.  In this sense, 
Morrison’s recourse to writing an interior life that is not recognized within the social 
realities and discursive practices of her time bears on those realities as ‘the 
articulation of culture at the point of its erasure’, making ‘a nonsense of culture 
itself’ (Bhabha 2005:189). 
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Bhabha describes this discourse as ‘the production of multiple and 
contradictory belief’; and as an indication of ‘two contradictory and independent 
attitudes’ inhabiting ‘the same place’.  It is in this place, we argue, in ‘the 
enunciatory moment of multiple belief’ (188), that the formulation of what Morrison 
describes as the not me takes place.  In the context of Morrison’s novel Beloved, 
we recognise the ambivalence manifest in the articulation of contradictory beliefs 
concerning who is human and worthy, and who is human and unworthy.  
Additionally, the ambivalence present in the critique of Morrison’s writing is 
noticeable in the claims that her conception of history, the milieu out of which she 
writes, serves as the meaning of race; that the present moment confirms the 
superiority of those individuals who reflect the ideals they have awarded it, while 
invalidating the marginalized as representatives and symptomatic of the 
undesirable shortcomings of race; that human suffering be reduced to the vagaries 
of a historic moment, meaning its deselection; and that, because of this, the victims 
of that moment are defined in the present moment as responsible for that 
definition.  The human suffering at the heart of the matter becomes a little beside 
the point in the process of disavowal. 
The anxiety manifest in the need to articulate contradictory beliefs is 
described by Bhabha as the ‘ambivalence’ created ‘at the point of disavowal’ (188).  
Crucially, it is at this moment, that is, in the process of disavowal when the visibility 
of difference makes little sense, that ‘a strategy for the negotiation of the 
knowledges of differentiation’ is produced (189).  The ability to negotiate the forms 
of its own desires ‘is productive of powerful, if ambivalent, strategies of cultural 
authority and resistance’ (189), an authority based in cultural ambivalence, ‘never 
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the mere authority of its originality’ (197).  White ‘culture’ in this case is the master 
of a power which provides it with an identity at the expense of reality.  In a cultural 
mishmash, this identity is unable to be shared with those who provide it its 
justification for its strategies for normalizing its negotiations of difference.  Meaning 
grasped, ineffectually, in the ‘production of an authority to differentiate’ (186), and 
given voice in signification.  In making its own point, the discourse of the historic 
present, in its proximity to differentiation, is able to deliver the justifying, signifying, 
and normalizing strategies for the fulfilment of its own desires. The negotiations of 
difference, which make sense of contradictory beliefs, make ‘a non-sense of the 
disciplinary meanings of culture itself’ (189).  The dominant culture’s demands for 
imitation and identification now become areas of negotiation for the assimilation of 
conflict and the translation of ambivalence into normality; and what remains as the 
source of culture is simply a selective history which must be defended continually 
and at all costs in order to provide a backdrop to the negotiations of normality. 
Although Bhabha does not mention specifically the extent to which a 
selective history frames these negotiations, he does point out that they bring the 
individual ‘face to face with culture’s double bind-a certain slippage or splitting 
between human artifice and culture’s discursive agency’ (196).  We trace this to the 
fact that as a culture’s desires become the generalizations of normality, they 
become a little beside the point.  That is, ‘to be true to a self one must learn to be a 
little untrue, out-of-joint with the signification of cultural generalizability’ (196).  In 
the attempt to normalize contradictory beliefs, how far can the individual stray from 
the bulwarks to chaos he erected for himself as he comes to terms with his own 
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haphazard self; as he enunciates, not the authority of his culture’s originality, but 
an authority based in cultural ambivalence? 
At this point, where the results of power cannot keep up with themselves, 
and culture ‘can no longer guarantee to author its “human” subjects as the sign of 
humanness’ (195), the negotiator requires an object by which to calculate the 
extent to which his culture’s disciplinary meanings survive as he enunciates the 
strategies resultant on their erasure.  It is the point where cultural ambivalence 
steadies itself with the fabrications it weaves around those it has deselected from 
history’s selective timeline.  Their presence is now an indication and reminder of 
the disciplinary mimesis at the heart of the culture for whose membership they 
were found inadequate.  In their perceived lack, they become the permanent 
reminder of the existence of the superior and worthy qualities that their betters 
imagine they possess in their struggle to replicate those imagined qualities in 
‘culture’s discursive agency’ (196).  It is in this struggle that the not me appears 
and doubles as the unknowable definer of lack, and also as the sign of the longing 
for that certainty erased in culture’s double bind.  
The formulation of the not me becomes the depository for any signification 
the haphazard self wishes to apply as replacement for the loss of certainty it 
experiences.  The void in which the haphazard self operates becomes manageable 
as the nagging failure of its own artifice is erased by the perceived horrors inherent 
in the unknowable unworthy.  No matter how far this new self strays from the 
discourses of contradictory beliefs, it is confirmed in itself in its contemplation of the 
double of the not me.  We argue that in an interracial society such as that which 
reduces Morrison to the not me, the ability to assimilate conflicting beliefs is 
54 
 
dependent on the configuration and part incorporation of the object that is forced to 
live at its margins. 
For Bhabha, the ability of the controlling majority to signify lack in those it 
rejects emerges as the lie ‘that never speaks the whole truth’, but comes to be 
‘repeated endlessly’ in the name of the marginalized.  In these lies we find ‘the 
archaic survival of the “text” of culture’ (197), but lacking its originality.  And as 
such, as it strives to maintain a self outside its own negotiations for authority, it 
pleads ‘a partial incorporation’, one that ‘deprives the object of a part of its body in 
that its integrity may be attacked without destroying its existence’ (197).  We find 
this phenomenon in Beloved (Morrison 2004:321) as Sethe wonders whether the 
parts of her body will hold together.  It signals that ‘the existence of the disabled 
native is required for the next lie and the next and the next’ (Bhabha 2005:197-8).  
We would substitute the word signification in describing the perpetuation of the 
myth of lack as the haphazard self negotiates the changing forms of his society.  In 
Bhabha’s example (198) of Marlowe’s lie to the ‘Intended’ (Conrad 
1995[1899]:103), we find in her formal role a testament to a cultural significance 
which Marlowe’s lie reduces to ambivalence.  In the face of this lie she is 
representative of the archaic demands of culture, and not its original authority.  In 
Marlowe’s use of her name instead of the words of horror, we hear the negotiations 
of ambivalence seeking out a new authority.  Her intended role is erased to be 
replaced by whatever artifice he is able to negotiate.  His artifice confirms his 
requirement for the existence of the ‘Intended’ as the locator, though less worthy of 
earlier cultural demands, for an authority that has to be preserved if the haphazard 
self is to remain unconscious of its true situation as neither one thing nor the other: 
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although erased, her integrity, though a little beside the point, is preserved.  
Bhabha’s example of Marlowe as the ‘awkward, ambivalent, unwelcome truth of 
empire’s lie’ (198) underlines his argument for ‘the existence of the disabled native’ 
(197).  We take his substitution of the disabled ‘Intended’ for the disabled native as 
a clear indication of their representative roles as the palimpsest on which the 
significations of empire or cultural authority can be seen as that process of 
‘disavowal’ which ‘produces a strategy for the negotiation of difference’ (189).  
These negotiations signal a reduction in the certainty of their former role.  In the 
realm of negotiations of differentiation, they become defined in accord with 
culture’s diminishing, former authority.   
In this new discourse their definition belies their humanity.  They are able to 
say that the controlling power must be talking about someone else, not me.  
Conversely, disabled, they signify, within this discourse, the form of the next lie to 
be uttered in their detractor’s pursuit of an elusive authority on which to ground an 
elusive identity.  Signified as unworthy, the disabled native is also the not me that 
the controlling majority knows it must not become.  They become the sign of what 
must be avoided, the not-me datum for the haphazard self in its proximity to the 
negotiations of generalities.  As the facilitators of an archaic cultural authority, they 
become the ever-changing source of meaning in the discursive systems and social 
realities of a controlling culture at any given time.  They facilitate meaning, but are 
not themselves the product of it. In this context the discourse of the present 
moment is the impossible ground of ambivalence and artifice.  We can say that 
Morrison’s aim is to avoid the discourse which negotiates the replacement of 
imitation and identification with ‘knowledges’ of differentiation.  These negotiations 
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can only ever signal her part incorporation as the disabled native.  We understand 
Morrison’s declared intention to engage with the interior life of the not me as the 
decision to expose ‘a truth about the interior life of people’ living with the 
insinuations of differentiation (1987:193).  She acknowledges the power of 
signification in its ability to produce facts but not truth: ‘facts can exist without 
human intelligence,’ she says, ‘but truth cannot’ (193). 
Her statement is an indication of the extent to which the discursive systems 
of signification have become established as the substance of meaning.  The ability 
of signification to establish meaning at the expense of truth is because it takes 
place within negotiations of difference.  These negotiations in the discourse of the 
present moment are resonant of claims for the recognition of a desire which is now 
the subject of artifice.  As meaning wanes in the erasure of culture, old sensibilities 
survive as the foil for artifice.  Grounded now in ambivalence, these sensibilities 
become enthralled to facts, that is, the knowledge of differentiation.  It must be 
noted that an endless seeking for recognition of an identity that is neither one thing 
nor the other is the search for a truth that, if it once existed, no longer survives.  
Morrison is pointing out that signification is the replacement of truth in the name of 
artifice at the expense of independent thought. 
We view Morrison’s use of her aesthetic, in her approach to the formulation 
of an independent sensibility, as the provision for her access to the interior life.  
Regarding the writing of an independent sensibility outside signification, Morrison 
has said that as ‘a writer who is black and a woman’, her job, in the latter stages of 
the twentieth century, ‘becomes how to rip that veil drawn over proceedings too 
terrible to relate’ (1987:191).  In order to explain her motivation within the context of 
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African American writing, she gives examples of the use of first-person narrative in 
the slave narratives.  This is the strategy where the refusal to relate the detailed 
particulars of punishment or abuse preserves the dignity of the writer in the eyes of 
the reader: dignity achieved in the presence of recognisably human qualities in 
adversity.  Juxtaposed with this is an example of nineteenth-century writing which 
acquainted the public with the brutalism of slavery.  Maria Child is identified as a 
writer who is willing to draw the veil aside: she is known to have researched 
‘instances of slave abuse’ (Baym 1998:1718) which she inserted into Harriet 
Jacobs’s novel, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (2001[1861]) during the writing 
of its introduction and its editing.  However, for Morrison there is ‘no mention of the 
interior life’ (1987:191).  In each example, whether its theme is dignity or the 
revelation of atrocities, Morrison ‘finds the writer taking refuge in the literary 
conventions of the day’ (190).  She points out that this entails ‘shaping the 
experience to make it palatable to those who were in a position to alleviate it’ (191), 
and even those who were willing to draw the veil aside did so by appealing to the 
better natures of those careful of patriarchy’s hegemony: ‘my sisters in 
bondage,...are suffering wrongs so foul, that our ears are too delicate to listen to 
them’ (Child 2014[1861]:4). 
In Morrison’s examples we hear the conversations that were taking place 
with the controlling majority, and in which the narrative attempts to frame its appeal 
in a common reality.  However, this is a reality whose meanings are derived from 
signification, and as such, although ‘the narratives are instructive, moral and 
obviously representative’ (Morrison 1987:190), they remain an appeal on someone 
else’s terms.  W.H.Auden’s insight that, ‘the experience an artist attempts to 
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embody is of a reality common to all’ (2015:210), is instructive in the situation faced 
by Morrison.  The lack of any mention of an interior life can be understood in the 
difficulty these authors faced in relating their experiences free of signification.  
Their experiences can only ever relate to an oppressed group and, consequently, 
appear private to them.  In these terms, the perspective of these authors is, indeed, 
one that no one else can occupy in the sense of whom they address.  However, 
this perspective must be expressed in ‘complete detachment, as if it were 
somebody else’s’ (210).  This is not to say that this is a call for a factual account 
devoid of human sentiment.  Rather, it is a call for a human voice whose humanity 
is enhanced in speaking in no other terms and from no other perspective.  
Fractured by signification and confined to the margins as representative of a group, 
these voices must evoke images and memories consequent on the human 
condition: the somebody else is the intensely personal life of every human being.  
Consequently, in order to resonate in a group whose authority rests in 
differentiation, and equally, to nullify that authority, and in order for it not to account 
itself private in its claims, the interior life must embody the state of being 
recognisably human in dramatic time.  The job now, Morrison says, is ‘how to rip 
that veil’ (1987:191), and consequently, drawing aside the veil is now replaced with 
the sense that instead of revealing all, it becomes a matter of making a tear in the 
fabric of signification and differentiation in order to maintain a perspective whose 
significance emanates from somewhere other than the oppressed; somewhere 
where humanity exists despite what people say.  It is the indication of an aesthetic 
which is able to function outside the discourse of differentiation: a human 
perspective as the source of a common reality.  
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The integrity of her aesthetic requires that she trust her own recollections, 
but also ‘the recollections of others’ (191). This places her memory at the centre of 
her writing.  Clearly linked to the milieu out of which she writes, her memories are 
the product of ‘the material that went to make me’ she says (192).  Morrison’s 
aesthetic is closely allied with Auden’s belief that ‘the arts are chief means of 
communication with the dead’, and his personal view that ‘without communication 
with the dead, a fully human life is not possible’ (2017:BBC Documentary).  We 
seem face to face with the source of an identity whose intimate link with the past is 
outside the influence of the present moment and its priorities.  In the context of 
Auden and Morrison’s artistic presentations, we know who we are because our 
deeply personal life is honed by the fragments we remember of our immediate 
dead.  In light of this reasoning we are the owners of our own measure. 
Morrison’s recollections of her family and their friends and acquaintances 
provide her access to the interior life, and decide the method to be used to present 
the ‘truth about the interior life of people who didn’t write it’ (1987:193).  However, 
this will not provide ‘total access to the unwritten interior life of these people.  Only 
the act of the imagination can help...’  Access is ‘a kind of literary archeology’ (192) 
in that, on the basis of information gained and ‘a little bit of guesswork you journey 
to a site to see what remains were left behind’ (192).  The reconstruction of ‘the 
world that these remains imply’ calls for the act of imagination: the imagination 
being brought to bear on the image.  The nature of Morrison’s research begins with 
something ineffable and flexible: ‘a dimly recalled figure, the corner of a room, a 
voice’ (196).  These images are the remains retrieved from the milieu of memory, 
and the approach that is most productive and most trustworthy for Morrison ‘is the 
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recollection [memory] that moves from the image to the text’ (194)...: ‘the act of 
imagination...bound up with memory’ (198).  A human life expressed in human 
terms. 
In order to stress the importance of that move from the image to the text, 
and not from the text to the image, Morrison is clear that the event to be written 
about must not be the source of the image which remains.  That is, meaning 
derived from the event represented by the image.  Her novel Beloved is not an 
exploration into the images of slavery.  Her ‘route is the reverse.  The image comes 
first’ and tells her ‘what the memory is about’ through her imagination (1987:195).  
The remains, the memory, must remain ‘intact in their mystery’ (196) to provide 
free rein for the artist to reconstruct the milieu out of which she writes.  Morrison 
notes that the image of corn provides meaning in the text of her novel Beloved.  
Corn on the cob is the image for Morrison which ‘keeps coming back’ (197).  It is 
reminiscent of her parents working their own cornfield and the pleasure derived 
from it by the whole family as they gathered its crop.  ‘The picture of the corn and 
the nimbus of emotion surrounding it become a powerful one’ in her novel Beloved 
(198).  The picture Morrison paints is worth remembering in full. 
‘I see them walking, together, away from me. I’m looking at their backs 
and what they’re carrying in their arms: their tools, and maybe a peck 
basket. Sometimes when they walk away from me they hold hands, and 
they go to this other place in the garden. They have to cross some 
railroad tracks to get there’ (197). 
In this passage we become aware of the intimacy and dignity that the artist is 
able to transmit: even if the freedom to prosper takes place across the tracks 
and, by association, in the shadow of the controlling majority.  In recollecting 
this picture ‘and in trying to figure out what all this corn is doing’, Morrison is 
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able to ‘discover what it is doing’ (197).  As a fragment taken from the past, it 
is transformed by the artist ‘to fill in and complement slave autobiographical 
narratives’ (199) as the source of a human, intensely private voice.  However, 
the outcome ‘is dictated by other concerns, not least among them the novel’s 
integrity’ (199).  We understand integrity to mean the maintenance of the 
novel’s aesthetic as the expression of a reality common to all.  This is 
noteworthy in that it signals that Morrison’s images become transposed into 
the individual expressions of several characters.  The corn picture and its 
aura of emotion become the means through which a collective response to a 
situation is communicable in the voices of several individual responses to that 
situation and which embody human sensibilities common to all.   
 This contrasts well with an example from W.E.B. Du Bois’s, The Quest 
of the Silver Fleece (2004[1911]:107).      
‘So it was that the Fleece rose and spread and grew to its wonderful 
flowering; and so these two children grew with it into theirs...all the 
Fleece was in flower--a mighty swaying sea, darkling rich and 
waving,...The joy of the two so madly craved expression that they burst 
into singing...a low sweet melody of her fathers’ fathers, whereunto 
Alwyn’s own deep voice fell fitly in minor cadence.’ 
 
Unseen and unbeknown to the controlling forces around them, the 
Fleece is the result of their own efforts.  In Du Bois’s hands it is suggestive of 
their own deeply personal interior lives and their free development.  However, 
this takes place in secret because, as representative of black life in early 
twentieth-century America, the freedom required for the expression of 
individual worth and aspiration was denied them.  Their singing voices, rich in 
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association with their forebears, signal a burgeoning identity of human 
proportion.  But it is Zora who must hold centre stage in Du Bois’s narrative: 
‘in the field of the Silver Fleece all her possibilities were beginning to find 
expression’ (104).  From her sweet melody to Alwyn’s fitly minor cadence, 
Zora has to be different in displaying her ‘pride’ and ‘womanhood’ (104): in 
their subsequent marriage, it is Zora who will propose.  Du Bois is determined 
to reveal the human qualities of those who are marginalized and threatened 
by white power.  His novel’s theme, however, delineated and represented by 
the cotton field, necessarily defines the qualities of his two young characters.  
The context for the expression of their human qualities is the representation 
of those qualities.  And as such, those qualities become private to them.  
These two are defined and confined within the context of Du Bois’s image, as 
are their human qualities.  In moving from the event to the image that is left, 
Zora and Alwyn’s maturation appears peculiar to them, and representative of 
black endeavour as a response to a pervading white power.  In this sense, 
they simply become an example of what could be achieved.   
Morrison’s aesthetic requires that the image tells her what the memory 
is about.  She says, ‘I can’t tell you how I felt when my father died’, but the 
image, the memory retained allied to her imagination, provides the access for 
her to write about ‘the world he inhabited and the private or interior life of the 
people in it’.  First and foremost, however, the people around whom these 
images float ‘are my access to me; they are the entrance into my own interior 
life’, she says. They are formed within an aesthetic whose response to her 
chosen milieu, as ‘the revelation of a kind of truth’ (1987:195), is always in 
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human terms.  Morrison’s attempts at defining who she is are centred on her 
existing knowledge, we must call it memory, of the people at the heart of 
these images.   
 A human voice, speaking in human terms out of a milieu whose formulation 
is the interior life of the people in it, is the precursor to Morrison’s transposition of 
the corn image into the symbolic form during its ‘interaction with an external world’ 
(Frisby 1986:62).  We become satisfied of its existence.  However, autonomy 
conceived in lived experience, we argue, is more of a means to an end in 
Morrison’s aesthetic.  The human voice that Morrison derives from her images 
requires a significance by which it becomes abstracted from the fragmentary, 
varied circumstances in which everyday existence takes place.  This means that 
the ‘fortuitous fragment’ can no longer remain ‘merely a fragment’ because its 
significance ‘lies in its being connected with the essential’ (58).  In order to deal 
with the implications of the word essential, we understand that ‘an aesthetic retreat 
from reality cannot be a final one’ (45).  Our interpretation of Morrison’s interior life 
as the conception of a voice removed from the aura of its intimidations, and its 
expressions as within the context of its milieu, must involve its method of 
transcending its own content.  This involves ‘a transcending of it which renounces 
the mere reflection of what is given in nature, in order to regain, from a higher point 
of view, more fully and more deeply its reality’ (Simmel 1890:179).  The words, 
reality and essential, we take as the manifestation of ‘an inner life as an 
autonomous, determinate and cohesive form as if from an inner core’ (Simmel 
1923:15).   
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In her Nobel Lecture, Morrison (1993) has referred to this as the retreat ‘into 
the singularity of isolation, in sophisticated, privileged space’.  It is a position of 
silence because, in Morrison’s terms ‘it is an art without commitment’ (188).  Here 
we have the individual at the edges of society isolated by subordination and 
prejudice, and an indication of the difficulty for the artist of creating a language 
which can express the particularity of humanity in a context other than the cultural 
space of the controlling majority.  An art without commitment is one that 
acknowledges it cannot, because of the element of contradiction, present ‘to the 
imagination’ the essential elements of the universal ‘in individual form’ (Hegel 1920 
[1835]:300).  It remains without commitment because it is unable, in its isolation, to 
articulate the particularization required in any expression of independence.  At the 
heart of this dilemma is the knowledge that, as the outsider, any claim to 
particularization would necessarily involve transforming the ideal reality enjoyed by 
the majority into an expression of the subordinate’s own being.  ‘The beauty of the 
ideal consists precisely in its undisturbed unity, repose, and consummation with 
itself’ (272-273).  In light of this, and as well as disturbing the inner harmony of the 
outsider, any challenge to social reality would be condemned as parody, as a 
travesty of the real.  In these terms, an art without commitment is one which seeks 
to preserve its internal harmony in its presentation.  However, in its singular, static 
and isolated state as ‘witness to the unpresentable’ (Lyotard 1986:82), it is able to 
maintain a privileged sophistication in that it harbours a consciousness fully aware 
of a closed society ‘framed by unacknowledged power relations’ (Taylor 2000:7).  
In its sophisticated, privileged space frozen in dramatic time, the art of no 
commitment is able to reserve its ‘good opinion of itself’ (Morrison 1993:188).  The 
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knowledge it harbours becomes simply fuel for resentment, not only at the 
controlling power, but also at itself, as good opinion plus resentment turns to 
shame. 
 The questions of the young African Americans, which Morrison’s (1993) 
story has brought to life, concern the lack of a context for their lives: ‘is there 
nothing in our hands except what you have imagined is there...no literature,...no 
history connected to experience that you can pass along to help us start strong?’ 
they ask (188-9).  The source of the resentment implicit in their questions is evident 
in the accusation that they ‘stand waist deep in the toxin of your past’ (189).  If we 
place this questioning resentment alongside Greenblatt’s democratically shared 
conception of what it is to be a human being, we begin to understand Morrison’s 
need to move beyond simply an awareness of that which is unpresentable.  Her 
choice of young people for her story articulates her desire to fulfil the outsider’s 
needs for a place in dramatic time where a consciousness, an individual sensibility, 
can be formed within a correlative relationship between the past and the present.  
It is not simply awareness, but awareness in relation to a past of ‘cruelty and 
mediocrity...think of our lives’ they ask, ‘and tell us your particularized world’ (189).  
It is evident that these young people, given voice in Morrison’s story, wish to know 
their past in human terms, and in a form representative of that to which they are 
committed in themselves.  Their final request is to be told about ‘a wagonload of 
slaves’ (189) for it is their conception of the past which must nourish the 
commitment of an art which has none.  We find that Morrison’s young characters 
are asking for the means by which they can arrive at the same conscious 
awareness of themselves as displayed by both Baldwin and Morrison: knowing for 
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themselves who they are because of knowing themselves in their ancestors, a fully 
human life.   
 It is significant that Morrison’s young people are asking for a way of knowing 
the past which will free them of its toxic influence.  Their wish is to be free of a 
signification that has dominated their ancestors and lingers still in every family 
memory.  They seek acknowledgement of the unspeakable in order to overlay the 
horror of the past with images of individual, human particularization, a new 
situation for an amalgamation of the past with their awareness of themselves as 
individuals in their own situation.  We can say, then, that this is the task to which 
Morrison is committed using a language which has ‘the ability to limn the actual, 
imagined and possible lives of its speakers’ (186).  It must tell a story whose intent, 
without context, is to express that which is present but unspoken.   
 We can clarify this with Morrison’s views made in her memoir What Moves 
at the Margin (2008).  Of the young black people she says, ‘I thought we had left 
them nothing to love and nothing to want to know’ (13).  This sentiment echoes her 
doubts concerning her generation’s ability to engage with young aspirations 
concerning the future, and the need to understand how to accommodate the bitter 
legacy of the past into the desire for something better.  These doubts resonate in 
the extent to which the aftermath of slavery has impeded generations of African 
Americans in communicating any vision of a future free of the prejudice they know 
to exist.  More revealing, however, is Morrison’s perception that those who had 
shown interest in the past have felt betrayed by their elders’ inability to extricate 
themselves from its toxic insinuations.  This appraisal by those who ‘had looked 
into the faces of their parents and seen betrayal’ becomes modified because ‘even 
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when they are wrong’ these black children ‘look us dead in the eye’ she says, ‘and 
it is as though they are waiting for us to apologise to them’ (14).  The expectation 
that the children would feel betrayed is telling as it reveals the guilt which pervades 
the consciousness of those who were powerless to prevent prejudice invading 
every part of their lives, including their relationship with their children. 
 Morrison’s memoir is constructed to provide a vivid contrast between a 
generation who struggles in vain with the odious distinctions of a recent past, and 
their children who are unafraid, and brazenly declare their right ‘to belong here on 
this planet earth and that it is theirs’ (14).  The stark differentiation between 
generations is readily available in this memoir because it is produced from a single 
voice which shares the concerns of the older generation.  It uses the first person to 
refer to the collective whom it represents, and whose fears it feels instinctively.  In 
similar fashion it refers to the aspirations of young people as those of a group.  For 
both groups the issue is the same: how to exist in a void ‘minus a future and a past’ 
(14)?  Presented in this way, Morrison ensures that the concerns and aspirations 
on view here are shared and not the result of individual reactions to moral 
injustices.  As such, they provide strong indications of the presence of the self-
awareness which has been stifled during the long years of slavery.  There appears 
no other datum for their shared consciousness other than its survival as an 
instinctual response to the frustrations of subordination.  Consequently, it fulfils the 
idea of democratically shared qualities but without the commitment to any aim or 
any future.  It remains ‘the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to 
share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable...to impart a stronger sense of 
the unpresentable’ (Lyotard:81).   
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 In this way we understand the response to slavery in human terms and the 
extent to which those terms are not sufficient to achieve their aim.  However, 
Morrison’s method in this memoir has as its goal the movement from the 
consensus and the unattainable to the production of a fragment capable of 
representing the existence of the unpresentable in the individual: to express what 
is to be conceived in the individual consciousness if it is not to remain static in its 
dramatic situation.  The key to this in her memoir is the change in her language 
when referring to the collective.  The language which has repeatedly used ‘they’ in 
referring to this group now undergoes a distinctive and significant change.  The 
‘they’ remains, but they now ‘watch us with the eyes of poets and carpenters and 
musicians and scholars and other people who know who they are because they 
have invented themselves and know where they are going because they have 
envisioned it’ (Morrison 2008:14).  Now the group becomes identifiable as 
individuals because of the infinite variety of jobs they do, and the posts they 
occupy.  They share the spirit of endeavour and individual purpose established in 
the contrast made between the generations.  Morrison’s language is able to 
indicate the variety within the group as the provision for the invention of an 
individual consciousness for each member of the group.  The ability to invent an 
individual is not the result of being of any one particular profession, but the variety 
of professions is the precursor for the concept in each individual of a unity whose 
other half is made up.  As outsiders these individuals, who have invented 
themselves, are denied the unity enjoyed by the controlling group’s lack of any 
distinction in that group between the universal, democratically shared and its 
particularity in each individual.   
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We can say that Morrison is attempting here to promote this same lack of 
distinction between the universal, expressive in each group member’s existence, 
and the presentation, the particularity of it, in each individual member.  The young 
people’s universally recognised attributes are present in each individual’s 
attainment of their chosen role.  However, this is insufficient in dramatic time 
because that which is made up cannot be conceived by the imagination.  They 
remain outsiders conferred in life.  This means that as conferred life, the universals 
of thought or abstract conceptions must be revealed as ‘independently contained’ 
in the emotional life of the individual’s own spirit and character (Hegel 1920 
[1835]:300).  If we consider the situation of Baldwin and of Morrison’s young 
individuals in dramatic time, we find that they do not progress beyond the static 
conferral of life because they lack this independent particularity. 
Their dilemma is present in the question they ask of their elders: ‘do we 
have to begin consciousness with a battle heroines and heroes like you have 
already fought and lost leaving us nothing?’ (Morrison 1993:188).  They are asking, 
here, for a context in which to express a burgeoning self-awareness and to be free 
of a signification they do not recognize in themselves.  They seek a context defined 
by the particularities of their elders and relatives. We argue here that Morrison’s 
task is to indicate the presence of a consciousness in a form which will enable the 
made up to be conceived in dramatic time.  That is, a consciousness which is 
recognisable as and conducive to the worldly aspirations of Morrison’s young 
individuals.  A consciousness born out of the past, not a past as context, but a past 
defined by human particularities.  When Morrison says that the vitality of language 
lies in its ability to limn the imagined and possible lives of its speakers, we begin to 
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see that the commitment the young people ask for must begin its formulation in 
dramatic time as the violation of the particular consciousness present in their 
enslaved ancestors.  This would require the loss of that singularity in isolation, and 
the loss of the privileged space of silence and personal harmony.  The isolation of 
the slave and the artist has to be surrendered to the signification given it by white 
people. It becomes lost by expressing it. Its recreation outside the influence of the 
signifier is Morrison’s task.  This signals that the good name of the artist implicit in 
the language of isolation, which is also the condition of the slaves at the inn, must 
now find an individual voice that can resist the significations of the controlling 
majority, a voice not reliant on the search for a context sufficient for its promotion.  
They ask for the presentation, in proximity to white power, of that which they are 
making up for themselves as the source for an inner unity which confers 
individuality.  In dramatic time this must necessitate the loss of that which is 
imagined. 
However, the consciousness of which we speak and its affiliation with the 
past is not to be confused with that advocated by identity theorists.  Mohanty 
claims (2000:33) that ‘personal experience is socially and theoretically constructed’ 
and, consequently, situated.  And because ‘social location is...closely tied to our 
understanding of social interests...objectivity is inextricably tied to social and 
historical conditions’ (39).  Saldivar (2001) finds Mohanty’s argument ‘compelling’, 
but wonders ‘how in everyday lived experiences one may reliably distinguish 
between experiences that produce dynamic and negotiated judgement and 
experiences that simply provide false consciousness’ (853)?  It is clear that claims 
concerning social relations and social reality are complex and contested.  
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Nevertheless, Ellison is clear that ‘most Negroes recognize themselves as 
themselves despite what others might believe them to be’, and, furthermore, 
‘Negro American consciousness is not a product (as so often seems true of so 
many American groups) of a will to historical forgetfulness.  It is a product of our 
memory, sustained and constantly reinforced by events’ (1972:124).  Historical 
conditions and considerations, however, are mediated in present events, and 
because of this, we become aware that for Ellison consciousness is self-evident 
and simply sustained by what is repeating itself around the individual.  Experience 
in this context is subordinated to an understanding grounded in memory.  The 
apparent alignment here with Mohanty’s theory is, however, illusory.  For Ellison, 
such a consciousness, sustained in the events of the present, is an indication that 
‘the basic unity of human experience that assures us of some possibility of 
empathic and symbolic identification with those of other backgrounds is blasted in 
the interest of...political conceits’ (123).  Far from gaining knowledge from 
experience, existing knowledge becomes stifled.  In its place there arises, in 
Ellison’s argument, a clear indication of an affirmation of self achieved through its 
‘identification with the group as extended through the individual self’.  This self 
rejects all delineation except that which involves ‘a basic resuscitation of the 
original American ideals of social and political justice’ (132).  Historical conditions 
and considerations, manipulated as they are, take a back seat; any identification of 
African American identity is possible only in a ‘depiction not of racial but human 
qualities’ (281). 
Mohanty’s interpretation of Beloved’s seduction of Paul D is an indication of 
the difficulties encountered when aesthetics are used to bolster theories of 
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situated, cultural identity.  Quite rightly, we feel, Mohanty says that, in light of his 
seduction, ‘Paul D’s initial moral judgement of Sethe’s actions can become subtler 
and deeper, more adequate to the reality they share’ (57).  However, he goes on to 
say that Paul D’s experience emphasizes ‘that under certain conditions personal 
experience yields reliable knowledge about oneself and one’s situation’ (57).  This 
may be so, but a close reading of this particular section of Beloved (Morrison 
2004:311) will reveal the difficulty for Mohanty in his attempt to provide a 
theoretical totality from the multiplicity of cultural identities. 
We can say that Morrison’s concern in this section is to devise a conception 
of Paul D’s most intimate and intensely personal fulfilment of his independent 
being.  There is a sense of drowning in this ‘open-deep place’ as Beloved insists 
that he embraces the full extent of that which she represents.  His intimacy with 
Beloved offers a conception of that which he has for so long kept hidden in the 
tobacco tin he carries with him at all times.  His ‘personal shame’, his ‘life hunger’ 
(311) are registered as one and the same vulnerability that he encounters in 
stepping from behind the veil to reclaim and express his own idea of himself.  If we 
place this piece of writing alongside that concerning Sethe’s confrontation with 
schoolteacher, and her murder of Beloved, we find vulnerability expressed in two 
different ways.  Sethe loses everything in her tragic denouement; Paul D, ‘beached 
and gobbling for air’, survives in his epiphany of understanding Sethe’s claim to be 
a human being.  On show here are the feelings of two human beings as they seek 
to express their humanity: a self-worth which has no reference point in the world 
they occupy.  However, Morrison’s aesthetic reveals how each one becomes the 
other’s reference point.  It is notable that their vulnerability in expressing this is 
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established, in Sethe’s case, in her singular determination to remain human in the 
face of her defilement; and in Paul D’s, a burgeoning need to revive the same 
established but secretive life force.  As each other’s reference point, they are finally 
persuaded to put aside singular, individual claims on the ocean-deep source of 
their longing for dignity in identity.  Together they form a reference point for what 
has been irretrievably lost or demeaned. 
Mohanty finds (53) that in this particular section of Beloved, Paul D’s 
relationship with Sethe is now ‘based on a new understanding of his history’.  
However, we would point out that it is a readiness to engage with that part of his 
identity which is forbidden to slaves because, once on show, their masters will 
destroy or demean it.  Together, he and Sethe share that which they dread to 
express in the wider world.  It is not an understanding of his history as such, but an 
understanding of her need to engage with her own deeply personal life.  There is a 
world of difference.  His refusal to risk the destruction of his dignity and self-worth 
by white power, that is his non-commitment, has fabricated a void in which 
thoughts of the past and future become suspended.  However, even if we accept 
as ‘experience’ Beloved’s seduction of Paul D, it does not yield knowledge of 
himself.  It activates that which he has kept hidden for so long.  It is precisely this 
knowledge of himself, and its centrality to who he believes he is that drove all his 
efforts to preserve it intact.  Beloved seduces Paul D into an almost involuntary, 
intuitive, conscious, correspondence with the vitality of his being, and those who 
came before him.  Similar to the drenching of the young males in the cornfield 
(Morrison 2004:32), Morrison’s allegorical writing presents to the reader’s 
imagination a conception of humanity which has been quelled through intimidation 
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and fear.  In his relationship with Beloved, Paul D learns that what he has kept 
hidden is that which Sethe attempted to live.  It is still denied to both of them, but 
recognisable in their relationship with Beloved.  The context, if we can call it that, is 
Beloved, not their community or the controlling majority.  And this has to be so in 
order for Morrison to establish the humanity, the credentials, of those who spend 
their lives enslaved. 
Mohanty appears to approach the slave character as one bereft of self-
knowledge, when in reality it is the danger inherent in expressing that knowledge 
which is at the centre of Morrison’s aesthetic.  Her characters become bereft in any 
act of self-expression.  Accordingly, he is able to say that the ‘special kind of 
knowledge about the world as it affects them’ possessed by oppressed groups ‘is 
hardly a mysterious one’, because ‘it is an empirical claim tied to a wider (empirical 
and theoretical) account of the society in which these groups live’ (Mohanty 
2000:60).  This seems to imply that experience gained in subservience and 
marginalization is sufficient to generate knowledge of the oppressor.  These 
experiences may be the result of subtle or brutal prejudice and, as a consequence, 
breed resentment, fear, and loathing.  However, we would view these as reactions 
to a power which suffocates human understanding.  Knowledge is confirmed in a 
comparison of oppressive behaviour with a moral compass gained elsewhere, that 
is, in a place of personal or group recollection, where human understanding has 
not been suffocated.  Perhaps it is this marker, planted firmly by Morrison in the 
oppressed group, which facilitates knowledge of the controlling group.  It is of note 
that Beloved is generative of and generated by this spirit marker: a marker vital in 
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understanding how the expression or repression of the essence of humanity is 
made available to the imagination. 
The call appears to be for social theory and objective knowledge to be the 
proving ground for any reality concerning individual experience.  Ramon Saldivar 
(2001) suggests that ‘no single map will suffice, including one claiming itself as 
real, for an understanding of the Real’ (853); neither can there be a ‘program for 
aestheticians, for example, that is a priori certain of its ability to render uniform 
assessments of what constitutes pleasure, beauty, or desirability’ (853).  His 
position is determined, he says, by the ‘specific condition that the subject’s reading 
of the topography of the real cannot occur except in reference to a nonunitary 
complex of social practices and symptoms of representation that have political 
significances and consequences’ (853).  Saldivar’s writing here is a reaction to 
Mohanty’s themes in the Status of Cultural Identity (2000), discussed above.  As 
we have seen, Mohanty’s discussion is centred on an event in dramatic time, and 
as such, Saldivar’s observations of that discussion are too.  In this context his 
assessment of what constitutes beauty is problematic.  The beautiful, for Benjamin 
(1919-1920a:219), ‘is multiplicity assembled into a totality’, and is able to be 
conceived, in an aesthetic presentation, in the imagination of the reader.  Saldivar’s 
insinuation that ‘the subject of real experience has access to real knowledge’ (853) 
risks the charge that his thinking is taking place outside the realm of the workings 
of the work of art.  The subject’s position within a non-unitary complex of social 
practices and systems of representation remains, as ever, at the centre of his 
enquiry. 
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The main consideration is how are these revelations of value and judgement 
to be communicated dependent as they are on ‘the reality of the real of lived 
experience’ and ‘the reality of the ground from which a subject can be a subject’ 
(854)?  Saldivar suggests that the ‘“real”’ may ‘be available mediately through the 
imaginary symbolization of real events and in our thinking about them at the 
margins of lived experience’ (854).  This may be a misunderstanding of the 
symbol’s role in its relationship with action, in that the constancy of the symbol 
registers meaning and not the event.  And as we have seen, without further 
development, the symbol is an insufficient harbinger of truth.  Nonetheless, if we 
are dealing with events at the margins of lived experience, then these events 
require a unity if their multiplicity is able to be judged of value or, of more 
importance, challenged within the aesthetic.  However, because Saldivar does not 
envisage the possibility of unity, and as such engages solely with the event, he is 
able to say that ‘we are not dealing with the real as such, but in the ways in which 
the real presents itself in crisis’ (854).  In light of this, he concludes that positions of 
‘value and judgement-ethical, aesthetic, and political-must be made from within the 
context of the local cultural conditions of knowledge (854). 
In order to situate our opposition to this, we can say that the novel has a 
relation with the philosophical problem and that the realm of theory becomes 
‘incorporated into ethics and language in symbolic form.  We then see the 
emergence of ethical and aesthetic critique’ (Benjamin 1919-1920a:219), and 
become aware that the context for value and judgement is the political and ethical 
within the aesthetic, which is not dependent on location or events.  Literary theory, 
then, is mediate in dramatic time, and if, as Benjamin points out, unity and totality 
77 
 
facilitate truth, then, we argue, the creation of art occurs in the artist’s relation and 
involvement with a method in which multiplicity is assembled into a totality.  
Morrison’s fragment of a memory of a cornfield has become transposed into a 
symbol.  This symbol, its truth, its meaning, is shattered in the tragic demise of the 
character Sethe.  What remains is a fragment of that symbol which is able to 
register an experience of the world ‘according to the laws of the moral universe’ 
(224).  As a ‘fragment of the symbol’ (225), Morrison has provided the smallest 
totality of semblance in order to take forward a fragment of that which Sethe has so 
tragically lost.   As such, it is capable, in the hands of the allegorist, of transcending 
the local and cultural conditions of knowledge as an indication of the spirit of a 
consciousness seeking freedom of expression in belonging.                                                                         
In Lyotard’s words, modern aesthetics is one of nostalgia: ‘it allows the 
unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing content’ (81).  It is this sense 
of loss which Morrison conjures in order to present the unpresentable.  However, in 
order for it to be conceived by the imagination as the unity conducive to 
individuality, but denied the African American, Morrison’s aesthetic must ‘present 
the fact that the unpresentable exists.  To make visible that there is something 
which can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor made visible’ 
(Lyotard:78).  This requires an art which Lyotard calls the modern, and which ‘can 
become modern only if it is first postmodern’.  The postmodern for Lyotard can be 
thought of as modernism in its ‘nascent state’, but for all that, ‘this state is constant’ 
(79).  We understand by this that the unpresentable, as loss, must attain a higher 
regard in the imagination for it to be a true particular of human nature (Simmel 
1890).  Consequently, the risk of the individual appearing as one of a whole is 
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avoided.  This is the challenge for the artist in that the nostalgia for the missing 
content must always and on all counts be elevated to the level of human nature.   
 The presentation of loss is the presentation of that to which the young 
people are committed in themselves; it is also the missing content of those battles 
fought and lost by heroines and heroes in their fight to be regarded as individuals.                                                                                                                    
But this commitment can be conceived only as its presentation degrades into 
fragmentation.  We argue that Morrison’s recourse to modernism is to develop a 
framework in which her allegorical vision and use of imagery are able to render 
loss a personal experience.  As loss degrades into missing content, its existence is 
able to be conceived in fragmentary incarnations as a response to loss, and in the 
individual’s relationship with ideal reality.  Conceived of in this way, the fragment is 
entirely separate from and independent of the requirements of the main group.  It is 
the unpresentable conceived as the universal and essential elements of the human 
being presented to the imagination in individual form.  The fragment is conferred 
life conceived as independently contained in the individual, and as such it fulfils 
art’s requirements for the realisation of a wholly human character.  In Morrison’s 
novel Beloved, this means that the presentation of the unpresentable is achieved in 
the tragic demise of Sethe in her murder of ‘Beloved’.  ‘Beloved’s’ return and 
subsequent intimate relationship with Sethe and her child Denver accentuate the 
semblance of loss, and her final disappearance fulfils Lyotard’s definition of the 
postmodern as the unpresentable ‘put forward...as the missing contents’ (81).  In 
the loss of ‘Beloved’, that which is missing becomes personal to Denver and, 
because of the use of allegory and imagery which frame the scene of her birth, the 
symbol of a collective human sensibility is now established as particular to Denver. 
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Morrison’s indication that her young people have invented themselves, and 
her ambition to form a language which is able to limn the imagined lives of black 
individuals, are both fulfilled in the language in which her novel Beloved unfolds.  
And, importantly, the self-subsistency that her young people imagine for 
themselves is able to be conceived in the singular figure of Denver and her venture 
into the world around her.  Denver’s self-subsistency is demonstrated in her unity 
with the past (with Beloved) and in her response to the world in which she finds 
herself, both conceivable as immanent in her own spirit and character.  Denver, 
then, is the fragmented incarnation of Sethe’s original claim for self-subsistency.  
That which has been made up is now conceivable in a singular visible 
consciousness which, in its conception, embodies the fact that the unpresentable, 
the made up, exists, and exists in each individual’s commitment to it.      
 As a fragment of that which was fought for by heroines and heroes, Denver 
is the reincarnation of what was fought for and lost.  However, it is not that she 
represents loss in any way, or that she is able to register what has been lost, but 
that missing content as loss is the source of her wholly human character.  In this 
way she is uniquely attached to the past in the present of dramatic time.  
Importantly, she is not the achievement of something desired or anticipated, but 
the individual in whom that which has already been imagined can be conceived as 
a result of the connection Morrison makes between the presentation of loss and a 
conscious reaction to it in the form of an allegoric image (Beloved 2004:99).  This 
allegorical representation is firmly concerned with the past, which nourishes its 
conception; the present of dramatic time; and with the wholly human character, 
Denver.  The sense put forward here is of Benjamin’s insights into the subject as 
80 
 
presented in photographs of times past.  In each image, he says, we can search 
‘for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to 
speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot...where the future subsists 
so eloquently that we, looking back, may discover it’ (Benjamin 1931:243).  David 
Frisby recognises that ‘out of the fragments of the past could step the future’ as an 
‘investigation’ of the ‘mythical present’ (1986:238).  The future subsists eloquently 
in Sethe’s association with Beloved, and in Denver we conceive of that association 
in the present.  We can say that Morrison’s intent is for the present of dramatic time 
to be defined in ‘the context of what has always already existed’ in the 
consciousness of the African American (Benjamin 1973:172). 
 Alan Rice links ‘the improvisary nature of the jazz culture’ with Morrison’s 
aestheticism (2012:123).  In a telling insight into Morrison’s relationship with the 
past, Rice points out how ‘jazz protagonists often seem to be working 
against...temporality’ in their emphasis on ‘the latest stage of a historical tradition in 
which they are steeped’.  This means that a strong emphasis on the past is the 
staging for a creative performance that in the artist’s hands becomes ‘a legacy to 
generations to come’ (125).  Significantly, for our argument, Rice cites the jazz 
musician Albert Ayler’s interview with Nat Hentoff.  In this interview, Ayler 
describes the music of Louis Armstrong as a ‘rejoicing about beauty that was going 
to happen’, and frames his own music in these terms.  The beauty that he 
expresses ‘is to come after all the tension and anxieties’, when the cries of the 
young ‘will emerge as people seeking freedom come to spiritual freedom’ (Ayler 
1966).  We understand, then, that the ‘continual cutting back to the past that 
created them’ (Rice:134), and the artists’ improvisations, which feed off that past, 
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actively seek out an expression of the truth that will resonate within the 
perpetuating conditions of the African American historical tradition.  The past is 
expressed in a form appropriate to the still developing conditions in which it will be 
played again.  It is the active seeking out of this spiritual freedom that we find 
dominates the pages of Beloved.       
This thesis maintains that Morrison’s novel Beloved is set within the past to 
enable the experience of enslaved human beings to predominate.  The past does 
not provide the context, but simply the situations for the formulation of a 
consciousness that will become robustly independent of its prescribed context of 
subordination under a controlling majority.  Indeed, Morrison’s treatment of the past 
is the measure of her determination to place the ideal reality of the controlling 
group within the context of what has always already existed.  We propose that the 
novel Beloved not only establishes for its protagonist the conferral of life, but also 
its transition, in dramatic time, into the individuality associated with a wholly human 
character.  In Lyotard’s terms, this involves a postmodern appeal to the ‘principle of 
a universal consensus’ (77), followed by the use of the modern to ‘present the fact 
that the unpresentable exists’ (78).  This means that Morrison has taken the totality 
that is ideal reality and placed alongside it a consciousness unable to be 
subsumed in the context of white superiority.  Because the novel achieves this, 
finally, in the presentation of a representative, individual consciousness sourced in 
the past, it establishes that ‘there is nothing new. And what is new is always very, 
very old; it is always you’ (Baldwin1962:31).  In elevating this individual 
consciousness over the prescriptions of a powerful collective, Morrison has cut 
across ‘the empty homogenous continuum of ruling-class history’ by facilitating ‘a 
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correspondence’ between the dramatic time of the present, and a redeemed 
fragment of the past (Eagleton 2001:214).  In affecting the senses in this way, an 
independence is established which is able to sideline the prescriptions of a 
subjectivity which reigns as the measure of all things.  Morrison has turned the 
tables on ruling-class history whose totality predominates as the ‘measure for 
whatever is not identical with it’ (Adorno 1981:5-6).   
 We argue that Morrison’s fully human, individual character is the result of 
the equivalence between loss and the presentation of an imagined consciousness.  
Because this human being’s consciousness is a result of a connection with the 
past, it avoids the claim that it is the product of its own privileged reasoning.  
Consequently, it stands in formidable opposition to judgements of subordination 
and differentiation which emanate from a controlling majority whose majestic 
reasoning is maintained within an ideological relationship with everyone else.  In 
order to achieve this we argue that Morrison employs a tragic framework in order to 
bring forward a conception of that which cannot be presented.  In order to trace 
Morrison’s themes of loss and renewal within Sethe’s tragic demise, this thesis 
employs Hegel’s theory of tragedy.  This may appear at odds with Morrison’s cited 
aim of writing literature that is ‘irrevocably, indisputably Black’, within the 
‘recognised and verifiable principles of black art’ (1984:389).  However, on the 
contrary, if we claim that those principles facilitate the formulation of a fully human 
black character free of the insinuations levelled at him or her within the boundless 
scope of white signification; and also of a consciousness that is not reliant on the 
context in which it finds itself for its promotion, we are able to discover the 
appropriateness of tragedy for the fulfilment of the former, and its requirement for 
83 
 
the production of the latter.  We argue that Morrison’s novel Beloved, while 
employing tragedy to promote the postmodern nostalgia for the whole and the one, 
is able, in the use of the modern, to form a consciousness which can be conceived 
of as ‘witness...to the unpresentable’ (Lyotard: 82).  This thesis takes the point of 
view that Morrison’s use of tragedy, symbolism and allegory, in writing the truth of 
black lives outside the context of intimidation, is vindication for the decision to 
devote this study to a critical examination of her novel Beloved.                     
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Chapter 2.           
  
 
The role of Beloved, Du Bois’s conceptualization of double-consciousness, Sula 
and Nel   
 
 The result of Morrison’s chosen aesthetic, the form in which she uses 
language, will be to bring to her characters’ situation the sense of a consciousness 
fettered by power.  Real-world dilemmas and the duality engendered by Morrison 
in her characters’ responses will ensure that their predicament is tangible.  This 
thesis argues that Morrison’s use of language and its forms of delivery produce a 
situation which is finite.  This is to say that Morrison’s aesthetic cannot, in a 
language capable of evoking and enforcing hidden signs of racial superiority, move 
beyond the presentation of a consciousness striving to overcome the debilitating 
effects of prejudice: the character’s dilemma cannot be resolved.  It will be argued 
that Morrison’s response to this lies in her treatment of Sethe.  However, before 
fully discussing Morrison’s ‘aesthetic status’ (Conner 2000:xxii) it is necessary to 
investigate her approach to the problem of racial language in order to position the 
argument in the context of language. 
 This is important to consider because the only way that we can understand 
a particular aesthetic is through a particular author’s use of it: Mary Shelley’s 
formulation of her ‘creature’ (Shelly:1992) is very different from that of Toni 
Morrison’s use of Beloved and, consequently, their aesthetic styles must differ in 
their approaches to their themes.  Gates (1984:5) argues that because African-
American life has been ‘one political struggle after another’, its literature has been 
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‘defined from without’: that is by cultural hegemony.  In order to counter this, 
readings are required whose concern is with the ‘nature and function of figurative 
language as manifested in specific texts’ (5).  This is ‘precisely the domain of 
traditional aesthetics’ in exploring a work’s ‘aesthetic and political power’ (Conner 
2000:xix).  Because we are faced with various shades of political influence and 
ideologies, literature’s relation to ideology can only be understood through a close 
analysis of its language (Conner:2000).  In addition, it is argued that unless close 
attention is given to figurative language in specific texts, the ensuing discussion 
may centre on a construct that is not present or accessible in the language: we 
could be discussing something that is not really there or ignoring something that is.  
Morrison resists the efforts of some critics to ‘place her work into an already 
established literary tradition’ because they never go into ‘the work on its own 
terms’.  The result is that their criticism ‘comes from some other place and finds 
content outside of the work and wholly irrelevant to it’ (Tate 1983:161).  In order to 
approach Sula and Beloved on their own terms, this chapter will consider the 
language in which they are formed.  
 The final words of the novel Beloved refer to the disappearance of Beloved.  
The narrator reveals that there was ‘no clamour for a kiss’ (Morrison 2004:324) and 
this may suggest that the community who now welcome Sethe back are not sorry 
to see Beloved leave.  We can say at this stage that Beloved is the expression of a 
need in Sethe to establish for herself an idea of her place in the world and her 
connection with those who came before her, and of whom she is aware only 
through the fragments she has gleaned from her interactions with other enslaved 
people: Beloved as a believable image able to represent the struggle of the 
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marginalized and discredited in their search to live a life conducive with their 
personal idea of themselves.  Sethe’s hankering after Beloved facilitates the 
expression of the unspeakable: the aspiration of a human being unaccounted for 
within the perceptions of white people.   And yet, there is a sense that the 
community, as a group of people, realise what Beloved represents and the futility 
of maintaining her presence in ‘124.’  They encourage Sethe to join them and to 
break the link with Beloved.  Morrison herself (1997:7) has said that the word ‘kiss’ 
‘searches for and locates a quality or element of the novel that was not and is not, 
its primary feature.’  In the novel Beloved she says ‘the necessity was for 
connection, acknowledgement, a paying-out of homage still due: ‘“Kiss” clouds that 
point’ (7).  Because the community do not ‘clamour for a kiss,’ it should be 
considered that their presence as a group and their reservations concerning 
Beloved are indicative of the doubt, the ‘cloud’, with which Morrison wishes to 
regulate Sethe’s claims.  That to which the community refers is unreachable 
through language.  It is intangible but discernible in the intuitions, perceptions, and 
sensibilities of the individual characters, but is never spoken, and any effort by the 
individual to express any claim in regard to it is only ever in actions that demean 
them.  Beloved and the community appear as separate conduits for connection to a 
compelling but indefinable source.  This is significant in that it locates within the 
figure of Beloved the means to express connection, acknowledgement and a 
paying-out of homage still due.  At the moment Beloved disappears from ‘124,’ the 
community are encouraging Sethe to return to them by singing, humming and 
chanting their expression of something they are not able to express in any other 
way, but Sethe immediately understands the significance of the sound and its 
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implication for the relationship she has nourished between herself and Beloved for 
most of her adult life.  Sethe’s first attempts to substantiate her feelings concerning 
her own identity are linked inextricably with Beloved and amalgamate the past with 
Sethe’s claim for autonomy.  It becomes evident that the ‘community’ do not 
clamour for a kiss from Beloved; in fact they reject her presence and the 
connections, acknowledgement and the homage still due that reverberate within 
her relationship with Sethe.  The ‘kiss’ is withheld and its absence clouds not the 
worth of Sethe’s endeavours but the hopelessness of her claim.  Between the 
singing of the community and the nagging insistence of Beloved, the narrative of 
Beloved registers the yearning for a connection with an unknowable and 
unfathomable past and its revival as the substance of a claim by the individual for 
self-worth.  However, this is a necessity that must be found wanting.  
Walter Benn Michaels argues that instead of Morrison’s work manifesting 
the self-regard usually provided to individuals in their interactions within the society 
to which they belong, her novel Beloved relegates the African American character 
to the subject position at the price of his/her subjectivity.  This ‘transformation of 
subjectivity into subject position’ (Michaels 2004:149) renders the character less a 
person and more the possessor of an ‘identity’ and slavery, even if that person was 
not there, ‘part of his or her history’ (147).  In order to explain the link between 
identity and history and the loss of subjectivity Michaels cites the reasoning of 
Arthur Schlesinger.  According to Schlesinger, ‘history is to the nation rather as 
memory is to the individual… [and] an individual deprived of memory becomes 
disorientated and lost’ and ‘a nation denied a conception of its past will be disabled 
in dealing with its present’ (Schlesinger 1998:51). 
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 Michaels develops this by saying that ‘memory is here said to constitute the 
core of individual identity; national memory is understood to constitute the core of 
national identity’ which means that individuals ‘must have access not only to their 
own memories but to the national memory’ (133).  Personal memories, then, allied 
with a history that reveals what happened to them as Americans (or African 
Americans) provides the individual with an identity.  Michaels points out that it is 
precisely because the relation between things that happened to and were done by 
Americans in the past is one of memory that ‘we know we are Americans’ (133).  
Consequently, a conception of the past is the means of defining national identity 
and it is in Toni Morrison’s Beloved, according to Michaels, ‘that Schlesinger’s 
identification of memory, history and national identity is given a definitive 
articulation’ (135).  This would be to maintain that for African Americans, Beloved is 
‘an antislavery novel’ because its heritage provides a distinctive identity for the 
African American; denying slavery is to deny an identity (132).  The fears of James 
Baldwin that the past haunts the present and the argument for the portrayal of a 
factual past by Margaret Mead (1971) resonate in Michael’s interpretation of 
Beloved. 
 In response to this dilemma it can be argued that Beloved is important 
because the source of her manifestation is visible in the relationship between 
history (slavery) and personal development (Sethe’s).  However, the claim is that 
Sethe’s experience is said to act as a testimony for African American identities in 
the present because it is based on events from the past in which the African 
American of the present time was not present.  Michaels explains this as the 
process by which the historical past is made part of our experience and in this 
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respect African American history ‘can have no particular importance without the 
ghosts’ (Beloved) (Michaels 2004:139).  Importantly, he believes Beloved’s racial 
identity ‘provides the mechanism for as well as the meaning of the conversion of 
history into memory’ (136).  This would imply that ‘meaning’ as far as Beloved is 
concerned is a result of her actions and not Sethe’s and that as ‘mechanism’ she 
can operate on her own without her soul mate Denver; it would be to conceive of 
Beloved as occupying a subject position instead of, as is implied, supplying  one.  It 
is necessary to contemplate that Beloved is enjoined with Sethe and never 
indicative of anything other than Sethe’s experience.  And in this light it must be 
remembered that Beloved expresses that which must remain in the past because 
her claims must not be judged competitive. 
 However, Michaels conceives Beloved as an account of the past that ‘takes 
the form of an encounter with a ghost’ (137).  He agrees with Valerie Smith that 
this ghost (Beloved) is ‘the story of the past embodied’ to support this (cited in 
Michaels 2004: 137).  In this interpretation Beloved’s purpose is not considered, 
only what she represents.  She does indeed walk out of the past but her 
development is equivalent to Sethe’s.  This is achieved through the use of allegory 
and imagery in the effort to display Sethe’s actions as those of a heroic character 
in adversity.  There is a sense of the tragic in Sethe’s experience which is 
fundamental to understanding Beloved and her experience.  These opinions are at 
odds with Michaels’s in that he insists ‘the ghosts of New Historicism are not simply 
figures for history; they are figures for a remembered history’ (139).  This is 
reminiscent of the efforts by Greenblatt (1988) to conceive a methodology capable 
of discerning the perceptions of those individuals who lived their lives in a particular 
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bygone era.  However, it can be argued that Greenblatt’s motivation in part sprang 
from the vast differences, in his opinion, that separated our perceptions and, say, 
those circulating in the seventeenth century; differences, if proved, which could 
alter the way we remember the past.  At any rate, Michaels’s bracketing of 
Morrison’s aims with Greenblatt’s is a little restricting in both cases.  To speak of 
Beloved in terms of New Historicism is to speak of her as the provision of an 
‘eternal image of the past’ (Benjamin 1999:254).  In these terms the image is the 
end result, the memory, of an event and a fixed moment in time.  ‘Historicism 
contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in 
history’ (255), and even though these moments may be separated by decades or 
centuries, the dead image is brought to life by association with a neighbour.  
Morrison’s engagement with the image is to connect it to her understanding of her 
history and to manipulate it to provide ‘a unique experience with the past’ (254): 
Benjamin’s ‘historical materialism’ (254).  His description of this is revealing.  The 
historical materialist, he says, ‘grasps the constellation which his own era has 
formed with a definite earlier one’ (255). Morrison’s method of putting the image 
first, that is within the constellation of her own memory, and then by transfer to an 
earlier one, not only undermines the notion of historicism put forward in Michaels’s 
response to the formulation of Beloved, it also defeats the idea of a remembered 
history.  In Morrison’s hands the image provides an experience with the past and 
not the representation of an event in the past.     
 Because Beloved is said to fulfil Schlesinger’s idea of a collective identity, 
Michaels is able to point out that as a figure of a remembered history Beloved must 
be understood as the ‘memory’ of those who were never there.  Indeed, he says 
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that without memory no history, except the things that had actually happened to us, 
‘would be truly ours at all’ (Michaels 2004:139).  It follows that Beloved can only be 
conducive to identity if she is representative of that part of memory which revives 
what happened to ‘us’ as African Americans.  Beloved, then, is the provision for an 
African American group history.  In this role she appeals to the memory which is 
personal to the individual as well as a memory which contributes to group affiliation 
and identity.  Without the ghosts, history is just a subject we study in school.  It is 
only accounts like Sethe’s of how other people’s memories can become our own 
that provide the apparatus ‘through which history can define identity’ (139).  This is 
the context in which Michaels’s and Schlesinger’s conceptions coalesce: Beloved 
as an imagined history which is carried through her to the present and capable of 
giving an identity to a group because her experience is that of an African American 
and not an individual; and Sethe’s ‘account’ is the telling in which she remains a 
black slave.  According to Michaels this is because Morrison insists that slavery is 
something to be remembered by both black and white people and as such provides 
the content for her work; and remembering something for readers that did not 
happen to them ensures that slavery continues to be regarded as something that 
happened to people of a particular race at a particular time.  This provides the 
background to his reasoning concerning Sethe’s pleas to Denver concerning 
‘rememory’.  
 A conversation between Denver and Sethe is cited to illustrate the 
argument.  ‘A house can burn down’, Sethe tells Denver, ‘but the place – the 
picture of it – stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there in the world’.  Sethe 
is cited further in order to establish her fears concerning, as Michaels judges it, the 
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risk Denver runs of ‘a return to slavery’ (cited in Michaels 2004:135): ‘The picture is 
still there and what’s more, if you go there – you who never was there – if you go 
there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen again; it will be there for 
you, waiting for you.’  This establishes for Michaels that in Morrison’s work ‘slavery 
needn’t be part of your memory in order to be remembered by you’ (Michaels 
2004:136) and ‘thus makes the historical past a part of our own experience’ (137).  
He goes on to acknowledge that from Sethe’s viewpoint, ‘this is a kind of threat’ in 
order to prevent the return of the memories of slavery Sethe and her 
contemporaries seek to avoid (136). 
 However, a close reading will reveal that Sethe’s concern is for Denver and 
Denver’s chances of gaining autonomy.  Because ‘it’s going to always be there 
waiting for you’, Sethe tells Denver, ‘that’s how come I had to get all my children 
out.  No matter what’ (Morrison 2004:44).  This appears at the end of the 
conversation cited by Michaels and its omission does not do Sethe justice.  If it is 
included it can be seen that Sethe’s fears are fulfilled in Michaels’s interpretation 
that ‘Denver runs the risk of a return to slavery’ (Michaels 2004:135).  Rather, 
Sethe’s fears are that Denver will remember the enslaved of Sweet Home as 
slaves and not as people.  The location remains as the signifier of the people 
enslaved there, and not of those people who enslave them.  Here the concept that 
an individual deprived of memory becomes disorientated is never more true.  But 
this is memory of events in history, a belonging through history. For Morrison 
memory is conducive with people because ‘when you kill the ancestor you kill 
yourself’ (Morrison 1984:344).  In this sense memory provides ‘timelessness’ and 
the sense of a continuum in the lives of ex-slaves.  Sethe’s rememory of Sweet 
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Home’s memorable landscape would destroy this as it projects into the future the 
memory of Sweet Home as a locator of slaves.  Michaels’s requires the 
transmission of a slave heritage into history; and in this way history becomes an 
identity, an I.D. for everyone in America, which means that everyone is accounted 
for, everyone is situated somehow in history.  It can be argued that Sethe’s all-
consuming aim is not to be remembered as a slave but as a human being, and the 
inhuman treatment she endured understood as a crime and not accounted for 
under the term ‘slavery’.  In this regard her own ‘rememory’ is a conduit through 
which the classification of her by her white owners returns as a persistent 
encroachment on her endeavours to imagine herself as the person she knows she 
is.  Her exchange with Denver also reveals her fears that Denver, and the 
aspirations of the people of the future, can be affected by the ‘rememories’ that 
attach stigma to human beings.  However, the significance of Morrison’s stance is 
that her concentration on the ancestor renders memory the product of abstracted, 
fragmented circumstances in which everyday existence takes place.  In this way 
history is ignored.  This manifestation of life provides an autonomy, a totality, which 
the simple revelation of lived experience lacks.   
 Sethe’s difficulties in avoiding the trauma conducive with her experience is 
indicative of Morrison’s effort to avoid the charge of bringing from the past a 
racialized history representative of a group’s perception of itself.  It can be argued 
in light of the above considerations that Sethe’s determination to defy the 
classification of ‘slave’ is a struggle to claim something which is intrinsic to the idea 
of a sense of self.  This emphasizes that Denver and the individuals of the future 
are encouraged to remember Sethe as a human being who happened to be a 
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slave, and this is expressed by Beloved as a claim able to remain separate and 
free from any present day inhibitors. 
 It should be considered that ‘rememory’ is the insidious capability generative 
of majority and minority groups of the present to parse an individual’s dignity with 
the events which frustrate and impair their endeavours.  In this context Michael’s 
argument has been anticipated by Morrison but the literary devices she uses to 
disprove it are overlooked. 
 Sethe’s dignity as an individual is not to be found in her treatment at the 
hands of her owners or in her efforts to disprove their lies.  It is in her efforts to re-
establish it within her own psyche and Denver’s and subsequently those who may 
‘encounter’ her in the remembered past.  Denver is safe from any racial twinning 
with the events of Sethe’s experience because the allegory and imagery which 
form the tripartite bond between Sethe, Denver and Beloved ensure Sethe’s story 
is that of an individual.  Michaels insists that this ‘warning’ is insufficient to prevent 
the revitalization of a racial identity capable of being taken up in the present 
because the effort ‘to imagine an identity that will connect people through history is 
replaced by the effort to imagine a history that will give people an identity’ (137).  
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that Sethe’s imagined history is one in which 
‘identity’ is unattainable.  Her effort, encapsulated in the figure and behaviour of 
Beloved, is particular to her because Beloved wanders around the watery edges of 
Sethe’s history as an unacclaimed but precious aspiration: valuable because the 
source of her manifestation is the visible effort to reject the categorization of others.  
Claims that Beloved is a ‘historicist novel’ (Michaels 2004:137) fail to address the 
import of the thwarted aspirations of an individual located in the past but whose 
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endeavours are framed within those sensibilities treasured by individuals in the 
present.  This omission may be responsible for the idea that ‘texts like Beloved 
only narrate…’ they do not provide ‘a meaningless or untranslatable signifier’ (146).  
And yet the so-called ghost, Beloved, disappears at the behest of the women of the 
community.  The signifier is Denver whose perceptions of the society in which she 
hopes to thrive are situated in the experience of individuals who were estranged by 
that same society.  Denver is connected to her ancestors and fully understands the 
import of this in her relationship with the society in which she lives.  Michaels 
refuses to give up the idea of history to this simple fact. 
According to Baraka, ‘the history of Western culture begins for the Negro 
with the importation of slaves’ (Baraka 2009:130), and only a close attention to the 
‘emotional history of the black man,’ which differs from that of the dominant group, 
enables a black writer to provide works of ‘cultural relevance’ (131).  This is 
because should the black artist describe his experience in terms of the American 
middle class he will remain an outsider unrecognized within white social codes.  
Baraka points out that ‘for them, the Negro has never really existed, never been 
glimpsed in anything approaching the complete reality of his humanity’ (133).  The 
importance of establishing this reality is emphasized by Amos N. Wilson 
(1993:121) who points out that ‘the operative oppression of blacks by whites 
depends on the ability of whites to create and maintain a discrepancy between 
what subordinate Africans think they were and what they truly were’ (121).  
Morrison herself has talked of this situation as confronting a reality ‘unlike that 
received reality of the west’ (1984:388).  Her view is that ‘confronting’ means 
centralizing and animating ‘information discredited by the west’; discredited not 
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because ‘it is not true or useful or even of some racial value but because it is 
information held by discredited people’(388).  In this context, as Morrison says, 
their ‘information’ will remain discredited.  Theirs is a reality unlike that ‘received 
reality of the West’ but it is the discredited individual and their ‘emotional history’ 
which must be ‘animated’ in opposition to a created discrepancy.  It is the individual 
on whom Morrison will concentrate in the effort to write ‘Negro life as an emotional 
experience’ (Baraka 2009:128).  
 The word Morrison uses in this context is ‘necessity’ (1997:7) and in the 
choice of this word can be heard the importance to her and her novel of the 
connection between the present time and the experience of individual African 
Americans as slaves in the past.  This means then that the presence and the 
expression provided by Beloved is indispensable to the fulfilment of the novel’s 
aims but her contribution must always be subject to an element of doubt; it must 
always attract misgivings and a hesitancy to enlarge on it.  It should always have a 
cloud hanging over it. 
 In order to challenge an unreal situation Sethe’s experience, according to 
Baraka, must be discerned as a ‘unique investigation of the soul’ (Baraka 
2009:126).  However, this unique experience risks being discredited because 
Sethe is discredited as a slave and her actions become those of a rejected and 
discredited individual.  In this situation we can anticipate Morrison’s task as that of 
leading her protagonist to fail in the effort to obtain a status within a social order 
which does not recognise her.  Sethe fails in her interactions with an unreal, 
received reality convinced it was her sole option for expression.  Her failure 
corresponds to the aura of doubt which ‘clouds’ the issue but the earnestness of 
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her effort establishes her emotional history through the hopelessness of her 
situation.  In this hopelessness, Morrison locates the human condition.  After 
making a flawed but unknowing decision, Sethe’s persona as a discredited 
individual begins its transformation on the steps of ‘124’ as Beloved is rejected 
during the appeal to Sethe by the women of the community. 
 It is pertinent to claim that the information to which Morrison refers is 
contingent with the performance of Beloved.  And in this context Beloved and 
Sethe’s relationship is the method by which the narrative reveals worthy 
information discredited by its messenger.  In a complexity of allegory and tragedy, 
Morrison removes the messenger in order to leave the information in the keeping 
of a tragic but worthy woman, Sethe.  The fulfilment of this achievement, this 
chapter argues, is the formulation of a character’s deepest but unfulfilled needs in 
a context which is ruinous of these aims.  However, the character does not ‘learn’ 
from her experience in the sense it aids maturation or the development of a more 
knowing or knowledgeable self.  In an intriguing fulfilment of authorial intent, within 
the predicament of the discredited, this very same character must remain defeated 
and bereft of any self-regard or self-consciousness because the substance of her 
claims, a hunger to validate her past and her connection with it, is impossible in the 
face of white power.   
This is the point where the individual perceived as outside white social 
codes is taken by Morrison into the heart of the community.  Sethe no longer 
interacts with the white world and her presence registers a human being defeated.  
Morrison has used her character Sethe as an indication of ‘the experiences of the 
human being, the emotional predicament…as he [she] exists in the defined world 
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of his [her] being’ (Baraka 2009:128).  Intrinsic to this achievement is Beloved and 
abandonment.  
As we shall see and in line with Baraka’s claim for close attention to the 
emotional history of the individual, Beloved functions as an expression of Sethe’s 
claim for a true self-consciousness.  However, she is also imbued with the very 
precepts, principles and characteristics which serve to establish an identity: the 
longing to possess an intimate knowledge of the past and those people, also 
enslaved, who came before her, and the need to partake in those rituals valued by 
a community such as marriage, the raising of children and the freedom to nurture 
and care for family members.  These are routinely denied to the individual who is 
enslaved.  Consequently, Beloved is representative not only of the ambitions 
readily understood by ‘everyman’, that is typical human beings, but also her 
presence and behaviour resonate with the urge to have them fulfilled.  Sethe’s 
yearnings have been got up as a person and that person, Beloved, asks of Sethe 
what she cannot give, and in doing that we can say that Beloved’s outward form is 
expressive of her inner source.  That is, Beloved’s instincts are consequential and 
representative of Sethe’s attempts to establish an identity for herself and apparent 
in her insistence that Sethe fulfils these instincts.  Sethe’s ‘soul is made flesh’ and 
Beloved’s body ‘instinct with spirit in which form reveals’1 (Wilde 1982:172); and 
that form is Beloved.  We can say that the relationship between Sethe and Beloved 
                                                          
1
 After Wilde, it is possible to discuss language as ‘both an autonomous system and a socially established 
one’ (Freedman 1998:7).  Confounding as this sounds, it is an indication of the task Morrison faces in 
alleviating the presence of cultural hegemony in language.  Wilde’s ambivalence concerning language; his 
determination that ‘we are no longer concerned in art with the type, it is with the exception that we have to 
do’; his belief that ‘an idea is of no value until it becomes incarnate and is made an image’; his insight that 
truth in art is the unity of a thing with itself’ (1982:160-182) resonate with an aesthetic quality suited to the 
production and critical enquiry of two opposing voices in one protagonist. 
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is the result of Sethe’s attempt to substantiate an identity within a social order in 
which she is not welcome or recognised ‘in the complete reality’ of her humanity 
(Baraka 2009:133).  However, as a rejected outsider, Sethe’s instincts are 
apparent in Beloved and Beloved is the register of their influence.   Pater (1888) 
describes this as ‘the absolute correspondence of the term to its import’ (122) and 
as an analogy uses music as the ‘ideal of all art’ in that ‘it is impossible to 
distinguish’ its ‘form’ from its ‘substance matter’ (122).  In this analogy, ‘term’ is 
aligned fully with ‘form’ and suggests that language is able to facilitate the form in 
which its implied meaning will correspond to the essence and function of that form.  
This is to posit an equivalence between Sethe’s effort to realise a truer, better self 
and Beloved’s actions and influence.  In this way literature becomes the 
representation of ‘facts or incidents’ such as are able to be ‘connected with soul, of 
a specific personality, in its preferences, its volition and power’ (106).  This means 
that Sethe’s faculty for developing her own will, or lack of it, is not transcribed as a 
‘mere fact’ but ‘as modified by human preference in all its infinitely varied forms’ 
(106).  The presence of Beloved ensures that that which drives Sethe remains on 
show and personal.  It is reminiscent of W.E.B. Du Bois’s (1994[1903]) formulation 
of the ‘twoness’ felt by the marginalized African American in his interactions with 
the controlling white society and a development and refashioning of his theory of 
double-consciousness.               
Du Bois describes this as the 'sense of always looking at one's self through 
the eyes of others' (Du Bois 1994[1903]:2) because the American world yields the 
'Negro... no true self-consciousness' resulting in 'two souls, two thoughts...; two 
warring ideals in one dark body' (3).  There is a sense that marginalization such as 
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this results in a double self which Du Bois claims is always 'longing to attain self-
conscious manhood' by merging itself into a 'better and truer self' (2).  That is, a 
self which is African but also a vibrant accepted part of American culture, 
suggesting an escape from 'isolation' and the fulfilment of ability and ambition.  
This then is his 'striving' and it is linked to a 'better and truer self' and indicates the 
complex nature of true fulfilment for the marginalized.  Beloved’s claims on Sethe, 
we can argue, are an indication of the ‘longing to attain’ self-consciousness by 
recovering into ‘a better and truer self’.   
Additionally, the 'hither and thither' experienced by the 'Negro' in his 'striving' 
will be perceived as a lack of power, as 'weakness' (3) by those who reject him.  
This contributes to the prejudice already directed at the 'Negro' but it is not 
weakness that is at the root of the problem: it is, says Du Bois, (3) 'the 
contradiction of double aims'.  The struggle on the one hand 'to escape white 
contempt' and on the other to 'plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde', 
having but 'half a heart in either cause', is the source of two unreconciled appeals 
both of which 'his larger audience despised' (30). 
 Resolution, in Du Bois's opinion, would be achieved only by a unification of 
the 'Negro' people in which their talents and traits would become apparent to all.  
'Work, culture and liberty...' would be achieved through the betterment of the 
'Negro' race in... 'conformity' to American ideals (3).  This would mean that two 
great 'world-races' would inhabit one great continent and, eventually, over time 
'give each-to-each those characteristics both so sadly lack' (7).  It was a vision for 
the reconciliation of insurmountable problems.  DuBois’s ideal of fostering and 
developing the traits and talents of the Negro is framed within what Anthony 
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Appiah (1985:25) calls a ‘revaluation of the Negro race in the face of the sciences 
of racial inferiority’.  It is not, then, the establishment of a group which is the goal, 
but establishing the credentials of this group as worthy.   
 In his paper The Conservation of Races Du Bois acknowledges that 
discussions of race have often caused the Negro to minimize race distinctions 
because at bottom they contain ‘assumptions’ regarding his natural, political, 
intellectual and moral status (1897:83).  In this statement we can trace Du Bois’s 
understanding of the prejudice which the Negro faced on a daily basis and the 
complexities inherent in pairing notions of worth with visible appearance: the fact 
that racial inferiority manifests itself more readily for the Negro than the social 
equality Du Bois sought. However, he rejects these assumptions completely as 
‘wrong’ but continues, ‘Nevertheless, in our calmer moments we must 
acknowledge that human beings are divided into races,’ (84) and although 
admitting it is difficult to come to ‘any definite conclusion’ when enquiring into the 
essential differences (85), he states that ‘in the world of science there are at least 
two or three great races: the whites and Negroes, possibly the yellow race’ (85).  
Du Bois’s effort to minimize the frustration inherent in his position is to point out 
that a ‘race’ is a group of people who share the same history, and in a move away 
from the ‘scientific conception of race’ (Appiah 1985:23) and its connotations of 
racial inferiority, Du Bois claims that eventually race must be conceived as a ‘family 
of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common 
history, traditions and impulses…’ (1897:86).   
This places the concept of race in a ‘socialhistorical’ context (Appiah 
1985:23) while preserving ‘the traits and talents of the Negro’ as ‘racial’ 
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characteristics: notions concerning ‘race’, ‘common blood’ and ‘impulses’ mean 
that, as Appiah points out, Du Bois is anchored in the scientific conception of race 
but assigns to it ‘a moral and metaphysical significance’(29).  This makes the claim 
distinctive in that it confirms that the ‘Negro’ race has a positive message 
concerning the value inherent in its difference from other races (29).  This position 
led Du Bois to accept that notions of race, for example common blood and visible 
differences, are signs of a racial essence but that the ‘cultural capacities’ of the 
‘Negro’ were not inferior to those of his ‘white-skinned’ neighbours (30).  Given the 
opportunity, the ‘Negro’ would rise above his situation to occupy a position in the 
world conducive to his natural talents.  In this reading, ‘it is not that his definition of 
race is at odds with the scientific one’ but that he allocates race ‘a moral 
significance different from that of his contemporaries’ (Appiah 1985:29). Du Bois’s 
task in revaluing the Negro race is to undermine notions of racial inferiority while 
establishing the credentials of this group as worthy: an attempt to remove the 
inferiority from race and replace it with racial worth.  However, Appiah sums up the 
dilemma in DuBois’s writings as the discrepancy between the simple claim on the 
one hand to equality, ‘a denial of substantial difference’, but on the other ‘a claim to 
a special message’ (25).  This sums up the classic dilemma of a subordinate group 
framed in the classic dichotomy concerned with perceptions of difference: how to 
foster the traits and talents of the Negro within ‘a conformity with the greater ideals 
of the American Republic’ while maintaining ‘ a moral and metaphysical 
significance’ different from that of the controlling group’s: a significance that can 
never be articulated within the framework of racial inferiority and the established 
‘greater’ ideals of a larger group (29).  Consequently, in adopting this position Du 
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Bois comes perilously close to affirming the existence of a hierarchy headed by a 
controlling white society whose self-acclaimed superiority is attained in large part 
by their marginalization of the very same people Du Bois is driven to uplift (Appiah 
1985).  It would be difficult to deny in this situation that white society would become 
the yardstick by which Negro progression was measured.      
‘The collapse of the sciences of racial inferiority’ in the early 20th century 
(Appiah:30) was the source for a fresh approach to the complexities of prejudice 
faced by Du Bois.  Earlier, the reasoning had focused on a difference which was 
not to be thought any less fruitful than that of other races.  Now that definitions of 
race began to move away from an understanding that physical characteristics 
imply certain racial traits, Du Bois was obliged to alter the framework surrounding 
his thinking concerning ‘race’.  Conceptualizing the idea of a group becomes more 
and more unmanageable as Du Bois is forced once more to adapt his thinking as a 
result of forces outside his control.   
By 1911, and in light of new lines of thought, he was stating that ‘it is not 
legitimate to argue from differences in physical characteristics to differences in 
mental characteristics’ and in addition to this that, ‘the civilization of a … race at 
any particular moment of time offers no index to its innate or inherited capacities’ 
(Du Bois 1911:157-8).  Having put aside the concept of racial essence, these 
statements now indicate that there are other forces at work, such as the 
development of economic power, which are detrimental to the development of a 
subordinate group of people but which do not provide a guide or a measure of the 
controlling group’s innate capabilities or a subordinate group’s lack of them.  
However, this may indicate that once a controlling group has the means to promote 
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its own ends, it will be very difficult for a minor group to assert itself to any 
advantage or to prove it holds a worthy stake in that civilization.  In this context, the 
idea that the Negro through his own development will in the end take his rightful 
place in the system remains a difficult proposition. 
 Du Bois’s willingness no longer to support notions of a racial type does not 
remove for him the need to substantiate the claims of the Negro through the 
framework of a worthy group.  It appears simply to transpose the problem to 
another area of contention not of his making.  He now states clearly that the 
physical bond ‘is least’ and ‘the badge of colour relatively unimportant save as a 
badge’.  The real bond has as its essence the ‘Social heritage of slavery; the 
discrimination and insult’ and this ‘heritage’ binds together the people of Africa and 
all those other peoples who have suffered at the hands of white people (116).  Du 
Bois appears sidetracked into framing his claim for unity within the idea of a shared 
history and experience common to all marginalized people because of his 
determination to prove that his group possesses innate qualities that are at least 
equal to those of any other group: an inhibiting prerequisite resultant of living in the 
shadow of an all-controlling group.  However, the change in argument does not 
further his claim because it requires, as a basis for unity, the establishment of a 
‘worthy’ history after the devastation of three centuries of slavery, and this may well 
prove as difficult to establish as the idea of a racial group who have the 
wherewithal necessary to take their place in society after such a ‘disaster’.  More 
than ever, the inviolable ideals of American society are twinned with ideals of 
civilization and because of this Du Bois cannot establish a niche in American 
society where the Negro can provide proof of his contribution and, consequently, 
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the group remains fractured and its claims inconsequential.  Unhappily, returning to 
those notions of the group and its situation, which evoke ‘the social heritage of 
slavery’ and which substitute ‘a socio historical conception of race for the biological 
one’, leaves Du Bois with ‘no more conceptual resources…for explicating the unity 
of the Negro race than he had in The Conservation of Races’ (Appiah 1985:34). 
This fresh approach defeats the idea of any Negro ‘residue’ within American 
society of Negro contribution and as such he is left with a general claim of 
diminution rather than one of unification through participation (34). 
 His inability to define and articulate fully and finally his response to prejudice 
resonates in the language he uses to describe the Negro’s ‘striving’ to merge his 
double self into a ‘better, truer self’ (Du Bois 1994[1903]:2).  It is through his 
striving that he comes ‘to analyze the burden he bore upon his back, that 
deadweight of social degradation’ (5) and which Du Bois uses to conceptualize the 
condition of the subordinated individual.  ‘In those somber forests of his striving,’ he 
writes, ‘…he saw himself, darkly as through a veil’ (5), providing an image of an 
individual who feels a veil has been drawn over his qualities as a human being and 
who survives solely on his ability to monitor the level of regard afforded his actions 
by those who shun him on a daily basis in the life he performs outside the veil.  
This is important because it situates knowledge of self in the striving to improve 
under the eyes of a controlling majority; failure becomes a personal infliction.  It 
connotes self-worth with the attainment of those values inherent in a group who 
remain steadfastly protective of them.  They are not meant for sharing.  And in this 
context a burgeoning awareness and comprehension must remain a secret and 
this secret increases the burden of ‘degradation’.  This is described by Du Bois as 
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‘looking at one’s self through the eyes of others’ (5), and as the double-
consciousness resultant of the absence of a true self-consciousness.   
The use of symbolism by Du Bois is an indication of the complexity of his 
task and the risks he faced in dealing with perceptions of difference.  It registers his 
intent to conceptualize the despair of the individual rather than the group in the 
attempt to register the true capability of the Negro and his quest for self-
consciousness, self-realization and self-respect.  The enduring symbol of the veil 
lays to rest the notion of a group that never was.  The veil, then, for Du Bois 
indicates the situation of an individual who is very aware and receptive of society’s 
requirements for advancement but because of prejudice develops a separate 
awareness of his place in the interactions of this society.  It promotes the image of 
an individual whose quest for acknowledgement and acceptance is centred not on 
those he knows best but the strangers who would rule over him, distorting the 
presentation of the effort to secure a better, truer self and the striving which 
facilitates it.  It also serves as a sign that rejection is the ultimate fate of the Negro.  
However, it is noteworthy that this striving has taken place away from the 
community, manifesting itself as the reserve of a particular type of individual. 
Consequently, it forfeits any consideration of the strivings of those individuals in the 
community and as such insinuates a particular dilemma suited to a particular 
individual and suggests that the community is ill-equipped to initiate or sustain a 
commitment to the higher ideals of the American Republic.  Nonetheless, it does 
mean that double-consciousness for Du Bois is a result of a rejection of the effort 
to express true self-consciousness by an individual who has become attracted to 
the rules of a game he/she is not allowed to play.   
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The capabilities of the Negro, even if they are behind the veil, can be 
established but the veil’s subtle distinction engineered by Du Bois is that a better 
and truer self is a frustratingly impossible goal without acknowledgement from and 
interaction with the controlling group.  The fault lines within Du Bois’s proposal for 
the establishment of two worthy races giving each-to-each are now manifest in the 
need for the integration and acknowledgement required by the individual for his/her 
fulfilment.  Within the symbolism of the veil, then, exist the contradictions that 
plagued Du Bois’s attempts to establish a racially worthy group: is it the individual 
or the group who is paramount; and if it is the group then what are the ties, beyond 
rejection, which hold it together; if it is the individual, how is she/he to distance 
themselves from the group without intensifying the feelings associated with 
rejection?   
Sethe and Beloved are indicative of the connection, acknowledgement and 
homage that animate Morrison’s theme, and decades later they satisfy Du Bois’s 
quest for the conceptual resources which would have allowed him to ground his 
conceptualization of the bond, shared by all victims of prejudice and insult, in an 
emotional and personal experience.  However, his ideas concerning the group, 
whose identification proved so difficult, remain unfulfilled.   The development of 
Sethe’s emotional history entails the reluctant rejection of that group which, finally, 
Du Bois conceptualized as those whose experience formed the essence of the 
‘social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult’ and a heritage vibrant 
enough to bind together the people of Africa whose context for development was 
America.  
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 The lack of any ready emotional and personal expression behind the veil, 
alongside notions of a worthy group existing under the heritage of slavery, 
contributes to the myths generated by white society concerning those who were 
once enslaved.  The symbol, which is meant to express the extent to which the 
humanity of the ‘Negro’ is hidden from view in his non-existence, and also the 
consequences for that individual in asserting his/herself under the gaze of white 
control becomes, when associated with the heritage of slavery, the expression for 
those inexplicable and intangible prejudices which are always seeking in reality an 
objectivity they do not possess.  Unification in this sense becomes impossible 
because the individual conceptualized behind the image of the veil fulfils the 
circumstances that saw its inception.  The refutation of that ‘discrepancy’ 
engineered by ‘whites’ between what Africans thought they were and what they 
truly were (Wilson 1993), according to Baraka, must be ‘a legitimate product of the 
Negro experience in America’ (2009:133).  His insight makes clear the risk, for 
those who do not exist in the perceptions of white America, of being coerced into 
providing credence to the myths ‘which only ideological domination can effect’ 
(Dollimore 1988:48).  Because of the failure of the veil to include comprehensively 
the Negro’s emotional relationship with his past and present, his experience 
becomes shaded by the difficulty of coming from behind it.  Personal experience 
must remain just that and not be a result of any characteristics foisted on it by 
prejudice.  Horribly, conjoined with someone else’s history, the ‘Negro’ becomes 
veiled in a prescribed heritage not of his own making but which, because of its 
persistent ‘imposition by the dominant’, risks becoming a ‘self-confirming’ agent of 
his/her own fears (Dollimore 1988:48).  The ground between Baraka’s plea for the 
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presentation of emotional experience and Du Bois’s earlier attempts to unite his 
people under overbearing bourgeois projections of ‘their America’ can be 
delineated within the thinking of Andre Gide (1978).  He understood that, ‘borrowed 
truths are the ones to which one clings most tenaciously’, and even more so ‘since 
they remain foreign to our intimate self’ (338).  He compared this with the ‘boldness 
and prudence’ required if the individual was to deliver ‘one’s voice to an already 
existing party’ (338). He believed above all, it is to oneself ‘that it is important to 
remain faithful’ (338).  His words resonate with an appeal to the individual and the 
individual’s own experience.  Gide’s most personal, intuitive instincts were classed 
as deviant by his society but for him this did not affect their authenticity.  Dollimore 
(1988:46) points out that for Gide, ‘deviant desire is legitimated in terms of culture’s 
opposite, nature’, which posits the personal and instinctual as ‘precultural’ or more 
importantly for our argument, ‘more than cultural’ (46).  These are the terms in 
which the relationship formed by Morrison in the ‘twoness’ between Sethe and 
Beloved can be understood.  We can say that the rights and wrongs, the 
complexities and contradictions carried within Du Bois’s use of the veil have, for 
Sethe, become very personal; and because Beloved is instinct with the effect of 
those complexities, they appear more than cultural.         
Although this summary of Beloved’s role expressed in the context of Du 
Bois’s conceptualization of double-consciousness is not a full delineation of the 
language and methods used in her formulation, it does serve as an indication of 
Morrison’s approach to those same complexities with which Du Bois was faced in 
the early part of that century which later saw the publication of Beloved (1987).  
This approach can be detected in her earlier novel, Sula (1973), and a close 
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reading of this novel will reveal its similarity to that of Beloved in the presentation of 
the difficulties of maturation for the individual under the debilitating effects of 
prejudice and marginalization.  The novel’s theme, as in Beloved, engages with the 
effects on the individual of the convoluted and impenetrable frustrations 
encountered in the African American’s quest for self-fulfilment and the relationship 
between the individual and the community.  In doing this the ‘two-ness’ of double-
consciousness is apparent within the developing lives of two characters, Nel and 
Sula, and the presence of the community’s conflicting impressions on them is 
expressed in the figure of Shadrack.  However, as the novel progresses 
Shadrack’s influence lessens to be replaced by an intimacy between Nel and Sula 
in which the complex nature of their expectations is played out.   
 Denise Heinze (1993), commenting on Morrison's attempts to transcend this 
two-ness in her characters, points out that Morrison has established a positive 
black identity and reordered racial consciousness through a 'serious exploration 
and rediscovery of the black community's unique cultural heritage' (9), and 
illustrates the demise of blacks 'who have adopted the corrupting influence of white 
society' (9).  This confirms the importance of Morrison's theme that identity in her 
work must emanate from within the community.  Heinze qualifies this by pointing 
out that Morrison's experience of the corruption of human values in the dominant 
society, leads her to believe that 'the rediscovery of these values is best effected in 
black culture' (8). 
This is a telling statement in that the relationship between Sula and Nel 
facilitates Nel’s realization that neither the white community nor her own are 
entirely conducive to her quest for a better, truer self, and it accepts the idea that 
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‘the ideology of the dominant’ will frustrate any attempt by the ‘Negro’ to contribute 
to it.  In light of this the community is the only place left in which to develop a sense 
of self-direction.  However, the community’s reaction to those individuals who 
return because they have nowhere else to go is a difficult proposition.  Their 
presence back in the community may be perceived as proof of that lack 
promulgated endlessly by white society during three-hundred years of slavery 
concerning their captives, the Negroes; their experience may be perceived as the 
proof that it is better to stay in the community and remain as they are in the sound 
belief that they do not live amongst the moral deficiencies so evident in white 
society.  Nonetheless, in Morrison’s work we will find ample evidence pointing to 
the decline and demise of those groups left in isolation.  As we shall see, these 
concerns are woven into the narrative of the novel, Sula, as they are in Beloved, by 
representations of reflexive action and introspection engineered within the 
conflicting desires of the individual.  These representations facilitate an 
understanding of the perceptions of the people who make up the community.  
Because her own community, and Nel within it, is seen to be deeply affected by 
prejudice and marginalization, Nel’s efforts to assert herself become individual 
aspirations and not typical behaviour.  Sula’s ambition to integrate with white 
society fails and her reunion with Nel back in their community develops to 
underline how the ‘ideology of the dominant’ has interpreted Sula’s ambitions as an 
effort by her to prove her equality with them; that her instincts are to fulfil their 
expectations and not her own.  In this context the framework of values defined 
within the relationship between Nel and Sula are better effected in the ‘black’ 
community in their real lives ‘in the exact terms America has proposed’ for them 
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(Baraka 2009:133).  It follows that the ‘rediscovery’ of those values occurs in their 
personal perceptions of their own situation away from anything ‘white’.  This is to 
say that the responses of Nel and Sula, each to each, demonstrate that the 
attainment of a truer and better self, within the social prescriptions of the American 
Republic and their own community, is an entirely personal undertaking. 
 The results of this will become clear in the experience of Helene and her 
daughter Nel.  On a rail journey they are accosted by a white conductor for walking 
through the 'white's only car'.  Helene is flustered and makes apologies and is 
addressed as 'gal'.  At this, 'all her old fears of being somehow flawed gathered in 
her stomach' (Morrison 1998:20).  She is berated and belittled as Nel and 'four or 
five black faces watch,' two of whom are soldiers (21).  She is made to move aside, 
but as the conductor moved past she 'smiled dazzlingly and coquettishly' at the 
salmon-coloured face of the conductor (21).  Helene is written as having great 
beauty and was conscious of its effect on the people in her community and the 
attention it attracted.  In her community she was 'impressive' and 'held sway'.  
Because of her status on her own ground and the confidence it afforded, her 'smile' 
can be read as a familiar recourse with which to recover or sustain a faltering 
situation.  However, along with being described as 'coquettish' she is also 
reminiscent of 'a street pup that wags its tail... after being kicked away only 
moments before' (21).  These two descriptions hover between the freedom of 
expression learned during experience and the detachment afforded the individual 
who has no real connection with their oppressor other than a requirement to get 
what they want from the situation.  The use of the 'street pup' in this simile does 
evoke notions of subservience, but the kicks it has received do not register with the 
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pup the anger we associate with the kicker.  The pup simply wants food and could 
not care less about the ire of his attacker because he/she is way down the list of 
priorities of which food occupies top spot: hence the wagging tail in spite of the 
rebuffs.  
 In light of these considerations Helene's dazzling smile is not then a last-
gasp gesture for approbation from white society, it is more akin to an effort to 
establish her own vibrant sensibilities, her own idea of herself, in a situation where 
they are not recognized by her persecutor.  Helene's successful attempt to pull off 
a dazzling smile situates her in another context, that of her home ground and is the 
expression that registers the validity of the identity she enjoys there and her 
readiness to smile is a measure of the insignificance she attaches to the opinions 
of the salmon-coloured conductor in her quest to be herself. 
 If we refer Helene's situation back to the loss of place and confusion 
associated with the idea of the 'black' individual not existing in the world at all, then 
it is evident that Morrison has taken the idea of double-consciousness and altered 
its significance.  The two-ness, which is the result of the 'black' individual’s striving 
to amalgamate two selves within one person, is rejected by Helene in her display 
of a vital identity gained somewhere other than in the context of her humiliation.  
And if we use Helene's behaviour as the expression of her identity we see 'how 
well constituted she must be, how healthily built, to step in such a way among 
them, contorted, rattled, and yet victorious, captivating' (Benjamin 1978:480).  In 
Benjamin’s terms, the truth emanating from Helene’s situation is muffled in her 
custard-coloured dress, and concealed in the veiled eyes of the soldiers.  But it 
exists as a condemnation of the prejudice whose roots nourish these modalities of 
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behavior.   Away from her community Helene transforms her experience of it into 
the expression of individual quality in an attempt to nullify prejudice and maintain a 
sense of identity and place where ‘two-ness’ is consumed in an expression of self-
worth.  It is intriguing that mention of the veil will refer to those watching and not 
the actions of Helene. 
 However, the same situation is witnessed by her daughter Nel and the 'black 
faces' in the segregated carriage.  Nel could not understand 'then or later' why her 
mother had smiled (Morrison 1998: 21), and her presence and position in the 
carriage where 'before her were the midnight eyes' of the 'black' faces and behind 
was the 'bright and blazing light of her mother's smile' (21) is the conduit through 
which double-consciousness is delineated.  She is very aware of the reactions of 
those watching because the 'closed faces' and 'locked eyes' of the four or five 
watching 'black faces' isolated her mother and refused to acknowledge her 
predicament.  Once it was over, however, their expression had not changed but a 
'veil' had been drawn over their eyes (22), and Helene's smile is now described as 
foolish. 
It is significant that the reaction of the black soldiers to Helene’s smile and 
her humiliation by the guard is described as ‘stricken’ (21).  Their indifference had 
now turned to alarm and we can say a scene containing the humiliation of a ‘Negro’ 
was a familiar occurrence to them but the smile was something else.  Morrison has 
chosen to make these witnesses soldiers.  In this context, they would have been 
very familiar with the ‘white world’ of the army and its stringent procedures.  
Although they would have been expected to take many risks and make sacrifices in 
promoting the interests of the American Republic, this commitment would not result 
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in their full inclusion into an institution run exclusively by white people.  
Concomitant  with their commitment they would have  experienced enforced 
discrimination and segregation in harrowing circumstances, a fact used by 
Morrison as commensurate with the madness of aligning oneself with the ‘white 
world’.  Their uniforms appear as an outward indication of the lesson they had 
learned during their entanglement with a system in which they were exploited, and 
their ‘stricken’ reaction registers their fears for Helene as they interpret her smile as 
a device to integrate with a group of people whom they knew from bitter experience 
it was better to avoid. 
Mention of the 'veil' suggests that at this point their true feelings were being 
hidden because of Helene's reaction to the white conductor.  There is ‘no earthly 
reason’ for Helene’s smile, ‘at least no reason that anybody could understand, 
certainly no reason that Nel understood then or later’ (Morrison 1998:21).  Nel’s 
observations, as she ‘looked away’ from the ‘flash of her mother’s pretty teeth’ are 
given in the third person; ‘she also saw the muscles of their [the soldiers’] faces 
tighten’ and is described as having the ‘blazing light of her mother’s smile’ behind 
her and ‘the midnight eyes of the soldiers’ before her (21).  This is reminiscent of 
the scene in Blue Stone Road as Beloved flashes a ‘dazzling’ smile at the 
community of women before her, with Denver watching (Morrison 2004:308): only 
in Helene’s case prejudice looms large, whereas for Beloved it is finally put to one 
side.  The truth trembles in both these situations but will never command the same 
meaning as before because something in the years to come, ‘much as we should 
have liked to share it’ with Helene and Beloved, ‘could only happen through [their] 
absence’ (Benjamin 1978:450).   
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The observations that the soldiers now looked ‘stricken’ and the fact that the 
expression in their eyes had not changed save a ‘hard wetness that veiled them’ 
are the narrator’s (Morrison 1998:22).  Given the subtle distinctions between what 
she saw and what the narrator gives us to understand about her situation, Nel’s 
lack of understanding is confirmed and developed as she is placed in this scene 
between her mother and the soldiers: if she cannot understand the reasons for her 
mother’s smile, then it follows that she cannot be seen to understand the reaction 
of those others to it.  In this scene we have the perceptions of those who have 
been away from the community compared with those (Helene) who preferred it as 
a place to develop after their experiences in a world where white people exert 
control.  The soldiers’ uniforms are a sign of their inability to develop away from the 
community and the control white society exerts over them.  They are described in 
terms of the veil which represents this condition and confirms their lack of 
resources for asserting or developing a ‘truer self’.  Additionally, the fact that the 
veil is described as covering their eyes suggests they are incapable of seeing and 
judging Helene’s actions.  It is noticeable that the only actions in this scene are 
Helen’s, everyone else watches.  This is an indication of the influence prejudice 
has on those people whose lives are lived in its shadow.  Helene’s smile says more 
about her idea of herself than it does about her relationship with white people, but 
because of the soldiers’ experiences they cannot ‘see’ what is happening on the 
other side of the veil.  Double-consciousness in this novel is beginning to be 
defined by those whose actions imply the presence of a truer, better self, and those 
watchers who remain behind the veil in a halfway house of self-doubt and 
frustration.                         
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In their eyes she had behaved in a manner not appropriate to a member of 
the group to which they believed all 'black' people belonged.  Neither one nor the 
other, she could not fulfil their idea of the response they prescribed when dealing 
with the white man.  Unable to relate to Helene they retreat behind the veil which 
now becomes the sign of the lack of that which Helene possesses, and this scene 
now confirms the conflict inherent in the situation of the individuals collectively 
judged unworthy by the imposition of false criteria.  In the most subtle of gestures 
Morrison reviews the veil which exists between 'black' and 'white' people.  The 
conductor, the source of the conflict, is ignored as the veil becomes the device able 
to frustrate the freedom of expression exhibited by Helene.  It is not that this vitality 
is hidden so much as Morrison’s use of the veil suggests a reluctance by the 
soldiers to do anything other than remain behind it.  The veil here registers the 
refusal to confront the debasement which invariably accompanies the effort to 
come from behind it.  This suggests that it is the provision able to preserve the 
human dignity central to self-respect and self-awareness.  Lifting the veil is to risk a 
confrontation where dignity is undermined by humiliation.      
 In a further emphasis on her view of the world and her lack of understanding 
of the situation before her, Nel contemplates her mother's custard-coloured skin 
beneath the 'heavy brown wool' (Morrison 1998:26) of her dress.  She seems to 
equate the half-way house of her mother's colour with the full-blown certainty of the 
colour of her dress.  Helene appears to Nel as neither fully white nor fully black.  
Her ruminations place her mother in both camps and therefore worthy of neither.  
Nel believes that if her mother 'was really custard,' then there was a chance that 
she was too (22).  Her resolve in this situation is always 'to be on guard' and to 
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make certain that 'no midnight eyes or marbled flesh would ever accost her and 
turn her into jelly (22).  Helene’s smile lifts the veil but Nel cannot take advantage 
of the experience.  Helene’s vitality survives to be wondered at, misread and 
misjudged.  Morrison’s conundrum is becoming clear: how to preserve everything 
which pertains to that dazzling smile while isolating it sufficiently for it to survive 
unsullied in the minds of the marginalized people who wish to inherit it.  How can 
human vitality be presented to the imagination as just that, as simply being there?  
As Nel will tell us, it cannot be hinted at, or unveiled like a statue, nor step forward 
from behind the curtain in triumph.  We argue that the essence of humanity, the 
idea with which we are most familiar, for Morrison must be isolated from history, 
that of the character’s and the group’s.  It is noticeable here that this scene in the 
railroad car becomes suspended, unresolved.  Nel’s determination to be free of the 
insinuations of white people and the constrictions of her own community become 
framed within the notion of double-consciousness: stay still and you are wrong, 
move and you are doubly so.  Nel remains, but her links with the past are 
smothered by white people.    
 From start to finish this scene has contrived to establish Nel as an 
individual.  It supplies a character whose ability to act in a natural way is 
compromised by prejudice and power.  Gide’s impression that ‘a fine life is a 
thought conceived in youth and realized in maturity’ (1978:338) is a fitting insight 
into Morrison’s formulation of Nel as a character.  As we have seen, Nel does not 
fully understand her mother’s reactions and this can be understood as the 
beginnings of the difficulties Nel will experience in achieving the maturity of which 
Gide speaks.  Nonetheless, ‘a fine life is a thought’ suggests an autonomy which 
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has its roots in private contemplation and not cultural influences.  Indeed, on 
returning home from her trip to New Orleans she now feels ‘different’ (Morrison 
1998).  Alone, she studies her face and ‘the nose her mother hated’ and claims ‘I’m 
me… I’m not Nel, I’m me.  Me’.  ‘She had gone on a real trip’ and ‘leaving 
Medallion would be her goal’…‘alone though’: Sula is not yet on the scene.  There 
are no doubts to cloud Nel’s plans at the moment.  In these private moments she 
confesses, ‘I want to be wonderful… Oh, Jesus, make me wonderful’.  Her ‘new 
found me-ness’ quietens her fear that she was ‘custard’ just like her mother and 
vulnerable to the wiles of both ‘black’ and ‘white’ worlds (Morrison1998:28-9).  
Whatever she meant by this me-ness we can see that she meant at all costs to 
remain faithful to her own self.   
 James Baldwin’s reveals his own struggle to maintain a sense of ‘me-ness’ 
between ‘social affairs’ (1995:14) as he calls them and his classification as an 
outsider.  Regarded as an ‘interloper’, he says, American society and its heritage 
would never be his.  However, because he was unfitted for the jungle or the tribe 
(14), he had ‘no other heritage he could possibly use’ (14).  The ‘most difficult’ 
thing in this he reveals was to admit the influence of white people in his life: the 
truth was, he both ‘feared and hated white people’ (14-15).  However, this did not 
mean that [he] ‘loved black people’: on the contrary, ‘he despised them, possibly 
because they failed to produce Rembrandt’.  This environment forced him to see 
clearly that ‘he hated and feared the world’ which meant that the world had a 
‘murderous power’ over him and in such a ‘self-destroying limbo’ he could never 
hope to write (15).  We can say that for Baldwin to write is his ‘me-ness’. 
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Baldwin’s words bring home Nel’s situation.  She too finds herself between 
the social affairs of the American Republic and the midnight eyes of the soldiers.  
So too, if she is to develop the thought of a fine life, it has to be tempered within 
the scheme of the moment, whatever that moment may be. The alternative is no 
maturation at all and the disappearance of the chance to be ‘wonderful’.  The 
comparison of Nel and Baldwin’s insights foregrounds the complexities faced by 
the individual living in a marginalized community and the problem of ‘writing’ Nel.  
Baldwin’s ‘me-ness’ centred on his urge to write, but the danger for him was losing 
that in his struggle with his hate and fear of the scheme he knew he must join.  In 
this context it is not enough for Nel to stake a claim for autonomy, it must be 
achieved within the scheme of the moment as Helene demonstrated on the train.   
Not doing so is to deny the truth that is inside (Gide 1978).  This is not to say that 
Nel’s efforts to be wonderful will be written similar to Baldwin’s experiences within 
American society, she never leaves Medallion again, but her resolve not to be 
‘custard’ will be expressed in action by someone else, and once again, Nel will 
watch.  Nel’s thoughts of a fine life will be acted out while she herself has no place 
in any scheme.  In this way her desire to be wonderful will be played out in the 
terms Baraka (2009) described: in the ‘exact’ terms America has prescribed, and 
described by Baldwin as the ‘general social fabric.’  However, Nel’s understanding, 
unlike Beloved’s (1987) Denver, is accommodated and accounted for in cognitive 
thought, which means that the reader is knowingly informed: that is, we begin 
again to see things as we are.  Barbara Rigby (1991:50) feels that Sula and Nel 
‘represent aspects of a common self, a construction of an identity in relationship’ 
(50), and this insight clearly defines the ‘ambiguity and irony’ present in Morrison’s 
121 
 
characters.  However, it has to be considered that the lack of an identity exhibited 
in Nel’s life and in Sula’s return to the community and all it signifies points towards 
something very different.  It is difficult to perceive a relationship in a lack of identity; 
in the frustrated effort to realize it in maturity.   
Morrison’s determination to persist with the development of an individual 
consciousness informs her development of a particular aesthetic in which cultural 
validation, engineered within the formulation of a social, collective consciousness, 
takes second place to the experience of the victim of cultural subjugation.  Nel’s 
observations concerning her mother’s colour as custard is indicative of this and 
reminiscent of the work of Don Lee (1971).  His poem The Self Hatred of Don L. 
Lee in some part expresses Nel’s conscious affirmation of the worth of blackness 
to her through asserting it. 
   after painfully 
                                                    struggling 
                                                    thru Du Bois 
                                                    Rogers,Locke, 
     Wright & others 
                                                     my blindness 
                                                     was vanished 
                                                     by pitchblack 
                                                     paragraphs of 
                                                     “us, we, me ,i” 
                                                     awareness. 
                                                     i began 
                                                     to love 
                                                     only a  
                                                     part of 
                                                     me- 
                                                     my inner 
                                                     self which 
                                                     is all 
                                                     black- 
                                                     & 
                                                     developed a  
                                                     vehement   
                                                     hatred of 
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                                                     my light 
                                                     brown 
                                                     outer.      
 
                                    (Lee 1971:298)  
 
Lee’s poem is emblematic of the Black Art aesthetic, the heart of which 
promoted a vision of black American unity (Washington 2001:307).  Its poetry and 
plays were honed to express the needs and aspirations of Black America and the 
communication of a ‘black nationalist consciousness’ (308).  Embracing the black 
vernacular, these artistic forms were an affirmation of cultural identity and its 
expression.  Their potential for mass appeal signalled what Justine Baille terms 
‘the flowering of a cultural nationalism’ behind which is the notion that ‘Black 
people, however dispersed, constitute a nation within the belly of white America’ 
(2013:45).  Implicit within this aesthetic, labelled a black aesthetic by Baille 
because of its aim to articulate a black collective consciousness (46), is an 
opposition to those writers whose concern is the delineation of the African 
American experience and not the artistic expression that originates in the 
experiences of the majority (44), and in this we see the measure of Morrison’s 
remove from the nationalist movement. 
For Houston Baker, the potential for mass appeal obstructs the production 
of ‘sophisticated analyses’ for addressing ‘expressive manifestations of Black 
American culture’ (Baker 1980:138).  Baker’s point is that the black aesthetic has 
been reduced to a ‘fundamental level’ which frustrates the critic’s ability to 
formulate a significant account of what ‘compels a writer to render his... instinctual 
experiences in a form accessible to others’ (140).  Only from such an account is it 
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possible to seek out ‘adequate explanation or theoretical insight’ whose critical 
objective would be the explanation of how ‘black narrative texts written in English 
preserve and communicate culturally unique meanings’.  In this conflation of 
literature and culture the concern to articulate a collective consciousness is 
modified within the call for a method of explication which will provide the meaning, 
the reason, behind those cultural concerns unique to the African American 
community.  The significance of Baker’s remove from the ideal of building a strong 
black nation can be discerned in Lee’s poem.  Its voice celebrates ‘pitch 
black/paragraphs of/ “us, we, me I”/awareness’ in the realisation of an identity 
denied for so long.  It registers membership of a collective where the worth of 
selfhood and kinship is analogous to blackness; a blackness whose sufficiency 
satisfies the desire for self-fulfilment.  However, in an acknowledgement that the 
‘consequences of self-representation cannot be calculated in advance of its 
performance’ (Benston 2000:288), the poem concedes a ‘hatred of/my 
light/brown/outer’ (Lee 1971:298).  Washington (2001:311) interprets this as the 
result of having to reject ‘that acquired self-image rooted in a white aesthetic’, but 
the ‘blindness’ of line six is an indication of an inability to engage a burgeoning 
sense of self in anything other than pitch black paragraphs: rather the frustration of 
being unable to find expression for the blackness inside than acquiring whiteness.  
In this sense the hatred of my ‘light/brown/outer’ is the measure of this frustration in 
terms of its watered-down expression in the world of white America.  
Baker (2001) asks ‘for whom - or, better, as whom? – does public 
blackness perform’ (53).  He regards performativity as a ‘human activity engaged in 
by an agent who is … seeking to satisfy some standard of achievement’ and one 
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that ‘may not be precisely articulated’ (35).  Consequently, he regards 
performativity by ‘black’ Americans in the United States, in part, as a defence 
against ‘sentencing blackness to exile from the human race’.   This is to say that 
the black figure is pre-judged by white people using other criteria whose influences 
cannot be defended against adequately by language but only through a 
performance which belies the destructive power of prejudice.  However, he points 
out that the body behind the veil is a body screened and ‘held in mythic 
suspension… within the framing mind’ of the prejudiced majority (58). In this way 
prejudice is not simply the inhibitor of a burgeoning, knowing intelligence but the 
insidious impediment to ‘the public emergence of a modern blackness’ from behind 
the veil (Houston Baker 2001:53-4): the impediment to the expression of humanity 
itself.     
 Because of this, blackness can be said to lack a context where its 
representation can stand on its own two feet.  Perhaps this is the context in which 
Gates (1989:29) calls for the ‘mask of blackness’ behind which African Americans 
can ‘talk that talk’ in a performance chosen by them to disturb prevailing social 
constructions.  Nonetheless, performance, even if contrived, is still a referent under 
the eyes of the prejudiced and that which is valued as blackness is still hidden and 
inexpressible and replaced only with pretence.   
Benston (2000) points out the ‘intricacy of negotiating between conceptual 
and expressive sources’ and how performance is implicated or even ‘mutually 
constitutive’ with the idea of blackness: context is constitutive of a light brown outer 
and restrictive of the construction of a ‘powerful cultural voice’ which receives its 
authority from ‘creative imitation’ (249).  We understand by this the risk that the 
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African American writer, in negotiating between convention and innovation, 
empowers in performance, behind the ‘mask of blackness...the language of black 
difference’ (Gates 1989:29).  We can say that Morrison’s work amplifies that 
performance is constitutive of difference because Nel’s determination to be black 
restricts a true personal expression of her experience. Her determination to be 
black clings to her, claiming value at her expense.  David Lawrence refers to this 
as the black body generating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy as blacks find themselves 
unable to assert an identity outside the expectations imposed upon them’ 
(2000:233) in the quest for ‘self-defined ownership’ (236).  Similarly, David Smith 
(1997:180) asks whether blackness precludes black people ‘from mastering 
nonblack cultural modes’ and argues that ‘racial notions subvert ...[the] ability to 
produce accurate theoretical or even descriptive accounts’ of the social and 
cultural circumstances of black people (181).  Nel’s feeling of being the colour of 
custard is an indication of a lack of consciousness or self-awareness with which to 
nullify the actions of the white conductor.  The strength provided by her internal 
blackness is lost in her inability to express it or maintain it in a world dominated by 
white power.  If we contemplate Denver’s links with Sethe, her closest relative, and 
with Beloved, who represents her ancestors lost in an unknowable past, then the 
blackness incarnate in Denver is a result of a connection with her ancestors and 
palpable in the present of her existence.  Nel is different.  Her blackness is 
animated in a rejection of Helene, and in her inaction when ‘Chicken Little’, 
representative of all that should be preserved in the community, is drowned.  His 
disappearance in the water from which Beloved, in another novel, will appear, 
registers the finality of the rejection of community values.  Beloved is incumbent of 
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Denver’s self-awareness and of her footprints down by the water’s edge.  The void 
which exists between Nel’s internal blackness and its place in the world is never 
tempered by a conception of the source from which it emanates or its contribution 
to a sense of autonomy for the character.  Denver achieves autonomy because in 
her we can conceive of the idea of what humanity is.   Smith’s insight is indicative 
of Nel’s situation in dramatic time, because her final, cognitive reflection is an 
indication that her performance is constitutive of blackness and not with the idea on 
which she reflects. Because of this Morrison is restricted to writing Nel’s reflections 
and not the formation of a powerful cultural voice.  In the light of these comments 
and the above interpretation of Helene and Nel’s relationship, it is clear that 
Morrison’s engagement with the black aesthetic isolates the blackness written by 
Lee, but its existence is not written fully until her novel Beloved, and her mastery of 
‘the relation between the presentable and the conceivable’ (Lyotard 1986:79).  
The Black Arts Movement’s ‘speculative quest for a distinctly black 
modality of cultural assertion’ (Benston 2000:251), according to Gates (1989), must 
redefine ‘theory itself’ from within ‘black culture’ and avoid the ‘premise that theory 
is something white people do’ (28).  However, we can read into this its claim to be 
expressive of a black tradition supported by a black critical endeavour to assert 
black cultural difference and a nation within a nation.  In doing so, it rejects any 
creative influences for its artists other than the black culture it expresses.  
However, the two threads of conceptual and expressive sources remain to be 
negotiated endlessly, and the reality of life for Nel is expressive of the difficulties to 
be encountered in making the idea of her internal blackness conducive to the idea 
of her humanity.  
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 Morrison has written of the ‘complex struggle… inherent in creating 
figuratively logical narrative language that insists on race-specificity without race 
prerogative’ (1997: 5).  This acknowledges that in Sula (1973) race is the mythic 
suspension that hovers behind the veil and which is the common denominator of all 
individual action.  It demands of the narrative a prerogative and ‘intellectual weight 
to which it has absolutely no claim’ (8). 
 The characters in the novel Sula display characteristics which are 
consequent of existing behind the veil.  Their concerns are a result of prejudices 
which are destructive of intellect, independent thought and well-being.  Their 
actions as black Americans are framed within notions of race where differences of 
‘morphology are correlated with subtle differences of temperament, belief and 
intention’ (Appiah 1985:36).  Consequently, at every turn, race appears as the 
determiner in the affairs of this group and its community.  Morrison acknowledges 
that a narrative can provide race ‘specificity’ when its effects are defined and 
identified, in that its debilitating effects becomes ‘(unwittingly)’ the preserve of a 
certain type of group (1997:8).  If the concept of race, or rather the mythic 
suspension in which it exists behind the veil, is an impossible one, not least 
because of the ‘easy assumptions’ claimed for it (Appiah 1985:36), then the 
credence afforded it by revealing its effects in the performance of a ‘black’ 
character, a performance choreographed by the easy assumptions of the bigot, 
renders it possible.  Morrison refuses to be cast as the ‘worthy opponent’ in her 
effort to define ‘a-world-in-which-race-does-not-matter’ as ‘home’ (1997:3).  She 
says that she has always known that she ‘could not, would not, reproduce the 
master’s voice and its assumptions’ (4) because that would be confining herself to 
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his ‘terrain’ and to an acceptance of his rules in the ‘dominance game’.  For her, 
‘counter racism was never an option’ (4).  These are the considerations she 
thought would lead to a ‘freedom’ her writing seemed to promise.  It would lead to 
the ‘racial house’ she lived in becoming ‘an open house, generous in its windows 
and doors’ (4) and here we feel the reach of Morrison’s allegorical writing in 
establishing the dilemma of the individual exposed to prejudice.  Yet, as Morrison 
points out, this freedom would at best be a freedom that would always need 
defending as one won from racial prejudice as we know it; it would be a freedom 
conditional on her intellectual ability to go beyond or rise above the easy 
assumptions which frame its rhetoric.  She describes this as being ‘tethered to a 
death-dealing ideology’ in whose service she had ‘honed’ all her ‘intelligence in 
subverting it’ (5). 
 This type of transformation of a ‘racial house’ would involve ‘intolerable 
circumspection, a self-censoring bond’ in maintaining a freedom in which ‘danger’ 
lies because to ‘reconceive the racial house’ would mean ‘forfeiting ‘ a home of her 
own (4).  The use of the words ‘Home’ and ‘house’ in this allegory traces out the 
intensely personal nature of the dilemma as delineated by Morrison.  In her use of 
allegory Morrison is able to trace the effects of prejudice and racism into the 
consciousness and well-being of the individual and into the reactions of that 
individual to the forces that play on him/her in the effort to resolve those 
assumptions, the effort which in itself forms the tether to that death-dealing 
ideology.  ‘Home’, then, becomes ‘me-ness’, the ‘body as consummate home’ (5), 
but always in ‘a race house’ where race ‘matters’ (1) and ‘freedom’ is the 
‘renovation’ which risks ‘forfeiting’ a home,  in Morrison’s words, ‘of my own’ (4).  
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Convincing oneself of this is to forfeit peace of mind, where the act of convincing 
subtly reifies the structure of that home.  Perhaps Morrison is trying to delineate a 
‘Home’ where self-consciousness, although in part a manifestation of chaos, must, 
eventually, be able to consider, measure and maintain its self-evident worth as a 
condition particular to a human being; not something regarded as resulting from 
history or from the mood of the time, but as removed from history.  She describes 
this as her ‘search for an elusive sovereignty’ and its abandonment when its 
‘disguise’ was recognized (4).  We can say that the disguise is the self-censoring 
bond and the self-reification which appear the ‘Utopia, but never home’ (11).  A 
freedom ‘that could operate…on any number of sites’ (4), but not conducive to the 
home where ‘a manageable, doable, modern humanity’ (4) can be expressed in 
actions which corroborate and support the vitality from which it sprang: self-
regulation instead of self-censorship or self-reification. 
 The language here is strikingly different from that used to delineate the 
dilemma whose existence hovers between, in and around human aspiration, fear 
and anxiety.  Nel is the vehicle through which the anxieties of a divided 
consciousness, in pursuit of an unrealizable dream, can be perceived through 
actions which are questioned within the group in which they originated.  
Consequently, they rank as ‘doable’ activities but resist being ‘manageable’ not 
least because within the setting of the group they are made to appear 
questionable.  Hanging over the group is an awful threat resultant of a double 
consciousness in action whose complexity in dramatic time has to appear palpable.  
It is here that allegorical language becomes the device able to ‘construct’ the walls 
of the raced house, as it were, and from where a conception of a ‘modern 
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humanity’ and its ‘doing’ can be contemplated: the means which frame ‘the 
politically and aesthetically unresolved’ question of how ‘to be both free and 
situated’ (5).  The same language is evident in Morrison’s presentation of the site 
she calls ‘Home’ where ‘race-free language is both possible and meaningful in 
narration’ (9).  This is a place ‘where race both matters and is rendered impotent’ 
(9).  In order ‘to evoke not only the safety and freedom outside the race house’ but 
also ‘to suggest contemporary searches and yearnings for a social space that is 
psychically and physically safe’ (10), Morrison relates a story of a sleepless woman 
who experiences ‘the concrete thrill of borderlessness’.  On a moonlit walk she 
feels safe and secure to the extent she fulfils her instinctual responses to the world 
around her because ‘nothing around or beyond considered her prey’ (10). 
 In its simplicity the story avoids the perils incumbent on everyday existence 
instead using the affinity engendered in the nursing of a restless child to evoke the 
intangibly personal in language.  However, it remains an evocation and the sense 
remains one of an ‘elusive sovereignty’.  As with the formulation of the triad, then, 
the work of Morrison takes place within a ‘raced house’ by an ‘already-and always-
raced writer’ (4) whose dilemma is how to be ‘both free and situated…how to 
enunciate race while depriving it of its lethal cling’ (5).  As we shall see in the 
following chapter and a closer look at Nel and Sula, this question is Nel’s and her 
final situation is an intensely personal recognition of the dilemma expressed in 
‘Home’.  Indeed, Morrison is very clear that in moving beyond the ‘dichotomous 
double consciousness,’ it is the ‘interiority of the othered, the personal that is 
always embedded in the public’ that must lead the search for a character who can 
‘iterate difference that is prized but unprivileged’.  Nonetheless, it is a space whose 
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provision ‘Home’ is still able only to be ‘conceived’ (12).  Tellingly, ‘W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s observation about double consciousness’ in this context is labeled as ‘a 
strategy, not a prophecy or cure’ (12); and in Morrison’s work we can say that it is a 
strategy gifted to the writer in the pursuit of the personal in that opposing voices 
can be heard emanating from the same consciousness.  This fulfils the demand 
that in all its complexities and transformations; from all perspectives and 
perceptions; in its reactions to a blackness it does not recognize, and its right to 
that which it is denied, that voice will be a human one.  However, the language 
used and the literary devices in which it is framed are the means which delineate 
the dilemma, but fail to make conceivable in dramatic time that which is most 
sought after: ‘sovereignty’.                 
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Chapter 3. 
Toni Morrison, Beloved, Hegel’s theory of tragedy, and a commitment to the 
historical consciousness of the form  
This chapter explores Hegel’s theory of tragedy and its application by Toni 
Morrison in her novel Beloved.  Hegel’s emphasis on tragedy as ‘a specific and 
even rare kind of action and response’ limits it as such ‘to certain cultures and 
periods’ (Williams 1966: 32).  In this context Toni Morrison’s artistic representations 
of events from the past in Beloved (1987) become significant.  In particular, the 
relationship between Sethe and Beloved and Morrison’s motivation for the form of 
its development, that is Beloved’s birth into slavery, the brief period of freedom 
enjoyed by mother and child, Beloved’s murder, subsequent return and final 
leaving, can be deemed appropriate to Hegel’s theory of tragedy. Hegel’s definition 
of tragedy is centred on a conflict inspired by contradiction and an ethical claim.  
For genuine tragic action, he claims, 
  ‘It is essential that the principle of individual freedom and independence, 
  or at least that of self-determination, the will to find in the self the free  
  cause and source of the personal act and its consequences, should already 
  have been aroused.’ 
                   (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:308) 
In ancient tragedy this principle is set against a network of beliefs connected 
to ‘institutions, practices and feelings which have their basis in particular myths’ 
(Williams 1966:17).  In contrast with modern tragedy, the effort here to assert an 
independent subsistence is confronted by a fatalism which exerts limits on human 
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actions.  The word fatalism, however, because of the complexity manifest in 
ancient tragedy in any comparison with modern drama does not fully convey the 
situation of the tragic hero.  The presence of myth, for example, in Greek tragedy is 
significant because its expressions in the drama are the ruling and influential 
families from whom are drawn the tragic heroes whose suffering (pathos) is the 
result of a contradiction between their growing claims to self-determination and 
those of the unique culture in which they live.  The form of this drama, then, 
‘embodies, in a unique way, both the history and the presence’, the myth and the 
values formed in ‘response’ to it (18). 
 However, in ancient tragedy, the limits on individual self-validation, that is on 
the developing consciousness which is not yet called freedom, are not known in 
advance or in a general way but discovered in ‘real actions’ (Williams 1966: 18) 
and precipitate a spectacular fall.  This has the effect of placing the myths at the 
root of this society in the present and alongside real experience and of 
undermining the harmony they previously provided.  And yet, importantly, the 
feelings produced as a result of this action draw attention to a fuller sense of the 
fatalism/destiny confronting the tragic hero.  ‘What we nowadays call fate is just the 
opposite of this attitude of self-consciousness’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:241).  Modern 
drama, we can say, presents fate as a condition applicable to the individual or 
rather as the reason for any condition affecting the individual.  This reason or event 
can be far removed from the present but somehow has repercussions for him/her 
in an arbitrary link which allows the cause to be associated with numerous effects 
and events.  Consequently, this sense of cause and effect insinuates a connection 
between ‘that which the sufferer is in himself and that which befalls him as 
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unmerited’ (310).  It is her fate. This is very different from that which confronts the 
tragic hero of ancient drama. 
 Hegel writes of the Greek character as someone who has transformed the 
natural ‘into an expression of his own being’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:239).  Though not 
absolutely self-produced or self-determining, ‘disposition and variety of 
temperament’ are thought of as ‘free individuality’ to the extent that those 
universally understood properties are now conceived as peculiar to the individual; 
the result of ‘disposition and individual constitution’ and ‘exertion of the will’ (239).  
Because this developing consciousness is not yet able to be expressed, and needs 
‘the matter nature supplies’, Hegel terms this state ‘spiritual individuality’ (239). 
 However, the concrete world, the social determinates that make up 
existence generally, exhibits power over spiritual individuality.  Its manifestations 
are uniformity and equality and the power emanating from them is known as ‘Fate 
or Destiny, simple necessity’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:239).  Nevertheless, in Hegel’s 
terms, there is a form of freedom present if considered within the realm of feeling:  
‘The Greek who has within him the feeling of necessity calms his soul with that’ 
(240).  This is comparable to a feeling of resignation, that there is nothing to be 
done about it, ‘it is so’, and Hegel implies that the contentment it provides the 
individual, in the form of a decision made, confers a freedom in that the decision 
itself is the product of an individual determination.  ‘Misfortune, discontent’ in light 
of this simply arise as things contrary to the individual’s will (240) and particular 
interests given up by him signal a repose into ‘being’ (241). 
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 This ‘mental attitude,’ (240) confirming necessity’s constative influence as 
something which simply is, results in ‘a renunciation’, the individual relinquishing all 
particular interests and aims and appearing ‘in relation to necessity’ (240) as 
something which does not exist independently.  Accordingly, a finite 
consciousness, that is one that would remain in thrall to power without inward 
freedom, is here repudiated in favour of a surrender to necessity, and this ‘revering 
of necessity’ is that attitude of ‘indeterminate self-consciousness... wholly devoid of 
the element of opposition’ (241).  Not yet freedom, it is visible in the hero’s 
readiness to take full responsibility for the actions which befall him, even though in 
our terms, he is completely blameless.  To us moderns his stoicism adds to his 
tragic demeanour but as Williams (1966) is quick to point out, this is not an 
aesthetic or technical achievement but a ‘dramatic form rooted in a precise 
structure of feeling’ (18).  It produces the most notable, noble characters and is 
least imitable in modern drama because the ability to express personal aspiration 
has been given over to necessity by a ‘shutting up of the spirit within simple 
abstraction’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:242).  The grandeur of the character is a result of 
what fate has wrested from him and is far less a result of any cause and effect 
because necessity is not a ‘connection of relations’ but prompts a return into a 
freedom which stands above the ‘concrete and particular’ (242) of the everyday.  It 
is still, however, of the abstract kind as it cannot thrive in any contact with that 
which is definite or determined.  ‘It is pure thought... being-within-self, the 
relinquishment of the particular’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:242).  And, importantly, with an 
eye on modern drama, lacking the particular it can never demonstrate harmony 
with existence generally.  That is, the lack of drive in asserting any particular 
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aspiration confines the character, but it is also indicative of a general state of 
feeling inherent within this unique society, which is expressed through the voices of 
the chorus.  Their presence ensures that what is felt by the hero is not the product 
of individual experience but resonant of collective experience and general 
sentiment.  What are realized here are the feelings of a particular society at a 
particular time, the expression of which reveals the lack of ‘the self-contained 
human individuality’ which Hegel designates as necessary for the development of 
character (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:311).  What will develop is the embodiment in the 
character of this general sentiment ‘as concrete individuality’ (312). 
 The shutting up of spirit and the relinquishing of any particular aspiration is 
referred to by Hegel as ‘simple reflection into self’ (1832 Vol.2:249)  In light of the 
role of the chorus, spirit in this ancient drama can be conceived as ‘the reality of 
the people’ whose abstract is its individuation into individuals (Taylor 1980: 85).  At 
this stage for Hegel ‘imagination is now the organ’ (Hegel 1832 Vol.2:249) which 
will give ‘outward form to the inwardly abstract’.  That is, the creative artist brings 
the abstract forward into existence for the immediate perception of ‘figurative 
thought’ and not ‘as present immediate forms’ (249).  Rather, Hegel describes 
them as products of the imagination, ‘invented’ but not fictitious because their 
content is the ‘moral element peculiar to men, their morality... and essentiality’ 
(256), and the result of man’s struggle with necessity.  They are, then, termed 
essential forms in that they issue ‘in vital co-ordination with man’s emotional life’, 
(Hegel1835 Vol.1:301) his spirit, and are powerful in their exemption from 
contingency in that they relate to self.  However, their manifestation as such 
content relies on their external, dramatic involvement with the tragic figure. 
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 We have, then, external images (the gods of ancient drama) whose content 
is the emotional life of the character and in which there is nothing ‘not known to 
man’ or which man ‘does not find or know in himself’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:241).  This 
means that having been given an external existence by the dramatist, the intimate 
life of the character becomes visible to all in any action he takes and is referable to 
all.  This must be so because this external representation is ‘the universal content 
of that which is the stimulating energy in the resolves and actions of human 
individuality’ (306-7).  Generated in a reaction to necessity and given form by the 
artist, the character’s separate existence is at once both the ‘vital force of our 
human existence’ and ‘the vital and moving forces in the human heart’ (306): both 
the reality of the people and the individual. 
 As an external development for figurative thought and also as the product of 
a reaction to necessity, it comes about that individuals have transferred the powers 
which control them in reality into feelings which in their external representations 
(the gods) now must be seen as the controlling forms of existence in that the scope 
of their influence is consequent on their separate and external configuration.  
These forms control humankind in that they are those principals of spiritual 
individuality which men and women have taken on themselves in opposition to 
necessity and they contradict the conditions present in the outside world.  In any 
action resultant on this contradiction, these forms will be discernible in the 
reactions of the chorus, and thereafter in the perceptions of the audience.   They 
are, then, precisely the harmony which man seeks with himself in his social 
conditions.  This must be viewed as the accomplishment of the artist in that ‘the 
stamp of universality’ appears on man’s existence ‘in all its shapes and parts’ 
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(Hegel 1832 Vol.2:252).  This will ensure that the form of any creative practice will 
be planned in spirit, ‘be produced only out of it and exist only in its mediation’: a 
work of art (252).  In A.C. Bradley’s words (1950:71), the reason the tragic conflict 
‘appeals to the spirit is that it is itself a conflict of the spirit’. 
 The ideal character for Hegel, then, is one who exhibits universal traits 
alongside a concrete singularity: that is, within him/her a particular sensibility is 
evident.  The unity achieved here is one of self-relation, the self-contained human 
individuality designated as character and predicated ‘in external existence’ (Hegel 
1832 Vol.2:253).  Man’s relation to the ‘gods’ is in fact a relation with himself.   
 An example of such a character is Achilles described by Hegel as containing 
the wealth of substance of ‘the complete and living member of society’ (Hegel 1835 
Vol.1:314), as well as that ‘concrete individuality’ which in their relatedness provide 
the drama with the human character.  The brutal, warlike spirit of Achilles is 
symbolized by his readiness to draw his sword, but he calms himself in the 
presence of Pallas.  This restraining element ‘is his own prudence’ predicated by 
Pallas.  But Pallas is also the living spirit of the Athenian people, ‘not an external 
spirit’ but present ‘actually alive in the people’ (Hegel 1832 Vol.2:256-7).  Achilles’s 
calm demeanour in the presence of Pallas manifests the harmony between him 
and his society.  That is, the bond now existing is a result of his own prudence and 
his identification with the spirit of the people and termed by Hegel as the unity 
subsisting in the totality of an assured character (312).  Importantly, ‘free action is 
[now] the response to what Achilles is’ (Taylor 1980:169).  We can understand this 
if we say that Achilles’s action has expressed what he is, his content as adequate 
to his idea of himself.  This is made possible by the external figuration of Pallas 
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whose universal content equates with Achilles’s essence, his particularity.  Here in 
‘sensuous terms’ (spirit) is ‘the reconciled opposition of particular and universal’ in 
the presence of figurative thought: Pallas (Karelis 1979:xxxvi).  The value of this 
presence is that it reciprocates a universal in its possession by an individual and 
only in this ‘sensuous guise’ can the imagination gain knowledge of this content 
(xl).  Because in the outside world any correspondence between individual self-
expression and the demands of social existence on which the individual depends is 
illusive, the presence of Pallas has provided a content (a spirit) in Achilles 
perceivable by the imagination and concomitant with his nature and that of the 
outside world.  This resists the idea of a ‘self-dependent will and brings to light its 
insertion in nature’, his own and that which surrounds him (Taylor 1992:159).  
Consequently, Achilles’s response is in virtue of his ‘condition as a natural and 
social being’; the actuality of his own essence: ‘situated freedom’ (160).  
 Sethe is a figure brought from the past whose development can be seen as 
concomitant with Hegel’s theory of tragedy, and able to fulfil Hegel’s requirements 
for character, situation and the resolution of that situation. 
 If we consider the character Sethe in light of Hegel’s theories concerning 
character, it becomes apparent that her development culminates in the possession 
by her of a self-contained human individuality consonant with general sentiment.  
However, the value of the above research is that it is able to establish that this 
achievement for Morrison is simply a means to an end, even if that end, in 
witnessing the ‘essence’ in the character Sethe, is the cause of her being 
dispossessed of it.  In brief terms, Morrison’s end game is to construct a situation 
in which a human being, fully recognisable within all that that term insinuates, is 
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presented in a conflict inspired by contradiction and an ethical claim.  Finally, this 
character, in whom ‘the fullness of life is completely preserved’ will be able ‘to 
unfold and express in every possible way the wealth of a truly complete spiritual 
life’, that is, ‘able to fuse together its particularity in the element of its spiritual 
substance’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:317).   
 However, the claims made here concerning the character Sethe have to 
include her daughter Beloved, who, as an external presence, is able to make 
available to the imagination Sethe’s passion, resolve and will.  The inquiries into 
Hegel’s theories concerning tragedy make it possible to bring forward the 
difficulties faced by Morrison in pursuit of her themes.  It is notable that in this 
sensuous external form these universal determinations of specific qualities, 
Beloved included, manage to avoid the modern interest in subjectivity where the 
spirit they represent would appear ‘merely as phases or aspects of human 
character’ and any action become linked to personality (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:297).  
Conflict, in the quest to find in the self the cause for the personal act, will here 
appear as internal; as an individual’s struggle with herself to retain the harmony 
she seeks with the outside world.  In this, spirit loses its sensuous availability ‘and 
becomes a working within individuals’ (Williams 1966: 35).  If there is to be 
reconciliation for the character it will be within the character, ‘and often less 
satisfactory’, because its guise may well be ‘personal destiny’ (34). This is in 
opposition to the ethical dilemma central to Hegel’s thinking. 
  Morrison’s novel Sula (1973), and its polar oppositions of character in a 
single mind as the expression of an internal conflict, can be thought of in this vein.  
The separation between human sentiment and society’s strictures played out in 
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this context culminates in the isolation of the individual.  This becomes evident in 
the character Nel who, in her determination to preserve the inner harmony she 
values, condemns Sula to an existence where ‘life has no meaning outside herself’ 
(Williams 1966:116). 
 In isolation Sula’s ambitions for herself in white society fail and on her return 
to her own community she becomes restless and petulant in her relationships with 
others.  Because she feels she does not belong where she is and with few options 
for change there appears an irresolvable opposition between the individual and 
society.  As Williams says (1966: 138), ‘what has actually happened’ in this 
situation ‘is a loss of belief in both,’ the individual and society and in ‘the whole 
experience of life’. 
 The result of attempting ‘to create an individual person without any 
relationships’ (138) is the character whose consciousness, their ideals, dreams and 
illusions, harbours a false reality, and all that is left is for Sula to demonstrate the 
struggles of an aspiring mind before white people prepare her for burial (Morrison 
1998:172), and her fate becomes justified by her struggles.  Sula’s experience is 
now pared down to express either the personal or the public: in the place of a fully 
formed humanity there remains for the reader only the taking of sides and the risk 
of loss of belief in either.  Our gaze is turned inward to contemplate the dramatic 
conflict within an individual mind.   
Inevitably, this ideality of form strips out the sensuous content we require for 
the full comprehension of the richness of the human character; the emphasis now 
must remain on the death of the individual and the manner of that death.  This is 
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quite different from the events in Beloved where it is the action in which Sethe’s 
demise takes place which enforces her claim to humanity.  It is in our efforts to 
accommodate ourselves to this divided consciousness that modern tragedy finds 
its stimulus.  However, our commitment should not be to the man/woman who dies, 
but to the action in which it takes place (Williams 1966). 
Dramatically, it appears that Sula’s role and her lack of connectedness are 
the causes of her isolation.  If this develops from an abstract condition to one that 
even briefly appears as a fixed position, that is, Sula’s general condition typifying 
that of the aspiring African American, then it signifies on the inertia of her 
community and becomes a new alienation, a new excuse to marginalise people 
who the dominating group thinks should not be there.2  Morrison’s dilemma 
becomes evident.  In her effort to present to the reader a human being in every 
sense of the word, her use of double consciousness, or polar opposition in 
Williams’s terms, has risked presenting this internal conflict as one within ‘a total 
human condition’ (Williams 1966: 154).   
Sula and Sethe’s ambitions are the same.  Theirs is not so much a struggle 
of liberal proportions set against the backdrop of a need for moral enlightenment, a 
struggle to change their society, but rather a conflict arising out of a struggle to join 
one from which they are excluded.  Morrison’s Sula and Sethe bring their 
aspirations with them, and in neither case are they the result of any personal 
development, progression or change in the sense of them altering their condition 
contingent with their circumstances.  In line with Hegel’s requirement both 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, the novel’s attempt to nullify this situation is in line with a metaphysical approach: the 
community’s frustrations, the result of their inertia, are embodied in the character of Shadrack as the spirit 
alive in the people of the community and as such invites imaginative inquiry.  
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characters express the principle of self-determination as one already aroused.  
However, where they differ is that Sethe’s aspirations are embodied in the 
development in her of universally recognised human characteristics: the reconciled 
opposition of particular and universal inserted in nature.  Sula’s dominate her 
demeanour and foster the idea of a self-dependent will.    The refusal by 
white people to allow Sula to participate in their society results in the burial of her 
aspirations.  Because Sula has no essential relation to either her own community 
or to that of the larger society, her ‘private self-definition’ as the ‘alienated 
individual’ confirms that ‘the conditions of its existence are in conflict with the 
demands of its perfection’ (Taylor 1992: 22).  Consequently, the novel has nothing 
left to offer her.  Her death and subsequent burial amount to an acceptance of the 
contradiction evident in this situation.  We have moved from a drama in which ‘the 
metaphysical and social categories were indistinguishable’ to one where the 
relation between a ‘temporal power and the spiritual condition remains unresolved’.  
Tragedy ‘has become a story’ because in these terms it cannot be seen as an 
action (Williams 1966: 23) but ‘an attempt to find reasons for an assumed general 
form of behaviour’ (27).  As a consequence, the consciousness generated by Sula 
and Nel in polar opposition results in the contradiction with which they wrestle 
becoming accepted as the dominating feature of their characters, and fated.  
However, ancient tragedy requires that contradiction be framed in an ethical 
consideration and as such as the foundation for the reconciliation of the spiritual 
condition with social existence. 
The situation prescribed by the artist as the background to any reconciliation 
is not developed as the background to a particular society or world condition, it is 
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simply a framework suitable for ‘a particular presentation, not the presentation 
itself’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:272).  However, it does supply ‘the material in which as its 
appropriate medium a character or temperament is unfolded before us’ (286).  If 
we regard Sethe in light of these requirements then we find she is intrinsically 
linked with motherhood and the bond existing between mother and child.  In this 
she fulfils one of Hegel’s component features for the action to which the situation is 
the background; that is, in her the universal forces are apparent and constitute her 
essential content.  Prior to her meeting with schoolteacher, her self-awareness and 
consciousness of her responsibility towards her children are indications of her 
vitality.  Consequently, if the situation is to present Sethe as the appropriate 
medium for the expression of motherhood then it must involve her bond with her 
children.  Her decision to free her children and escape herself ensures that her 
personal emotions ‘pass into the world’ as universally valid (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:249). 
The centre of this situation is the ‘self-conscious... personality’ who is its 
paramount and vital force (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:251).  This is not the individual person 
whose independence would be ‘emphasized in his/her subjective life’.  Rather, in 
being brought forward to provide an event, this character is not the expression of 
an ‘inwardness’ in opposition ‘to an external world’, but one whose whole vital 
humanity becomes evident in ‘external realization’.  This is important in Hegel’s 
tragic theory because, even though the external event is one of action, it is not 
consequent on external conditions but on the character’s ‘personal volition and 
character’.  Crucially, its dramatic significance is derived in relation to the aims and 
passions of the character at its centre.  In our case, Sethe is placed in a situation 
where that by which we know her forms ‘the peculiar nature of the conditions’ in 
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which she is placed (251).  Because of this we cannot say that Sethe has become 
self-exclusive.  She fulfils her ideas of herself within these particular conditions 
through purpose, the nature of which is her essential character and volition. The 
conditions are the means for an external action in which Sethe’s content is 
sensuously available.  As a result of her action that by which we know her 
becomes true to her. 
Consequently, any idea of self-exclusive independence is compromised.  
We can understand this better in the context of Sethe’s confrontation with 
schoolteacher.  In killing her child Sethe is confronted with ‘a principle of necessity 
which is essentially self-supporting’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:255).  This is Hegel’s term 
for those forces in society whose justification is carried within them, a force which 
simply is.  In the drama the artist chooses the action but the necessity against 
which the action is chosen must not originate purely in the personal passions and 
character of individuals.  In this situation it must also ‘relate to the external 
circumstances and relations of concrete life’ (8).  Sethe’s actions must make 
discernible the true nature of this force and demonstrate fully her claim to what she 
will be denied and the full import of what is to follow.  However, her passions relate 
to life and she relates to life because the artist’s ‘intelligence is awake to that ideal 
and universal substance which is at the root of human ends’ (255). 
There must arise a sense that as Sethe’s claim is a reaction to necessity 
and as such, in Greek tragedy, must be available to the imagination in the form of 
an external, imaginative formulation, the full benefit of presenting a tragic character 
is not available in the situation provided by Morrison.  This is to say that the 
presentation of external figurative thought to modern sensibilities is not thought 
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proper here. The form necessary for Morrison’s novel now becomes clear in that 
her creative practice, that is the external development of figurative thought in 
sensuous form, will appear in the very first pages of the novel.  Nevertheless, in 
this situation, Sethe has emerged as a recognisable, human being and the ethical 
situation in which she finds herself is still an indication of the external nature of the 
pressures of necessity. 
The murder of a child by its mother is seen as unquestionably wrong, and 
yet in this situation who would not understand the despairing fidelity within this act 
of forfeiture.  Even as we postulate, Sethe is unveiled as a fully recognisable 
human being as she disturbs the harmony provided by necessity.  It is ‘a rightful 
claim’ to that which simply is, and if there is ‘a wrongful misuse of the passions’ 
they evidently, because of this situation, emanate from ‘the human heart’ (255).  
We can say here that this is ‘the actual self-accomplishment of what is the essence 
of reason and truth’ (255).  The drama in Morrison’s chosen situation, then, is 
driven by ‘personal volition and character’ (251) in a conflict with other forces in 
which ‘the personal factor’ is asserted ‘as essential characteristics of human 
purpose’ (251).  The structure employed by Morrison in this novel to engage her 
readers, and to bring Sethe to this situation as a fully rounded and self-conscious 
character, is conducive to modern sensibilities and not those feelings generated in 
ancient dramatic structures.  The presence of Sethe’s external nature, in ancient 
tragedy, would signal the appearance of the gods and the triumph of moral over 
worldly forces.  Their immediate leaving would signal the recovery of a real-world 
setting and the predominance once more of worldly forces.  However, in keeping 
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with the spirit of ancient tragedy, an external imaginative formulation will take its 
place alongside Sethe. 
Sethe’s situation has gone beyond the idea of the self as an independent 
will and her motivations and actions appear products of her own nature.  Her 
behaviour aided by the right or wrong of an ethical situation is, though terrible, the 
response of a natural and social being: infanticide was ‘absolutely the right thing to 
do’, Morrison has said, ‘but she had no right to do it’ (Rothstein 1987:Y19).The 
modern shift to self-division and self-restitution, then, is displaced in the 
reconciliation between Sethe’s inner spirit and the universal forces which surround 
her.  This comes about because the expression of Sethe’s sentiments as universal 
is her children.  Her decision to destroy this universally recognised essence 
provides the proof of its presence and its manifest centrality in the world of 
necessity.  It is what everyone has and Sethe’s actions demonstrate that that which 
is present in the universal forces which surround her is also present in her: the 
reconciliation of inner spirit and external forces.   And because the conditions of 
this situation are peculiar to Sethe’s nature we can say that the loss of her child is 
the loss of the universal substance which is at the root of human ends.   
This absence results in a character who is bereft, but the child returns as 
‘Beloved’ and as the external, universal and essential elements which formed 
Sethe’s motivation for self-determination.  Should they not appear in isolation, they 
must present as ‘phases or aspects of human character’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.1:297) 
and lose ‘the simple truth that these eternally dominant powers are immanent in 
the identical nature of mankind’ (298): if these powers are implicit, then they must 
be seen as such.  In addition to this, the form of Morrison’s novel reveals her intent 
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to bring Beloved into intimate contact with those other characters whose lives are 
closely related to Sethe’s.  The self-expression denied Paul D and Denver 
becomes a source of imaginative conception in their interactions with Beloved and 
the powers she represents.  Paul D and Denver become recognisable human 
beings in their interactions with Beloved.  The emotional lives of both Paul D and 
Denver become available to the imagination when in contact with Beloved because 
she is the embodiment of the powers active and dominant in their own experience.  
We can say that the intimacy Paul D and Denver share with Beloved expresses the 
life force manifest in the yearnings of Sethe.  These characters and their 
sensibilities are imbued with the themes which Morrison wishes to project into the 
complexity of African American life in the late twentieth century.  
At the centre of the main argument of this thesis is that Morrison’s aim for 
Sethe is that she possesses those ‘eternally dominant powers [which] are 
immanent in the identical nature of mankind’ (Hegel 1835 Vol.4:260).  This aim is 
achieved within a written tragic framework in her novel Beloved (1987).  She posits 
the slave woman Sethe as a human being and as recognisable as such by other 
human beings.  However, as Hegel’s theory of tragedy makes clear, this involves 
the purposeful creation of an individual whose driving force, although recognisably 
implicit in human nature as human nature, requires their isolation from their 
community or group.  Morrison’s quest to provide in the self of her character Sethe 
the cause of the personal act must result in a discordant relationship between 
Sethe and her community.  Because Sethe’s sensibilities are identifiable within the 
identical nature of humankind, the dilemmas present are not as acute as those in 
Sula (1973).  Notable in this framework is that tragedy on these terms implies a 
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stasis in which the situation of the tragic character remains exactly the same 
(Williams 1966); indeed her demise signals the reconciliation of the conflict and 
establishes in truth the root of her claim.  The price for this is the emotional and 
physical deprivation of the character.  The truth is Morrison’s goal, and achieved 
through the presentation of a character within a tragic framework.  However, this 
thesis extends this line of thought to reveal Morrison’s adaption of ancient drama to 
the demands of African American writing and the resolution of the conflict arising 
between presenting a human being who is demonstrably self-aware and one 
similarly immersed in the values of their own black community.  Crucial to this is 
her innovatory use of the separate and external configuration of Sethe’s 
sensibilities in the form of Beloved whose interactions with Denver and Paul D 
communicate Morrison’s perceptions on the role of community in the lives of 
African Americans and its historical sway.  This achievement is consequent on 
those specific universal qualities embodied in Seth being made available to the 
imagination through Beloved and taken forward into the future in the possession of 
a self-aware, self-conscious character, Denver.  Indeed, it is the disappearance of 
Beloved from the porch of 124 which registers the idea of the specific qualities that 
Sethe is unable to express.  The gods, in the form of Beloved, have come and 
gone, but that which has been represented, the idea of a full and spiritual life, 
lingers.  The semblance of situated freedom, first made available within the corn 
symbol, now awaits the artist in the form of a fragment garnered from the past.  We 
are not now viewing situated freedom in its entirety, but the idea of it.  That means 
that in its fragmentation, we are concerned with only that which is offered by the 
artist.  It is not simply a case of what you see is what you get, but rather, what you 
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see is all you are going to get.  It is noteworthy that the fragment, although 
retaining the semblance of the totality of its former content, is no longer concerned 
with the totality of that content, accrued as it were in another time.  Aesthetically 
inspired, the totality now offers only and exactly what it decides it wants us to have.  
We get the idea, but it is not a fragment of an idea, but a fragment of the truth as 
an idea: the result of the artist’s ability to shatter the symbol she constructed.   
 Tessa Roynon’s (2013) recent study examines ‘the ways in which classical 
myth, literature, history, social practice and religious ritual make their presence felt’ 
(1) in the work of Toni Morrison.  In particular, her undermining of ‘the classical 
dependent nature of dominant US history and identity’ is achieved through ‘a 
revisionary relationship with antiquity’ (4) in which Morrison ‘reconfigures significant 
historical moments’ in America’s past (22).  This is not necessarily an imaginary 
reshaping of the past but a repositioning of the marginalized African American 
within a classical narrative whose appropriation by a burgeoning white society 
contributed to the elevation of its traditions, historical past and its political realities 
into what could be called a received national identity.  In the process, the presence 
of the slave community was erased along with its contribution to what is now 
modern-day America.  Roynon’s point is that, using the same frame of reference, 
the classical world, Morrison not only reveals its use in the formulation of America’s 
past, but adopts its symbols and themes in her own work ‘to challenge the erasure 
of political realities that became the dominant cultural norm’ (Roynon 2013: 82). 
 As a striking example, Roynon draws attention to the tendency for the 
history of the ‘Old South’ to be articulated in ‘tragic terms’ with the emphasis on 
‘the suffering of the losing side’ (82).  The old south in these terms refers to the 
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Confederacy whose defeat in the American Civil War saw the loss of a culture and 
way of life which is a source of nostalgia for many commentators within the 
dominant culture.  However, for Roynon, ‘Morrison’s overall conception of 
nineteenth-century African American experience as tragic’ unsettles this tendency, 
and it is in the form of Beloved she says where Morrison will ‘insist... that the 
tragedy and tragic heroism in these events belongs not to the Confederacy but to 
the African American’ (82).  Consequently, not only does Morrison subvert the 
history that the dominant culture claims for itself, but also she deploys the same 
classical tradition as her own to establish an African American presence.  In this 
way the realities of the moment will override the ideologies generated by a tragic 
vision of American history. 
 Nevertheless, Roynon’s argument conflates experience with tragedy and as 
such, even in a reconfigured format, tragedy becomes contingent with a particular 
event in time.  A received national identity is displaced using the same themes and 
symbols on which it based its claims in the effort to, in Morrison’s words, ‘change 
the past,’ one that was appropriated by a dominant white culture (Taylor-Guthrie 
1994:xiii).  This has the effect of subjecting the events of the past to a wider 
scrutiny and of signifying on the present.  However, within a classical framework, 
history is carried on Sethe’s back in the form of a ‘chokecherry tree’ care of 
schoolteacher (Morrison 2004:18).  The permanence of this symbol’s connection 
with Sethe’s body is, as we shall see, conducive with Morrison’s adaption of 
ancient tragedy and not with a reconfiguration of Sethe’s participation in a given 
event.  This example accentuates the difficulties when equating tragedy with 
known events and the temptation to perpetuate this contingency leads Roynon to 
152 
 
claim that the deployment of the classical tradition by Morrison suggests that 
‘rather than black society having to adapt itself to suit the dominant culture, it is the 
dominant culture itself that must be changed’ (2013:22).  While this is a worthy goal 
supported by many critics and artists, in light of Morrison’s Beloved, this thesis is 
directly opposed to such a conclusion.  In the tragic vein, Sethe’s expression of her 
escalating self-determination takes place within the culture which dominates her.  
However, in Hegelian terms, as we have seen, the tragic character’s situation is 
not the background to a particular society, but the result of her volition.  In her 
failure, the world remains the same.  And the material forming this presentation 
must be the medium appropriate for making available to the reader the character or 
temperament of the individual.  This means that the artist’s imagination will be 
employed fully here in order to ensure that the action is consequent on the 
character’s personal volition and not external conditions.  The symbols of the 
classical condition in the hands of the artist can change overall conceptions of 
history, but in the formulation of a tragic character it is not the changing of an event 
but the making of one to suit the spiritual make-up of the individual. 
 Significantly, Justine Tally (2010) writes that ‘Sethe’s value as a human 
being does not spring from the terms of the masters’ (3), because in the debate of 
appropriation the dominant culture’s fixation with religion, literacy and rationality ‘as 
definitions of humanity’ are bypassed in Beloved.  As Tally points out, Sethe is 
neither ‘rational nor literate’ and so avoids the risk that her individuality is 
envisaged in relation to the dominant culture.  Consequently, ‘her agency is 
determined by the deeply human concerns of a mother for her children’ (3); and in 
compliance with Hegel’s thinking, Sethe’s self-determination is already aroused. 
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 In a critique of Foucauldian theory, McNay (1994:7) challenges the idea that 
‘resistance is severely undermined’ when the body becomes the visible marker of 
judgement of the individual.  And in the context of Beloved, Sethe’s immediate 
escape after her beating could be interpreted as the ultimate resistance.  However, 
Tally (2010:10) takes Sethe’s resistance, although ‘ultimately ineffective,’ as more 
in line with Foucault’s description of genealogy in that it is an attempt to 
‘emancipate obscured knowledge from subjugation’.  And yet, Tally’s observation 
that ‘the dominant discursive regime has obliterated any alternative meaning’ is a 
powerful indication of the extent to which Sethe’s human sensibilities have been 
transferred onto her body and in the process erased.  It also helps to define 
Sethe’s actions not as simply resistance but as expressions of personal volition in 
which she yearns to retrieve that lost sense of individuality through a connection 
with a past of which she is the result.  
 If we consider Sethe’s final tragic denouement as signifying the final loss of 
any personal volition, all that remains after the murderous actions witnessed by 
schoolteacher is the chokecherry tree he ingrained on Sethe’s back.  This equates 
Sethe and whatever she becomes with the Master’s definition of her.  In this, her 
personal volition is obliterated and replaced by the sign her masters have given 
her.  Her wherewithal is now contingent with her designation as chattel.  In line with 
Tally’s insight concerning Sethe’s value as a human being, it is important in this 
situation that the humanity defiled by schoolteacher remains accessible to the 
reader if a sense of her personal volition is to be preserved.  On these terms, 
Sethe has become exactly what schoolteacher says she is.  Beaten and hounded 
as she is, the result will be a character formed in relation to a dominant culture.  
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Whether her resistance is to schoolteacher’s definition or to slavery, her body will 
forever link her protest to the criteria prescribed by those who think her beneath 
them.  We have to place McNay’s reasoning in this framework and conclude that, 
even in its many forms, resistance is linked to its antagonist: in Eagleton’s terms, 
‘oppositional identities’ (2001:414).  Elsewhere (1988), he writes that ‘any 
oppressed group has most vitally in common the shared fact of their opposition,’ 
(37) and the resultant collective identity, although formed in response to a political 
order, will generate eventually ‘a positive, particular culture’ (37).  Not only this, but 
also the original ‘deferment of selfhood’ will be replaced by a strongly alternative 
consciousness of who they are (37).  However, because this ‘positive identity 
evolves within oppressive conditions’ it will always be to some extent ‘collusive with 
its antagonists’ (37).  The paradox in this process is that ‘a self-confident agent 
would not be necessary in the first place if such self-confidence were possible,’ and 
this reasoning leads Eagleton to declare that without the consciousness developed 
in oppressive conditions, ‘one would not even know what one lacked’ (37).  And in 
this logic, which posits the marginalized as somehow lacking in self-awareness or 
self-consciousness, we gain a full sense of the mark on Sethe’s back.  Even 
Eagleton’s (2001) valiant attempt to water down the effects of this narrative ends in 
more complexity.  He points out that ‘the more fundamental question is that of 
demanding equal rights with others’ in order to realise what ‘one might become’ 
and not of ‘assuming some already fully fashioned identity which is merely 
suppressed’ (414).  However, this places the beginning of development in two 
different places for the marginalized and their oppressors because the universal of 
which he speaks, containing as it does the ‘individual particular’ (414), cannot 
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contain the human characteristics common to all if somehow they have been 
developed in opposition in an assumedly fully fashioned identity that comes from 
somewhere else.  In the light of this argument Morrison’s imperative to develop the 
inner self of her characters becomes acute.  The tree on Sethe’s back marks the 
refusal by schoolteacher to recognise any of her qualities as human.  She is not 
allowed to possess or claim those sensibilities he thinks of as the elevated 
characteristics of his ‘race’.  Those same qualities have been beaten out of her and 
his mark signifies this: ‘they took my milk,’ she says (Morrison 2004:20).   
Marking Sethe in such a way has facilitated the transition of a fully 
recognisable human character to one bereft and deficient and the opposite to what 
is usually expected of transition and the idea that ‘a subject that thinks itself 
complete feels no need to revolt’ (Eagleton 1988:37).  But Morrison has written 
Sethe a self-consciousness whose form is her relationship with her children and 
her wish to express herself through the rituals of a Christian marriage and a will to 
belong.  However, the challenge to her self-awareness in the form of schoolteacher 
is the motivation for her escape.  Morrison rejects the idea that revolt is consequent 
on a diminished awareness or lack. Getting her children ‘out of there’ signifies the 
agency they represent and which drives her awareness to preserve herself.  For 
Eagleton, oppositional identities ‘are in part the function of oppression as well as 
resistance to that oppression’ (2001:414), and because of this the individual cannot 
be judged on what she is now but only when that identity gains expression, equal 
rights, in the wider community.  It is through expression that a true identity is 
formed and through a common process that it is achieved.  Morrison has ensured 
that Sethe’s children have achieved this already for her, but that expression is 
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denied to Sethe in the ‘community’ of Sweet Home.  The lack of a common 
process for Sethe, then, in this topsy-turvy world, is the lack of a proper identity 
and the completeness that accompanies it.  Completeness equals universality in 
this context because the universal is simply ‘every individual’s equal right to have 
his or her differences respected’ and to take part in the ‘common process’ where 
that can be achieved (Eagleton 2001:414). But who is different from whom and 
how?  This question may sound trite and overly simplified but in relation to 
Morrison’s work it is a valued query.  It cannot be the case that to be like everyone 
else, the individual must first have their perceived difference from everyone else 
established in the acceptance of it.  The marks on Sethe’s back register Morrison’s 
rejection of this delineation of universality.   
 In opposition to the argument expressed by Eagleton (1988), Sethe 
resonates with human qualities while a slave because her deeply human concerns 
for her children are discernible as universal human sensibilities.  Sethe’s resistance 
is a result of her understanding that the greatest threat to her humanity is 
schoolteacher.  This is confirmed when she is beaten with the resultant loss of her 
milk.  The scars imbedded in her back now represent who she is.  They do not 
register his inhumanity but hers and her difference.  This difference is an imposition 
but it prevents the acknowledgement, as human, of any expressive action she may 
wish to take.  It must be stressed here that this imposition by white people is a 
measure of the fabricated superiority they enjoy and the extent to which they are 
protective of that position.  Almost indestructible, its influence is so powerful 
because the people responsible for it do not see things as they are but how they 
are.  The hiatus opened up between this abstract superiority and the particularity of 
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individuals is, then, immense.  This would imply that difference is imposed in order 
to preserve a notional superiority manifest in a group’s recommendations of itself.  
It indicates a dearth in the marginalized of those sensibilities thought universal, and 
a dehumanizing of the particular.  Difference in this respect is a one-way system 
whose criteria are the arbitrary derivations of ascendancy.  We can say that 
Sethe’s chokecherry tree is the image chosen by Morrison to indicate the 
deprivation inflicted on a human being in these circumstances, and the 
impossibility for that individual of regaining that lost self-worth.  On Morrison’s 
terms the functions of oppression result in no identity at all, not as the means to the 
achievement of a true identity.  Morrison provides us with a character whose self-
consciousness becomes vital in a desire to live a fully human life.  Her subsequent 
rejection and flight to preserve that self-consciousness, in opposition to the mark 
she carries, result in a growing sense of individuality which yearns to develop on its 
own terms, and knowing its own history.                  
The difficulty of presenting the essence of humanity in those thought of as 
different and in a form and context available to the imagination is a formidable task 
when the claims of progressive thought cannot move from the single significant 
tenet of the centrality of whiteness.  In dealing with this, the idea of a reconstituted 
past is quickly taken over by the symbols and images provided by the author for a 
considered presentation of the human psyche.  
 The narrator of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (2002 [1952]) is similarly 
marked. However, it is within his briefcase that he carries the classification handed 
him by the central power, and one which he finally manages to jettison.  Stepto’s 
(1991) thorough inquiries into Invisible Man (1952) and James Weldon Johnson’s 
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The Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man (1912) consider the situation of the 
individual in relation to stigma.  Although the narrator of Invisible Man has been 
coerced into seeking development within white society on its own terms, when free 
of those terms, his survival results in isolation.  Notably, he learns that his history is 
only properly represented in the articles he has found which relate to his own 
particular past and he fills ‘the empty briefcase with what are in effect “protections” 
or “passes” from his own hand’ (Stepto 1991:174-5).  Consequently, Ellison’s 
narrator is making his own past on his own terms and in his isolation, his cellar, he 
attempts to be free of the insinuations of the master.  Stepto terms this ‘his removal 
to a fresh space, the “warm hole”’ of the narrator’s frame (174).  In this space, 
‘Invisible Man’ is now ‘outside the boundaries of what others call reality (an 
imposed fictional history)’ (45-6).  And Stepto points out that the writing of Invisible 
Man has advanced the ‘authorial posture beyond that which mistakenly attempts to 
control two texts-the author’s and the one imposed’ (45-6).  In order to control his 
own personal history, the ‘trap before the African American writer...is that his texts 
will never do more than challenge the content of the exterior authenticating texts 
surrounding them’ (45-6).  In this context, Roynon’s (2013) classification of 
classicism as somehow and nonsensically white and, as universal and European, 
‘the ultimate fabrication beyond which we must move’ (184), must now include an 
engagement with the form in which this content is delivered.   
The narrative of Invisible Man is moulded, as is its narrator, by interactions 
with the white world.  Much of his experience is gained in refuting the myths the 
white world has woven around him. And although Addison Gayle (1976:255) has 
described Ellison’s novel as ‘rich in imagery...and infused with the wealthy 
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language and life-style of a people,’ he criticizes Ellison’s choice of ‘individualism 
as opposed to racial unity’ and the use of a European existentialist ‘image of the 
faceless, universal man trapped in his own ego’ (258).  Morrison herself has said 
that she ‘always missed some intimacy’ in reading Invisible Man.  ‘I thought they 
(Ellison and Richard Wright) were saying something about it or us that revealed 
something about us to you.  Just in the style, I missed something...’ (Ruas 
1981:96).   And yet, Ellison (1972) has said how he felt morally obliged to write 
about the African-American experience to communicate the full extent of its range 
and fluidity.  However, at the same time his motivation was to express in universal 
terms a larger concern with the ‘tragic struggle of humanity’ (Ellison 1972:169).  
Nonetheless, in light of the criticism above the failure to engage with the notion of a 
collective consciousness or to achieve a true intimacy with his readers resonates in 
African American responses to his work.  It is worth considering here Morrison’s 
achievement in providing Sethe with an agency which avoids a relation with the 
dominating culture.  She enters Morrison’s narrative as the bearer of an ‘essential 
individuality’ which derives from an ‘inner essence rather than to the empirical 
selfhood of everyday life’ (Eagleton 2003:43-4).  We know Sethe by heart because, 
as Eagleton has it, tragic circumstance ‘here is imminent rather than accidental, 
flowing from the inner logic of action rather than commonplace contingency’ (43).  
Here is the provision of intimacy so important to Morrison and its lack in Invisible 
Man, registered by Gayle (1976) as the image of man trapped in his own ego, can 
be contemplated now more as the condition of a character whose modern 
subjective state is derived from ‘sheer extraneous accident’ (Eagleton 2003:43).  
The result is an individual personality whose contingency with everyday life 
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produces a private internalized battle.  Ellison’s motivation to express a concern 
with the tragic struggle of humanity is now channelled through the individual whose 
struggle in the present is framed within a resistance to the burden of history given 
him by his oppressors.  Unlike Sethe, ‘Invisible Man’ has succeeded in finding a 
space where he is free of his burden.  However, similar to Sethe, the burden he 
has carried is an imposition whose intrusive criteria, as myth, have no basis in fact.  
Their powerful hold on him is evident in his decision to destroy them.  He realizes 
that he has no control over them whatsoever; and replaces whiteness with 
‘protections or passes from his own hand’ (Stepto 1991:174).  However, if his quest 
began ‘in imposed configurations of social structure’ (168), where is the alternative 
structure to be found in which a full consciousness can be written? 
It is this difficulty which so inhibits the writings of those who suffer stigma 
and prejudice.  The problem involves presenting a transition whose final structure 
is sufficiently malleable to provide a protagonist’s ‘final posture outside the realms’ 
of the dominant culture and the claims of community (Stepto 1991:164).  In this 
context Stepto offers the example of Jean Toomer’s Cane (1923) whose form is 
capable of evoking, but not advancing, the ‘historical consciousness’ at its heart 
(164).  The form, then, although to a large extent answering the calls for intimacy 
and a collective consciousness, is not able, fully, to project a transition in which 
they are both able to be fully sustained.  Stepto refers to the conflicts inherent in 
the African American’s quest for freedom of expression in a larger and dominating 
culture as a narrative of ascent and immersion (1991:167).  Originally envisaged as 
a ritualized journey into a symbolic ‘North’, the ascent narrative developed a 
character for whom this journey signified a new beginning free of the constraints of 
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a ‘South’, which although familiar, implied prejudice and poverty.  However, the 
alienation and rejection experienced by many African American men, women and 
children in the North resulted in a narrative structure which saw the ‘South’ in turn 
ritualized as the place of community and one which offered the benefit of 
immersion in group identity and a collective consciousness.  Stepto points out that 
the quests of immersion and ascent ‘conclude as they began, in imposed 
configurations of social structure’ (168) and asks, can the ‘literary history’ of these 
narratives become ‘the basis for a narrative form’ (168)? In the context of Invisible 
Man, this would depend on a narrative’s ability to establish his history, prior to his 
hibernation, as a fiction while preserving the individual at the centre of that fiction.  
Stepto points out that the ‘protections’ which are now the new contents of Invisible 
Man’s briefcase ‘assert a marvellous and heroic concept of self-willed mobility’ 
where his ‘hibernation’ is a secret preparation for, eventually, a ‘more overt action’ 
(174). The goal as ever is the presentation of a knowing self-conscious character in 
a space in which she or he is able to express this as a fully recognisable human 
being. 
 Most certainly, it can be claimed that ‘Invisible Man’ is outside history: that 
is, outside the history foisted on him by the machinations of the overbearing society 
in which he finds himself.  In his hibernation, his free accommodation and free 
electricity place him, within the text, uniquely unfettered by the myths that 
influenced every part of his life subsequent to his reappraisal of his situation.  
Nonetheless, his transition does not result in a form where his position in the 
human race is realised through his personal volition.  The symbols within his 
briefcase gesture toward a collective consciousness which reverberates, as with 
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Gayle and Morrison, with the bitterness felt at the wrongs done to generations of 
Africans.  But if as Stepto believes, Invisible Man is the beginning of an expression 
which will advance the form of African American writing beyond the posture of 
hibernation, we must ask who was the man who took shelter in the cellar, because 
in transition he has become invisible not only to white people, but also to his own 
people and to the reader.  
 His removal of the mythical perceptions of him generated by white society 
has given way to a space of repose.  However, it also serves to register the 
slipping away of any connection with the sensibilities of the man whose life force 
has been so sorely threatened.  Stepto points out that the African American 
narrative in the future will advance ‘the historical consciousness of the form beyond 
the posture of hibernation’ (Stepto 1991:xvi).  But, it must be considered that, as in 
the case of ‘Invisible Man’, the character who does not already retain, fully, the 
historical consciousness around which African American writing has developed, will 
be perceived as a subjective individual whose true self is yet to be realized.  Not 
only this, but how is a form to be structured in which such an enigma will develop 
the necessary self-consciousness of the fully developed character.  We can 
perceive in this dilemma that the reason for Sethe remaining bereft is for the 
commitment to art to be realised in another form.   
 Both W.E.B. Du Bois and Toni Morrison have experimented with a form in 
which the attempt to fashion a transition is situated in the ‘Jim Crow’ section of a 
railroad coach.  Du Bois’s version has the segregated ‘Jim Crow’ section occupied 
by white as well as black people, although the white only section must always 
remain white.  The train here travels South into the ‘Black Belt’ (Stepto 1991:75) 
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and presents the unchanging degradation of segregation within a structure of 
movement.  Significantly, the white people include a nurse with her charge, 
(DuBois 1994[1903]:70) ‘a little white girl’.  This prompts ideas of a future where 
white people, especially white women, who were perceived as particularly at risk 
from black males, would accept integration between white and blacks as a natural 
condition.  Stepto (1991:94) considers the scene as an effort by Du Bois to suggest 
that a journey ‘of immersion’ into the Black Belt of the South undertaken by a group 
of blacks and whites would ‘be a moment in and out of time’ as an ‘occasion of 
communitas/a ritual transition’.   Stepto uses the term ‘communitas’ as defined by 
Victor Turner where it is used to ‘characterize relationships between those jointly 
undergoing ritual transition’ (Turner 1978: 274).  A ritual transition in these terms is 
a situation in which ‘egalitarian and cooperative behaviour is characteristic’, and 
where ‘secular distinctions of rank, office and status become irrelevant’.  These 
distinctions, for Turner, contribute to a social structure of ‘mutually dependent 
institutions’ in which ‘alienation, distance and inequality thrive’ (272).  Transition, 
then, becomes an ‘Anti-structure’ and ‘something positive’ where the forms of 
structure are unpacked in a ‘generative’ situation where individuals seek to know 
and communicate’ (273).  
These situations, however, are still classified as ‘ritual’ because the putting 
to one side of the secular distinctions which alienate individuals can take place 
between persons who are ‘deeply divided’ from one another and cannot be termed 
communitas (238).  They are ritual in the sense that they lack the spontaneity 
associated with communitas as interaction may be influenced by learned rituals.  
They are said to possess ‘temporal structure and to be dominated by the notion of 
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time’ (238) and are, therefore, contingent.  All the same, within this ritualistic world 
there arises a close cooperation between individuals in what Turner believes is a 
noticeable effort to maintain ‘a cosmic order which transcends the contradictions 
and conflicts inherent in the mundane social system’ (238).  This, we can say, 
refers to an awareness of self which sees the mundane structures of society as a 
hindrance to the fulfilment of the desires which lie beneath the individual’s 
commitment to his society.  In the manner of seeking it out in other individuals it 
takes on a universal aspect but remains personal.  In this context, Turner can 
define ‘the bands of communitas as anti-structural in the sense that they are 
undifferentiated, equalitarian, direct, extent, non-rational, existential relationships’ 
(274).  The structures of society which keep people apart are here neutralized in a 
‘sentiment for humanity’ (274) which represents a relationship in which uniqueness 
is safeguarded and which does not merge identities’ (274).  It is a place in which 
the demands of society are recognised for what they are, as individuals 
communicate on a level where the sensibilities implicit in human nature generate 
values above those in evidence in the structure which is society, but these values 
will never be represented in a form which is available to the imagination.  In this 
sense communitas is directly opposed to the forms of ancient tragedy in that it 
liberates the individual from conformity to general norms in a separation of the 
personal life from society, whereas in tragedy the essence of humanity 
recognisable in the tragic figure’s demise is seen to fail as the structures of society 
assert themselves.   
 However, although the individuals safely settled in the ‘Jim Crow’ car do 
present an image of harmony, their destination once arrived at will render the 
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structure of movement null and void; in Stepto’s words, the ‘spatial image of 
destination, not simply the interior of the black belt, but more profoundly in 
communitas itself...is not forthcoming’ (1991:75).  Notwithstanding this, it is notable 
in Du Bois’s passage that although he points out that the car is ‘fairly clean and 
comfortable.  The discomfort lies chiefly in the hearts of those four black men 
yonder’, and in his own (Du Bois 1994[1903]:70).  This implies that where 
integration cannot flow back into the white car, the consciousness prescribed by 
colour will inhibit even the most tenuous attempts to situate transition within any 
spatial image.  It is as if Du Bois has anticipated Stepto’s criticism by referring to 
the one thing that is not on show in a text perhaps directed more at white people 
than is first thought: the interior universal content that is the stimulating energy in 
the actions of human individuality, the heart of the black men yonder.  In Du Bois’s 
vehicle of transition his central theme is that he and his companions remain 
unknown to us. 
 As we have seen in Morrison’s novel Sula (1973), a similar situation is 
played out in a railroad car.  On a journey ‘South’ Helene and her daughter Nel are 
accosted by a white conductor for walking through the 'white's only car' 
(Morrison1998:20).  What is noteworthy here is the dazzling smile she gives the 
salmon-faced conductor.  In her novel Beloved, Morrison uses the same adjective 
to describe the smile Beloved gives to the women gathered outside Sethe’s cabin 
prior to Sethe and Denver’s abandoning of her: ‘her smile was dazzling’.  As the 
women of the community ‘make a hill’ together, the single white man present looks 
only at Beloved (Morrison 2004[1987]:309).  In the novels Sula and Beloved, both 
women are described as beautiful but maintain their distance from their respective 
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communities, and both women suffer rejection and disdain:  Helene (Sula), by the 
gaze of the black soldiers and to a lesser degree in Nel’s opinion of her, and 
Beloved (Beloved) by the vocal efforts of the women of the community.  If we add 
to this the gaze of the white man, Edward Bodwin, transfixed as he is by Beloved, 
we begin to sense that the dazzling smile represents something better forgotten 
because it cannot provide a facilitation with the material conditions of the present 
moment.  We can say that both women though rattled, and in Beloved’s case 
fleeing, remain captivating.  And in the case of the white man, we can register his 
gaze as shock as he watches Beloved, ‘thunder black and glistening’, 
contemplating the scene before her (308).   
 We find in Morrison’s Sula that within this framework of movement, Helen’s 
vitality is recognized but found to be misplaced, out of place, in that she is ignored 
and reproached from all sides.  However, her disposition registers human 
sensibilities which are able to survive this reproach and maintain traction within 
dramatic time.  Bodwin’s reaction to the figure of Beloved registers the 
concentration of a gaze confronted by a vitality not recognized before.  The context 
for his visit to Bluestone Road is to retrieve boyhood treasures and memories he 
left behind.  His search for old certainties places him within the discourses 
surrounding transition, and we read his gaze as the shock of recognizing in himself 
the boundaries which frame his self-consciousness.  The lure of Beloved startles 
his self-immersion in his idea of the not me he has not let himself become, or 
rather the limits to which he clings during his loss of the givens he relied on.  We 
become aware of the sensory stimuli activated in Helene and Beloved’s 
interactions with Nel, the black soldiers, the white conductor, the women of the 
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community, Sethe and Bowden.  However, as a result of the white gaze directed at 
Beloved, we find revealed the register of an uncertain and flawed consciousness.  
Bowden’s inattention to the community and his fixation on Beloved, standing 
‘thunder-black and glistening’ while contemplating the scene before her (308), 
determines his role as representative of the dominance of white people as the main 
contributor to the events unfolding in this scene.  
 In Morrison’s novel Beloved we find the truth of both Helene and Beloved’s 
sensibilities cannot survive in the world they occupy.  We contend that Bowden’s 
convoluted consciousness represents the material world, in dramatic time, in which 
this truth becomes threatened.  The observations of those around these two 
women are a result of the demands of this situation.  Consequently, the truth that 
they have carried with them in dramatic time must now be transposed into a form in 
which it is able to survive.  We can say that in this context, the sounds emanating 
from the women of the community are a call for exactly this.  In Benjamin’s terms, 
as Beloved ‘almost unrecognizable- flees from us to other people’, she remains 
‘victorious’ (1928:480) because, although the context of prejudice and 
marginalization will change little, the truth and not the context will be adapted.  
Morrison’s work acknowledges this in facilitating an exchange where the vitality of 
Helene and Beloved is replaced in a character consciously aware of the 
boundaries in which Bowden operates and, consequently, that her own (Denver’s) 
vitality is not a trait of black individuality, but is characteristically human.                             
 It is noteworthy that the interactions of Sethe, Beloved and Denver could be 
appraised as the difficulty for them of extracting themselves from the cling of 
someone else’s lies.  In order to appreciate fully the extent of Morrison’s aesthetic, 
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we can point out that the enigmatic quality of the solution to this dilemma is now 
determined by its availability as a concept in that it has become transposed from its 
original setting; that is the perceptions of those who observe.  The truth in the 
absence of Helene and Beloved remains because of the doubt that was cast upon 
it.  
 Closely aligned with Benjamin’s insight, Adorno points out that ‘the 
unexpected promise of something which is highest, cannot remain locked in itself 
but is rescued only through the consciousness that is set in opposition to it’ 
(2013:102).  This is in opposition to Ziarek’s (2012) reading of the enigma as ‘a 
constitutive feature of aesthetic beauty and a source of fear in the world of white 
supremacy’.  Her argument calls for the preservation of ‘foreignness’ in literary 
form as ‘a challenge for the hegemonic values of aesthetics in complicity with white 
supremacy’ (184).  In order to support this she cites the figure Clare in Nella 
Larsen’s novel Passing (1992), and her friend Irene’s stream of consciousness in 
which Clare’s eyes are ‘mysterious and concealing’, and ‘surely!  They were Negro 
eyes’.  In addition, Clare’s ‘beautiful face…was unfathomable, utterly beyond any 
experience of hers’ (191).  However, what is not cited is Clare’s sudden death and 
the suspicion of Irene’s involvement (271).  Similar to the women of the community 
who reject Beloved, Irene’s thoughts concerning Clare are that ‘she couldn’t have 
her free’ (271).  Clare is also rejected by her white husband on his discovery of her 
Negro roots.  The truth concerning Clare threatens his idea of himself as she was 
central to it.   
 The point we argue here is that Clare’s beauty is a little by the way.  It is the 
misperceptions of others, male and female, black and white, which become 
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undermined in relation to it.  The truth concerning Clare is that the perceptions of 
others are set in opposition to it, and it survives because of this.  To claim 
foreignness as a challenge to white supremacy avoids acknowledging the source 
of that foreignness in supremacy, and also Irene’s enthrallment to white 
supremacy.  It is not that foreignness is on show, but that the perception of it allows 
the indeterminable, in this case the vitality of life, to be determined by the idea of it.  
This has the effect of locking away the essence of humanity which is the source of 
Clare’s vitality.  Larsen’s purpose as artist is to provide the shock able to shatter 
this perception and its opposition to Clare’s vitality.  In this way Clare’s carefully 
crafted demeanour, in the artist’s hands, becomes the vehicle through which the 
concept of a fully human character is rescued.  Clare’s white husband and black 
friend, although blind to life, summon its presence as a concept where it was not 
before, and bear witness to it.  (Ziarek’s views on the aesthetic are further 
developed in Chapter Four of this thesis.) 
 Irene’s opposition to Clare preserves her anonymity in a world dominated by 
white people, or rather her ability to navigate that world without commitment.  The 
rescue of the truth in Clare’s demise remains a concept and not conceivable 
because it has no equivalence in Irene’s consciousness.  For Morrison’s women of 
the community, the truth transposed is conceivable in their pleas for the ex-slaves 
to love and value themselves in the here and now, and to reject their longing that 
affirmation be reflected in an unknown past.  What until now has been perceived as 
foreignness, mysteriousness or as particularly Negro now becomes conceivable as 
human vitality in its demise set against perceptions whose opposition is fixed in the 
material world.  The permanence of this opposition in Larsen’s novel means that 
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what has become an idea is never given form.  The perceptions of Clare’s husband 
and her friend Irene will now appear invalid but inviolable.  In the sense of truth 
rescued, Irene, and Clare’s white husband now exist within a framework of 
negotiated difference as indicated in the work of Homi Bhabha (2005).   
The promise of Clare free of foreignness exists only when we realize it 
cannot be kept; then it becomes longing and will remain as such until its loss is 
recovered in its projection in another form.  Unfortunately, the figure of Irene is 
incapable of this.  In Beloved, Sethe’s demise is at the hands of white people, but 
framed in her own volition, and the rejection of Sethe’s longing in the form of 
Beloved’s exit, is replaced by the sounds emanating from the women of the 
community which encourage pride in the self.  In Larsen’s novel we experience the 
postmodern presentation of the unattainable without the modern expertise for 
making what is longed for conceptual, that is, that it exists.                    
Compared to Du Bois’s Jim Crow car, Morrison’s contains both a fully 
recognisable human being as well as a group whose humanity is hidden in the 
presence of whiteness.  It is possible to discern here the beginnings of a situation 
in which, because of the complex nature of transition, those who are inhibited or 
repressed by whiteness must remain as such in dramatic time while the interior life 
is brought forward in someone else.   
The writings of James Weldon Johnson provide valuable insight into the 
reasons for this.  His Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man provides us with a 
protagonist for whom whiteness is an all-pervading inhibition: it is 
‘The dwarfing, warping, distorting, influence which operates 
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upon each and every coloured man in the United States.   
He is forced to take his outlook on all things, not from the  
viewpoint of a citizen, or a man, or even a human being but  
from the viewpoint of a coloured man.  It is wonderful to me that the 
race has progressed so broadly as it has, since most of its thoughts 
and all of its activity must run through the narrow neck of this 
one funnel.’ 
     (Johnson 2004[1912]:15) 
 
 The inference here is that everything he does or says carries the implication 
of a consciousness imposed on him by white people.  He may not be marked as 
Sethe is but his development as a character enables a clear image to appear of a 
self-awareness frustrated by whiteness.  Although perfectly deserving at school, he 
is not awarded the scholarship his achievements warrant, and this is because of 
his colour.  From then on he says, he was limited by ‘one dominating, all-pervading 
idea’ (Johnson 2004[1912]:15) and we can say this idea is ‘whiteness’.  The idea of 
an imposed consciousness is necessarily a conceptual misdeclaration but it must 
be remembered that it is accompanied by force.  As far as Sethe and ‘Ex-Coloured 
Man’ are concerned, whiteness and force combine in one powerful idea.  This is to 
say that the myths which contribute to white ascendancy generate at every turn a 
reaction in those who are thought incapable or unworthy of owning them.  This 
reaction in this context must also be false but in the context of white ascendancy it 
is judged a true and trusted indication of a lesser being.  The contention, then, is 
that in the context of ascendancy, any reaction becomes the mark of a 
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consciousness prescribed by difference by those who believe their own 
recommendations.  In the case of ‘Ex-Coloured Man’, the consciousness 
prescribed for his colour does not match that generated in his early years and 
made available to the reader.  Notably, this form is in opposition to one that depicts 
a transition where black women and men must be shown in actions which displace 
a consciousness made up for them by white people. 
 We can say that in all ‘Ex-Coloured Man’s’ travails, he behaves as an 
individual whose colour does not define him.  Stepto’s response to this is that it is 
the development of a ‘race consciousness’ where none existed before (1991:112).  
The description of the episode at school is deemed ‘frivolous’ as ‘Ex-Coloured 
Man’, as a child, learns, as all African Americans do, that he ‘was black and 
therefore different’ (112). However, the point of Johnson’s narrative is that the child 
does not feel different, either to the reader or himself.  Johnson’s development of 
his character is a clear signal that difference is imposed from without and as such 
forces those who come into contact with it to adjust her or his bearing in relation to 
a fixed point, in this case, the idea of whiteness.  Once established, this imposition 
will mean that everywhere and always, the characteristics of those thought different 
will be judged on the extent to which they are made separate by society. 
Unfortunately, it also exerts huge influence on the validity of their perceptions of 
themselves.  Throughout, we can say that in any discussion on transition, 
interpretations concerning the presence or not of ‘the soul or spirit of Afro-America’, 
its ‘genius loci’ (Stepto 1991: 114), will ricochet between a character’s successful 
projection of an innate African American consciousness and one fashioned for 
undertaking the perils of a transformation into ascendancy.  ‘Ex-Coloured Man’ is 
173 
 
valuable in this context in that he never doubts himself in his judgement of his own 
people.  This makes him a ‘chameleon’ or ‘seer’ (116-7) in Stepto’s eyes, as 
Johnson’s protagonist displays at every turn an awareness which is unabridged by 
the effects of a prescribed racial consciousness.  However, the fact that a racial 
consciousness is not present is a source of frustration for Stepto as he searches in 
vain for a place in dramatic time where he can say ‘Ex-Coloured Man’ renders it 
inert but, because it does not exist, it cannot be perceived in loss.  Nevertheless, 
this means separation from, even abandonment of, a past whose literature and 
history resonate, as they must, in a culture within a culture.  This is evident in the 
criticism of ‘Ex-Coloured Man’ as a ‘seer of surfaces’ (116): in other words, a man 
of shallow perceptions and ‘deficiencies of vision and character’ (114).  The point 
to be made here is that the inhibiting force of the imposition of difference is never 
more toxic than in the desire to have its passing writ large. 
 Herman Melville’s sense of transition writing is central to this form of 
reasoning.  His method of moving from an inhibiting past into spatial images of free 
expression is accomplished through the movement of a vessel:  ‘Foremost through 
the sparkling sea shoots on the gay, embattled bantering bow’.  However, this 
sense of striving is qualified by the presence of Ahab: ‘but only to drag dark Ahab 
after it, where he broods within his sternward cabin, builded over the dead water of 
the wake’ (Melville 2001 [1851]:184-5).  This most striking piece of writing captures 
the exciting and energetic momentum of a journey rich in promise and the 
communitas accompanying it.  But it is the presence of Ahab, unable to move from 
the prescribed knowledge of his past, who renders most the significant void 
between the bantering bow and the dead water of the wake. It must be asked how 
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would this most powerful character make his way forward and in what new 
situation would we be happy to see him rid himself of the ‘whiteness’, which it has 
to be said, feeds off him?  The true force of this ‘whiteness’ is only ever visible in 
Ahab’s determination to be rid of it, and Ahab only ever Ahab when in full 
awareness of its power over him.  The strife with which Ahab battles is always 
visible as an external threat, and his personal commitment to this battle remains 
the obsession of a human being who cannot prevail in such a situation.  
Consequently, we are witness to the debilitating power of ‘an inner essence rather 
than to the empirical selfhood of everyday life’ (Hegel1807:144).  And with this in 
mind, we can say that Ahab embodies, in opposition to an individual personality, 
historical forces which overpower him.  His motivations are neither the products of 
subjective states or contingent with commonplace activities.  He shares with Sethe 
a permanent mark of his brush with ‘whiteness’ and I would like to suggest that 
Ahab’s wooden stump and Sethe’s mutilated back are the impositions which 
register the limit of the form which has created them.  The permanence of these 
marks indicates the presence of an implacable force and the impossibility of their 
bearers ever being free of its power, but they also indicate the presence of a 
human being who has been denigrated.  We can say that because of their personal 
commitment they are more subject than subjective, pre-formed and subject to no 
change.  In this form of writing, the central influence is the humanity of the 
character and its availability to the perceptions of the reader.  A loss of subjectivity 
is to be free of the implications of the moment and simply, masterfully, to be simply 
who they are and recognised for that.  This finality, as it were, is the end game, 
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resultant of the form of its telling.  Because of this, it cannot undergo a transition; it 
is simply there in its loss.   
 Unlike Sethe and Ahab, ‘Invisible Man’s’ briefcase is something whose 
contents can be changed to express the source of the new self-awareness 
cultivated within a new persona.  This is significant in a discussion of Morrison’s 
creative practice and its implications within African American writing.  If as Stepto 
(1991) claims the form of African American writing is conducive to the immersion 
and ascent dilemma, then Invisible Man is the hope for a narrative voice which will 
express a consciousness fully aware of its rightful place in American society.  
However, this new sensibility will have to retain a good deal of its earlier self as it 
moves away from itself.  Melville will never allow Ahab to make the journey forward 
from the stern to the focsle to join ‘individuals jointly undergoing transition’ (Stepto 
1991:75) because his quest is generated by a volition recognisable in the form of 
its presentation as a human being; and there is little to be done other than for him 
to continue as he is: his ‘embodiment is both the condition of his existence and the 
expression of what he is’ (Taylor 1992:37).  Indeed, that is the whole point.   
The above discussion of African American writing, its themes and forms has 
shown Toni Morrison to be acutely aware of the inhibiting nature of imposition and 
the flaws inherent in writing a transition from the position of a subjugated 
consciousness to one vibrant and self-aware.  There lingers around the idea of 
transition ‘the development of a liberal consciousness’ where ‘the point of 
reference [becomes] not a general order but the individual’, and who at this point is 
seen to inherit ‘this separation between ultimate human values and the social 
system’ (Williams 1966:68).  In this development, ‘conceptions of a permanent 
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human nature and of a static order’ become steadily eroded.  Consequently, the 
idea of ‘human and social transformation’ finds traction in the idea of revolution, 
and the most important human values become associated with ‘development, 
progress and change’.  Its comparison with the stasis of the tragic form could not 
be starker.  The idea of rebellion or revolution suggests ‘the possibility of man 
altering his condition’ (68), but in the effort to proclaim a truth, tragedy leaves 
things just as it found them.  Morrison, then, uses tragedy to call a halt, as it were, 
to the proceedings in the segregation car in order to facilitate an adaption to the 
conditions in the present of dramatic time by a consciousness born out of the past: 
that is, to manage loss in the context of signification.  Implicit in this consciousness, 
as a result of the idea of loss, will be an awareness of the boundaries in which 
white superiority operates.   
This is significant in that adapting to marginalization is a rejection of the 
ethos on which it is founded, and not acquiescence to it, adapting not to real-world 
situations but to the falsity of the idea that fosters belief in the myth of white 
superiority.  The idea of development, progress and change is bound up with 
selections from history, and in its conditioning framework for future aspirations 
otherwise impossible to predict.  Morrison’s claim is not to be moving forward, or 
aside, but to provide an awareness of the false claims which history regurgitates 
around the lives of black people and, importantly, the debilitating drag they produce 
on the human condition.  Her position can be understood in the light of Benjamin’s 
deliberation that the ‘oppressed class itself is the depository of historical 
knowledge’ (1950:251).  Morrison’s characters are indeed an oppressed class, but 
with little historical knowledge.  However, historical knowledge, someone else’s, is 
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deposited with them in order to substantiate it in the minds of the people who 
selected it.  In the context of this new appraisal in dramatic time, in a questionable 
white world, the white man approaching Bluestone Road is in fact moving 
backwards in search of old certainties.  These include the physical symbols of the 
boundaries in which this search must take place; locked in the past as they are, the 
only place where it can take place.  For both parties the past must give way if a 
true, conscious self-awareness is to be achieved: one forced by prejudice; the 
other to relinquish its need for it.  The fact is that ‘because white men can’t police 
their imagination black men are dying’ (Rankin 2015:135).    
Johnson’s writing (2004[1912]) of ‘Ex-Coloured Man’ is indicative of 
Morrison’s approach.  Because not defined by a racial consciousness, his 
observations are those of an outsider whose influences were formed elsewhere.  
His blackness, then, is shown to be an imposition and its criteria are alien to him, 
but his claim to be ex-coloured is the acknowledgement that avoiding a prescription 
of blackness has forced him to nullify his intuitive and most personal ideas about 
himself.  The power of imposition in this sense has not prevented ‘Ex-Coloured 
Man’ living a full life but it has prevented him living it fully.  In a most revealing 
passage he admits a ‘dread’ he cannot explain, ‘unfounded, but one that never left 
[him]’ (Johnson 2004[1912]:126). And this was that his wife, who was white, would 
at some time discover in him ‘some shortcoming which she would unconsciously 
attribute to his blood rather than a failing of human nature’ (126).  She never did.  
But here, his innermost fears register the permanence of imposition and its 
debilitating effect on human beings: not defined by it, but plagued by it.  And this is 
precisely the place in the human psyche which Morrison seeks to preserve in 
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calling a halt to transition.  At this moment, the character’s humanity is evident and 
his contact with his people animated.  At the end of the passage the loss 
encountered in avoiding prescription becomes evident when ‘Ex-Coloured Man’ 
regrets ‘selling his birthright’ as he puts it as an ex-coloured man.  He salutes the 
work of men such as Mark Twain and Booker T. Washington in elevating the worth 
of the ‘coloured man’, and with regret claims, ‘I, too, might have taken part in a 
work so glorious’ (127).  Her wish to avoid regret, and to preserve a racial 
consciousness and a recognisable humanity while resisting prescription, are the 
motives for Morrison’s adaptation of ancient tragedy.                                   
Her creative practice involves an engagement with the complexities of 
immersion and ascent and the necessary transition this involves, but now two 
characters will reciprocate to express a mutual desire for fulfilment.  Transition, in 
Morrison’s hands, will formulate a link, a relation, between the present and the past 
able to nullify the influence of signification.    
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Chapter 4. 
 Toni Morrison’s aesthetic presentation of self-expression and autonomy in a group 
designated as an undifferentiated mass 
Carole Anne Taylor (2000) writes that ‘both tragedy and comedy become 
inseparable from the closed nature of a moral universe necessarily framed by 
unacknowledged power relations’ (7).  Nevertheless, in a Hegelian sense tragedy 
thrives on an ethical situation rather than a moral one, that is, what appears to be a 
rightful claim is also a misuse of the passions, (Chapter 3 of this thesis:15-16).  
Taylor’s conclusion placing ‘the individual protagonist as central to reaffirmations of 
values only temporarily in jeopardy’ (7), is a telling insight into Morrison’s purpose 
of erasing difference in order to reveal the relations of power it hides. 
 Morrison’s use of a tragic framework reveals the unassailable values 
temporarily unveiled in the killing of Beloved, and exposes a twofold challenge. 
First, the hidden unacknowledged powers which designate African American 
people as a subordinated group distinct in themselves, and ‘foster the development 
of an essentialist theory of identity by making invisible the processes constituting 
groups as a social category’ (Juteau-Lee 1995:18).  Secondly, the same theory of 
essentialism fuels the attacks on the ‘supposed essentialism’ (18) of those African 
American artists who wish to reveal the fact that dominated groups ‘are 
constructed in the context of a social relation of domination and dependence’ (17) 
where the use of difference perpetuates the ideologies of race and notions of 
inherent and existing categories.  An investigation into the hidden social relations 
which render African Americans a social category will clarify Morrison’s use of Du 
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Bois’s (1994[1903]) symbol of the veil.  In Morrison’s hands it becomes a device to 
symbolize the extent to which the power and influence of their masters compelled 
enslaved individuals to appear as a stereotypical mass, and whose existence as 
such denies us an unobstructed view of the true face of white supremacy.  
 Introducing Guillaumin’s (1995) theory concerning the imposition of 
difference, Jutean-Lee (1995) points out that notions of race engendered by skin 
colour and physical appearance are constructs and significant because they apply 
to existing ‘real’ groups; and these groups ‘are constructed in the context of a 
relation involving the appropriation of their labour power’ (9).  This is fitting to the 
situation which Morrison writes around Sethe whose labour as a slave is unpaid 
and whose very survival depends on the discretion of her masters.  Her 
membership of the slave group entails continuous subjection to an overriding 
power.  However, in light of Guillaumin’s insights we can say that it is not because 
Sethe is black that she is appropriated, but ‘because [she is] appropriated’ that she 
is black (9). 
 This means that the slaves’ colour has become significant as the sign of a 
designated and ‘distinct social collectivity’ (Miles 1989:74).  Guillaumin’s revelation 
of the material circumstances of appropriation also undermine the idea that the 
individuals of this group possess a specific nature.  That is, it is the circumstances 
of appropriation which establish the conditions for racial groupings and where, in a 
‘representational process... social significance is attached to certain human 
phenotypical human features’ (Miles:74). 
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 However, essentialism is avoided in Morrison’s writing of Sethe and her 
situation at Sweet Home.  The owners of the farm, the Garners, although slave 
owners, are minded to instil, along with their authority, a degree of autonomy 
amongst their slaves without, however, harming the economic well-being of their 
farm and themselves.  Sethe’s role in the kitchen and Mr Garner’s attitude towards 
his male slaves is illustrative of this (Morrison 2004:165).  It is notable that 
Morrison’s writing in this section of the novel acknowledges Garner’s awareness of 
the human forces at work in his slaves as he attempts to provide the conditions 
where their cultivation aids his business.  This compliments, at this stage, 
Morrison’s endeavour to infuse her character Sethe with the human qualities 
necessary to her tragic role.  Also noteworthy is that the human qualities that 
Garner wishes to promote in his slaves are those which he finds most valuable and 
the result of his own ruminations on the world he is a part of.  In light of this it is 
possible to claim that Garner considers his slaves of the same ilk as himself if only 
in their childlike, primitive way, and it is for him in his elevated position to improve 
them. 
 As readers we know that Sethe’s mother carried her owner’s mark branded 
into her skin and that Sethe’s plea to have the same mark is violently rejected.  
‘This is me’ her mother tells her, and this ‘me’ will be her identity even in death: ‘if 
you don’t recognise me when I die, you can see it’s me by this mark’, she tells her 
daughter (72).  Guillaumin considers this the mark of possession, purely functional, 
and in which there is ‘no endogenous implication and which is no different from the 
marking of livestock’ (142).  As such, we can recognise this mark as the 
consequence of a relationship between captured individuals and their masters, and 
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in Sethe’s development in the context of Sweet Home, as that of a slave and 
member of an appropriated group who are considered, by their captors, to be 
underdeveloped and naive.  Nevertheless, the persistence of the mark in death 
registers its capacity to be remembered and the admonition of Sethe by her mother 
is an indication of Morrison’s mistrust of bringing marked bodies into the present 
and will be intensified when Sethe receives her own mark.  It is also a sign of the 
doubt Morrison develops around individual efforts to establish an identity in relation 
to a past stolen from African Americans.  Morrison’s development of Sethe’s 
human sensibilities in this situation is juxtaposed to the Garners’ conceptions, but 
wholly personal to her in that they are centred in Sethe’s overarching role as 
mother.  Her development is quite different from the male slaves who, it can be 
argued, although enjoying a certain amount of autonomy, are still defined by their 
master. 
 Sethe’s position as an individual who is not defined by her masters is, in 
part, the result of not being marked.  Her mother’s admonition of her for wanting to 
be seen as ‘belonging’ is clearly an indication of the horror of being labelled as 
property, and not human.  Here is the indication, highlighted in her mother’s 
stance, of the importance of remembering the person and not slavery.  Within her 
mother’s statement is the horrible fact that she has no recourse to any self-
expression, and that she knows that, somehow, her loss in that must survive the 
memory of her as a slave.  Sethe’s characterization as an independent, conscious 
human being takes precedence in this, firstly, because she is being prepared for 
the tragic situation which Morrison has planned for her, and, secondly, because her 
instinctual and natural inclinations must reveal the extent to which they have 
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become corrupted in her owners.  Mrs Garner’s reluctance to acknowledge Sethe’s 
appeals concerning her marriage to Halle is an indictment of her interpretation of 
the values her society promulgates (Morrison 2004:31), and enhances Sethe’s 
claims as valid, human aspirations.  Sethe, we can say, is the walking configuration 
of that which has been denied to her mother.  We see here repeated Morrison’s 
determination to avoid the suggestion that Sethe is in any way a character other 
than one whose appropriation is the cause of her situation.  Unlike her mother, her 
appropriation is signalled in the stifling of her burgeoning self-consciousness. 
 Harding and Martin (1994) argue that even ‘the more politically sympathetic 
views of classic Marxist criticism’ would still tend to believe that ‘the resistance of 
dominated groups is pre-defined by the ruling class.’  This results in a situation 
where any self-expression by the slave is judged within the framework of ‘the 
underdog’s subordinate status’ (88).  With reference to the cornfield symbol, they 
point out that Morrison avoids this dilemma in her text by ‘surcharging the 
oppressors’ words, deriding them by subverting their most offensive strategies... 
rather than ignoring them or obliterating them’ (94): similar, they say, to how ‘ivy 
supports itself on another plant that it devitalizes in order to thrive’ (95).  This thesis 
would argue that this is achieved in the formulation of Sethe’s consciousness at 
Sweet Home prior to the cornfield scene.  Indeed, the Garners’ interpretation of 
their own guiding principles is severely undermined in their attitude towards 
Sethe’s requests; and as we shall see, their restrictions on Sethe’s ability to fulfil 
her instincts are prerequisites for the events in the cornfield.  Much like Tessa 
Roynon’s (2013) take on the same theme, the idea that Morrison’s work survives 
on established structures, and the dichotomies they attempt to resolve, can only be 
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of value if we ignore the fact of Sethe’s self-consciousness and her eagerness to 
develop.  An insight into this is Harding and Martin’s response (96 note 6) to 
Guillaumin’s (1972:90) quote concerning minorities: ‘... they cannot define 
themselves according to internal and independent references, they must do so on 
the basis of references available within the majority system’. 
 The use of this quote appears as support for the claim that ‘the minority 
writer has the possibility only of fictionalizing the very terms in which the dominant 
class wants minorities to see themselves’ (Harding and Martin 1994:88).  In light of 
this concern and the risk ‘difference’ holds for the writer, their argument centres on 
the use of the corn symbol as the opportunity to undermine and redress the 
complex dichotomies spawned by slavery in the throwaway space secretly 
appropriated by the slaves.  This thesis argues that this is an inaccurate reading in 
that at its heart it carries a flawed understanding of Morrison’s attitude to 
difference.  We would argue that Sethe’s request for a marriage ceremony, a place 
of her own befitting a married woman, and a chance to express her contribution to 
the workings of Sweet Home’s kitchen (Morrison 2004:31-2), are indeed the very 
references mentioned by Guillaumin.  However, Sethe’s aspirations are 
established as characteristics of her humanity.  They mirror those of her mistress 
and become more definitive of Sethe the more Mrs Garner controls and 
appropriates them.  Sethe’s internal and independent references are recognisably 
human and conducive to human aspirations.  In this sense, they conflate the 
independent with the majority by establishing a common humanity as the common 
denominator.  This means that Morrison has established that the references 
available within the controlling system are associated with and accommodate the 
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internal independent references of the enslaved individual.  They are present within 
the system because that system is made up of human beings, and they exist as 
the conduit through which human beings define themselves.  They attract Sethe 
because she is a human being.  This provides the opportunity to point out that in 
Morrison’s work, the terms jealously guarded by the dominant class are exactly 
those which they refuse to acknowledge exist in those they dominate.  Morrison 
has no wish to fictionalize these terms, her aim is to accentuate them.  Sethe is not 
different, it is simply that her internal references are forbidden expression by a 
controlling majority unable to contemplate their embodiment in anyone else. 
 A failure to recognise this is to misread what is a focus on the ‘subject of a 
group socially constituted in the context of a relation of appropriation’ (Juteau-Lee 
1995:13), as an effort to subvert the complexities which have grown up around the 
effort to hide that relation of appropriation.  After all, it is not Sethe’s values which 
are flawed in their presentation, but the system in which they are rejected.  The 
presence of Sethe and her new husband and the remaining male slaves in the 
cornfield is a result of this rejection.  The space they occupy is not economically 
essential to their owners and as such the wild animals which stray there are 
tolerated, and so for the slaves it is a haven; and although forbidden them, the risk 
of retribution is a small one.  Consequently, Morrison’s construction of this space 
acknowledges that the actions of the slaves are a result of the power and control of 
their masters.  However, the subsequent events in this space are not contrived by 
Morrison to undermine or redress the reasons for their presence in it, but to 
illustrate how quickly, naturally and instinctively the emotional vitality and zest in 
life returns to these individuals: ‘the jailed up flavour ran free’ (Morrison 2004:33).  
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Montagu’s description of myths as ‘most effective and perilous when they remain 
unrecognized for what they are’ (1997:41) is an apt illustration of the mythical 
structure which underpins the myth of white supremacy.  This thesis argues that 
Morrison’s wary aversion to these myths has resulted in her construction of a 
character-based system where the purpose of the symbols chosen by her, and in 
their progression through the various contexts given them, is to provide the senses 
a continuing marker for Sethe’s situation as a self-conscious human being in the 
context of slavery.  It is a device in Morrison’s hands able to complement the 
instant and vital willingness of human beings to be resurgent in the face of 
degradation and adversity: humanity is simply present.  More important, the 
strength of this marker is as the unmissable sign of what has been lost in the 
individual’s subsequent demise. 
 It is clear that in the context of ownership, of unacknowledged power 
relations and their detachment from the universal, the structure which Morrison 
uses does not replicate an original structure framed in its own image, ‘that 
newcomer which has taken the place of the gods’ (Guillaumin 1995:211), but one 
formed by tragedy in order to make visible that which, in the absence of the gods, 
has become the preserve of dominating individuals who believe they form a group 
whose recommendations of itself constitute a central, superior position.  
 What is difficult for Roynon, and Harding and Martin, is that Morrison’s use 
of symbolism reverberates from Sethe and is perpetuated at length throughout the 
novel but remains consonant with its raison d’etre.  This is at odds with the 
‘ambivalence’ that Harding and Martin find in the increasing ‘complexity’ of the 
symbol in its transition from Sweet Home to Bluestone Road, an ambivalence 
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founded in the slaves’ ‘entrapment in the system and resistance to it’ (93).  
However, there is ambivalence only if we concentrate on the entrapment and not 
the system.  As we have seen, the system is one of appropriation and power and 
does not acknowledge the individuality of those it captures, which is precisely the 
reason for the corn symbol.  Harding and Martin’s conception of an interface 
between the system and resistance to it as a site of fresh inquiry shifts the onus 
onto ‘the slaves’ distinctive experiences of the shared icon’ (93) as they put it, 
when in fact those experiences would be of the system.   
 The difficulty of sustaining this site of inquiry within the corn symbol 
becomes apparent in the movement from a site of slavery to one of freedom.  As 
Harding and Martin point out (1994:93), the slaves decide to escape ‘when the 
corn is tall’ (Morrison 2004:261) and ‘to meet in the cornfield,’ and there is plenty of 
corn still to ripen even after the feast celebrating Sethe’s escape is over, which 
Sethe ‘could see from where she stood’ (162-3).  Because the cornfield becomes 
for some slaves a place of escape, and for those recaptured a place ‘where the 
whites redouble the repression’ (Harding and Martin1994:93), the ambivalence of 
the symbol, for Harding and Martin, increases in a ‘double-edged irony’ which 
assists ‘the symbolism of the interface’ in promoting ‘narrative development 
unrecognised by the sequential, problem-solving model conventionally applied to 
texts’ (93).  The irony, they say, is evident in the attempt to burn Sixo which reflects 
on the white men responsible because the fire they build is ‘only enough for 
cooking hominy’ (Morrison 2004:266).  Once more, they ask the symbol to address 
actions for which there is no reference other than the system, because they 
consider it a shared register of experience and not as a constant within experience.  
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Clearly, hominy, as a derivative of corn, ploughs the same furrow and in its 
coarsely ground form it is reductive of the natural vitality of the corn itself, and its 
failure to quell Sixo is heard in his determined, shouted affirmation of his identity, 
‘Seven-O!,’ which belittles the attempt to destroy it (266).  It registers the vitality of 
the symbol and the paucity of the white man’s ability to destroy it.  Here we see the 
symbol able to reference the extent of Sethe and Sixo’s involvement with the idea 
of a singular, independent consciousness that is not, in its possession by them, 
dependent on community or group affiliation.  This means that the icon is 
responsible for the representation of a self-conscious vibrant humanity as the 
central, constant and established fact in this part of the novel, while the system, 
because of this fact, becomes increasingly repugnant in its all-knowing complexity. 
 The culmination of Harding and Martin’s site of inquiry is that the ‘parasitic’ 
principle favoured by them would engage with ‘a process of mutual and conflicting 
occupation of one common cultural field’ (1994:95).  There are two points to be 
made in opposition to this.  First, the singularity this thesis argues for, and second, 
the subsequent marking of Sethe.  Recognition of the singularity that the corn 
symbol promotes is to acknowledge that the only thing separating the singularity 
developed in the corn symbol and the self-centred singularity alive in the 
perceptions of the Garners is the system and the relation of appropriation it 
spawned.  Existing within the corn symbol already is the ‘common field’ and any 
conflict arises out of questions of appropriation of that field. 
 Indeed, this match, so to speak, is the qualifier which rejects any 
modification of its presence.  If this were not so it would mean that slaves are 
defined differently from other human beings, and must take the blame for their 
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appropriation.  The grounds for these claims are found in the use of a symbol 
which, in its aesthetic reach, reveals to the senses human qualities which are, on 
the one hand, sullied and misappropriated, and, on the other, vital for life, but 
eternally and irrevocably possessed of everyone.  The power inherent in the 
system will have a marked effect on this situation as schoolteacher prevents any 
recourse to a common ground between slave and master, but Morrison’s need for 
the individual is cast here in the single entity she uses to achieve her aim.  And this 
is, at this stage, to show that her characters belong to a ‘real’ group which is 
‘constituted in the context of a relation involving the appropriation of their labour’ 
(Juteau-Lee 1995:9): subordination not difference.  The problem for schoolteacher 
in his central position, in the effort to sustain relations of power, is how to hide this 
fact. 
 This thesis argues that, in relation to this group, Morrison’s concentration on 
the individual is to provide a manifestation of a consciousness of a class of people 
in opposition to any ‘spontaneous belief in themselves as a natural species’ 
(Guillaumin 1995:234).  In this aim, the development of consciousness is 
dependent on the development of an individual through fulfilment and despair.  
However, before Morrison’s substitution of schoolteacher for Garner, and the 
movement from a collection of individuals who, sustained by their economic 
success, are now ‘laying claim to power’ (58 note 20), Morrison’s presentation of 
individual qualities within an oppressed group requires clarification. 
 Sethe’s individualism, framed within universally acknowledged 
characteristics and the vital self-consciousness of the corn symbol, although 
refused the chance to thrive, will seek to protect itself in escape.  In this, it signals 
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once and for all the danger inherent in any association with the controlling white 
power.  Notwithstanding this, an awareness of the origins of the values espoused 
by schoolteacher will illuminate Sethe’s situation in relation to power and the guilt 
she expresses when saying ‘I made the ink’ (Morrison 2004:320).  In Guillaumin’s 
terms (1995),  unlike the individual unconscious which becomes visible only in 
‘transpositions’, for example Garner’s transposition of concerns for the 
development of his slaves’ characters into strategies for economic gain through 
appropriation, ‘the social unconscious shows itself at face value’.  This means that 
‘ideologies, like uncensored dreams, literally speak the obsessions and magic 
imprecations of their culture’ (58 note 20). The face value that Guillaumin describes 
can be said in Morrison’s work to be the behaviour of schoolteacher: what you see 
is what you get.  Schoolteacher sees to it that Sethe’s ‘human characteristics‘ and 
her ‘animal ones’ (Morrison 2004:228) are written down, and in doing so positions 
himself as ‘both a biological being and a thinking subject...the measure of all 
things’ (Dumont 1972:44) in his superiority over Sethe.  Regarding himself as an 
‘individual, elementary man’ in his particularity, he ‘incarnates the whole of 
mankind’ (44).  In this sense, ‘values are turned upside down’, because ‘what is still 
called society is the means, the life of each man is the end’ (44).  This implies that 
for the individual, his society’s characteristic spirit and aspiration are fulfilled in his 
elevation of himself.  Consequently, constituted in notions of liberty and equality, 
society cannot deny him those very same notions, that is, it cannot ‘thwart the 
demands of liberty and equality’ (44).  We can say that the character 
schoolteacher, in his individual actions, literally speaks the obsessions of his 
culture which are fulfilled in its ability to mediate his actions into the free expression 
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of the individual which it preserves: society as an irreducible ‘datum’ of the claims 
of its members (44).  Dumont’s summing up of this situation is that the ‘ideal of 
liberty and equality follows immediately from the conception of man as an 
individual’ (46).  Dumont’s observation offers a framework for the context of 
Sethe’s subsequent marking by schoolteacher, because the system incarnate in 
schoolteacher ‘grants real existence only to individuals and not to relations’ 
between them (1986:11). 
Dumont offers two alternative aspects to the individualism discussed here 
which go some way to unravelling the violence perpetrated against Sethe by 
schoolteacher.  The first is the idea that society consists of ‘individuals prior to the 
group of relationships they constitute or make more or less of their own accord’ 
(74).  In this reading society becomes an associated body of individuals in contract.  
Secondly, in contrast, and to stress his idea that individualism is a form of 
‘ideology’, he registers the idea that society with its institutions and values is prior 
to its ‘particular members, the latter being human beings only through education 
into and modelling by a given society’ (74).  The first of these two, where individual 
essence and interaction separate ‘the individual from the relation’, is deemed 
essentially modern (Dumont 1972:77), and the second, where the individual 
appears the product of a network of relations, appears to be the system overturned 
by the modern and one where, in Dumont’s words, ‘the interdependence’ of the 
individual elements is so great that the relations between them all but disappear as 
‘they become the product of that network of relations,’ undermining the notion of 
the individual element (78). 
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 In light of these considerations, it becomes possible to spot schoolteacher 
within the modern framework, where the individual incarnate of the whole 
perceives the system in which he thrives to be consonant with his own idea of 
himself.  In other words, in one consciousness there are joined the material values 
of society and the ability to ‘spiritualize matter’ into human sensibilities (Ziarek 
2012:141).  And of Sethe we can say that there is not, because ‘white bodies erase 
their materiality in the reflection of social values’ from which black bodies are 
excluded (141) in a lack of relation.  Morrison is bent on revealing that 
schoolteacher’s refusal to accept this human being is because, as a human being, 
she is unrecognisable to him.  For schoolteacher, Sethe is there to make real the 
dream he lives; not to share the ‘peculiarity’ of what he ‘regards as normal’ 
(Macfarlane 1993:4). 
 In the attempt to resolve these difficulties, Sethe’s admission to Paul D that 
schoolteacher ‘couldn’t have done it if I hadn’t made the ink’ (Morrison 
2004[1987]:320) is an indication of Morrison’s insights into white power and the 
appropriation of black individuals.  It was ‘Mrs Garner’s recipe’ Sethe tells him, but 
schoolteacher preferred how she ‘mixed it’ and this ‘was important to him’ because 
‘at night he wrote in his book’ (44).  Sethe’s admission is an indication of the 
mistake she felt she had made in allowing schoolteacher a glimpse in her of that 
which is expressed in the corn symbol.  His personal preferences are now satisfied 
by Sethe which means she is now a part of the system of means which fulfil the 
ends of the individual in a relationship of power.  And it is this relationship which is 
foremost in the structure of this stage of Morrison’s method.  Sethe’s position as 
means would run concomitant with the subordination of Mrs Gardner in the context 
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of the patriarchy at Sweet Home, if it was not for her recipe.  Because of it, she 
remains superior to Sethe and in this underlines Sethe’s position as a person who 
is forbidden any self-authorization at all.  In this Sethe’s subjugation is maintained 
as the novel establishes that the best use is made of her within the perceptions of 
her owners.  The corn symbol supersedes the lack of any mark similar to that 
branded into her mother, but it is not visible to schoolteacher, and as the measure 
of all things he is able to record and thus objectify his superiority as an individual 
over her as stereotype. 
 Her attempt to be free of him is a promotion of her consciousness and a 
rejection of the ‘kingdom of ends’ (Dumont 1972:44) which provides him with his.  It 
is a rejection of the very man himself.  Her escape establishes in her a quality for 
which the modern world ‘grants real existence only to individuals and not to 
relations’ between them (Dumont 1986:11).  Sethe does not exist in any terms 
appropriate to schoolteacher’s consciousness and she must remain a means to his 
ends.  Her punishment is the imposition of the mark which classifies her finally as 
non-human and whose role as chattel is finite, inviolable.  And in this her outside 
does not represent what she is but what he says she is.  In making the ink she has 
promoted his view of her in the process of demeaning herself.  Her humanity is 
hidden in this imposition and this means she is now unable to articulate who she is.  
It is preserved inside her but not available to any symbol other than the tree which 
schoolteacher opens up on her back.  In this situation there can be no self-
authorization for Sethe because she is considered as something outside the 
system of values where value is self-regulated and self-referential.  
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Schoolteacher regards her as chattel and not as a subject being.  The 
practical everyday sense of the conflict between oppressor and oppressed is 
superseded by ideological considerations of consciousness.  The oppressors or 
dominators deny a consciousness to the oppressed ‘because they take them to be 
things’ (Guillaumin 1995: 215).  In their elevated state the dominators see 
themselves as having moved beyond the natural state they perceive to be present 
in those below them, who, they believe, are ‘precisely... the pre-programmed 
elements of this nature’ (211).  Schoolteacher wishes to write this down as the 
signifier which will, along with the mark on her back, register Sethe as forever 
inferior to him.  Theweleit points out that ‘the language of man is governed and the 
thinking of the (male) theoretician ruled by the signifier’ (1989:51).  He describes it 
as ‘an instrument that etches order into meaning – a pointer, a prescription’ (51).  It 
certifies that appropriation by a certain group of people ‘is what makes the world 
function properly’ and things should remain as they are as ‘this will avoid disorder’ 
and preserve ‘true values and eternal priorities’ (Guillaumin 1995:217).  As a 
pointer and an indication of a common absence, it is able to register that between 
the individual slaves there is a common lack of humanity.   
 In Sethe’s tragic denouement she kills the best of herself to avoid the 
contamination of the signifier; to avoid the contamination which is schoolteacher.  
In this act Sethe the human being is on full show, but for the last time.  The signifier 
provided by schoolteacher hides the human essence of the slave, and brings to 
mind, any mind, the base nature he prescribes for her.  In its attention on the 
individual it is able to hide the relationship in which she is constituted.  The 
practicalities of appropriation can be seen as giving way to an ideology which 
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provides confirmation for the actions of the masters and makes real the dubious 
nature of schoolteacher’s prescription.  In the distance Morrison opens up between 
writing tragedy and the written signifier, we can understand how the masters’ 
narratives have become confined to writing either the confirmation for the order 
their position provides them, or the ‘apocalyptic turmoil-from castration to the end 
of the earth’s rotation’ (Guillaumin: 217) should that order be undermined. 
   Writing of this Goldman (1990) says that the ink is ‘the evidence of the 
labourer whose work would articulate her own authority’ (326).  This implies that 
her beating is designed to remove this authority and to reassert his control, but his 
use of the ink she made has enabled him already to consolidate his own opinion of 
himself in writing and as a reference for others, and makes his elevation a fact.  
However, her escape is to prevent the continuation of this; to prevent it being a fact 
of her life.  In this line of thinking we can find Morrison’s motivation for establishing 
Sethe’s guilt in the ink she made.  It is in the context of Sethe as a loss of means 
that Morrison wishes us to contemplate her beating.  Goldman’s positioning of 
Sethe’s subjectivity as the ground of the conflict flies in the face of this.  Her 
beating is a result of her bid to escape because his consciousness measures her 
as a means and exercises its right to be the measure of all things.  Schoolteacher 
is measuring in ink and establishing in writing the distance between Sethe and the 
datum of himself, and the sign of his findings will remain on her back forever as a 
lie in which she played a part.  It is as if Morrison is recording the recording of 
difference measured and plotted in relation to power.  She has not written 
schoolteacher simply as an appropriator, but to reveal that this means the 
appropriation of everything and all sensibilities in his elevation within power. 
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 It is important to keep this idea of power central in order to gauge fully 
Morrison’s intent.  As we have seen in the work of Harding and Martin, and 
Goldman, the line between form and content can become blurred and result in a 
lack of clarity surrounding the character Sethe.  In Morrison’s work, Sethe, as a 
member of the human race, is a fact, and non-negotiable.  It is the expression of 
this essence which registers conflict after conflict because once it is in the open 
and visible, it belongs not to her but to someone else: appropriation.  This is the 
true ground of the conflict acknowledged by Morrison.  However, it would be a 
mistake to think that the essence so vibrant in the slaves of Sweet Home will be 
contested.  In conjunction with this is the hint that, unlike Mrs Garner and her 
refusal to consider any self-authorization for Sethe in her kitchen, the ink made by 
Sethe is a contribution in these terms to her sense of achievement.  She has, in its 
making, allowed a brief glimpse of an aspiration to dignity formed through doing 
something well.  Unlike the corn symbol, the ink provides a momentary or partial 
view into that which is covered by the veil, which is the slave’s self-expression.  
Aspiration is now visible in its separation, in the form of the ink, from the whole 
defined as slave and we find it to be, in this state, at its most vulnerable.  The corn 
symbol expresses something singular to each slave, but the ink is something 
expressed in a relationship of power with the hint that it may have been better kept 
to itself.  In these terms it is expressive of the modalities adopted by those whose 
body and soul have been appropriated.  However, if it goes unrecognized as such 
because of the power relations in which it takes place, Sethe’s spirit will be seen as 
conforming to schoolteacher’s judgement of it, not least by her.  It is noteworthy 
that her admission concerning the ink is in the concluding part of the novel, and in 
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a period of introspection in which she contemplates the effect on her of 
appropriation.  It is the realisation that she acted as she did out of ignorance, and 
changes her memory, the reality, of what happened to her.  She blames herself for 
what was her appropriation by others and still feels the measure of schoolteacher’s 
ink against her most human of actions.  But we only truly know her by the human 
actions which are her downfall.  In a quirk now evident in the most complex of 
themes, the importance of distinguishing between form and content in Sethe’s 
denouement is finally surrendered when the effects of slavery are made plain.  In 
the final pages of the novel her guilt becomes the measure of the character she 
has become; in effect she is now modern in that her demeanour is now a reaction 
to the events around her and she will be judged on her ability to deal with them.  
Unfortunately, as the result of the most awful circumstances, she is unable to 
configure those circumstances in relation to her: the mark she carries now hides 
the real reasons she has become the person she believes she is.  The result of 
power is that the modalities of existence under power are regardeded as individual 
traits by the individual concerned as well as their oppressor. 
 Ziarek (2012) acknowledges that ‘the activity of the spirit, in contrast to... 
racialized sensibilities and passive matter, has been associated with the self-
determination of the subject and the constitution of meaning’.  In this context, ‘the 
self determining spirit of both idealism and materialism is illusory and violent’ (178).  
This means that ‘when separated from the sensuous, the spirit of freedom reverses 
into the domination of materiality and otherness’ (178).  Consequently, we can say 
that if the spirit of freedom is not available to the imagination then it appears 
nothing more than the expression of sensibilities peculiar to a racialized object, and 
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as passive matter that is as tainted as the criteria imposed on it by power.  In 
Adorno’s words, it signals ‘the concretion of the aesthetic structure’ (2013:127).   
 Ziarek also confirms that a spirit available to the imagination ‘preserves the 
traces of expressive capacities in the remnants of materiality reduced to waste’ 
(179), which is to say at the hands of the controlling power.  Ziarek points out that 
the struggle between form and content simply transforms the subject into ‘a mere 
reflection of the hegemonic subject’ (181).  The Hegelian aesthetic, she says, 
‘underscores the struggle’ in that it ‘preserves the alterity of the material’ (180).  
The conflict for Ziarek, then, is between the continuing presence of the form which, 
‘despite the labour of spiritualization’, still retains traces of alterity, and the 
Hegelian aesthetic which ‘defines the perfection of classical art as a harmony of 
form and content’ (181).  In Ziarek’s reasoning, the contradiction between ‘the 
interior and exterior’, that is the lingering insinuations of difference perpetuating in 
the spiritualized form, characterizes all art in the ‘different modalities’ of that 
contradiction (181).  The modalities of difference identified by Ziarek, in opposition 
to the Hegelian aesthetic, can she says, provide ‘a feminist trans-valuation of 
aesthetic values associated with the devalued feminine, blackness, and materiality’ 
(180); and not least in their ability to produce, in the form of the enigma, an 
‘absolute blackness’ capable of ‘exceeding comprehension’ (184).  This is in 
opposition to Hegel’s vision of the self-knowledge gained by the individual resultant 
of experiencing the power which dominates materiality, bodies and nature.  
 The knowledge gained in this new state facilitates the recognition and 
contestation of the power which perpetuates this domination: in Kaminsky’s words 
(1970:23), ‘a full awareness of the place and role of man in the world’.  Essentially, 
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the individual recovers ‘a conception of free activity’ in a response of her choosing 
as a natural being, or ‘in virtue of some inescapable vocation or purpose’ (Taylor 
1992:160).  This means that her response, although accepted universally as a 
human response, is that of an individual existence.  First and foremost it must be 
peculiar to her before it can be recognised by the imagination of everyone.  This 
must be so because the unity achieved between form and content is appropriately 
available to the ‘spiritual interests’, the imagination, of the observer (Hegel 
2004[1886]:44).  Consequently, the representation before the observer is not 
conducive to an external inquiry into internal essences because its form is the 
semblance of that which resides in each observer: their private claims as separate, 
individual, human beings.  The universal as particular to the individual is revealed 
in an action where form, because it is harmonious with content, predominates.  
There can be no appeal otherwise.  She is the essence, but for the watchers she 
resembles something they always knew to be true.  As Taylor points out 
(1992:159), this goes beyond the notion of ‘a self-dependent will’ because of ‘its 
insertion in nature’, and whose choice is free of desire.  This, then, is the Hegelian 
spirit situated within the ‘free subject’ which will progress to ‘enjoy in the shape and 
fashion of things a mere external reality of himself’ (36).  This level of perception 
we can say links the individual to her environment as the possessor of an 
understanding relative to the human condition.  However, this is the contradiction 
to which Ziarek draws our attention: the recognition of humanity in the denouement 
of the individual, and the disappearance of that humanity in the form which 
survives; and of course the artist’s ability to revitalize that spirit at will.  
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 A necessary part of this argument is the visibility of the modalities of 
difference which survive the tragic denouement, the remnants associated with the 
enigma: absolute blackness and a capability for ‘exceeding comprehension’ (Ziarek 
2012:184).  Ziarek regards as ‘a unique accomplishment...art’s relation to traces of 
materiality and alterity, to what remains non-identical: remnants of non-
symbolizable matter’ (183).  This implies an interaction with the non-conceptual, 
and Ziarek’s argument is that the enigma is capable of making an intervention into 
hegemonic structures of power and control: the possibility of ‘political 
transformation’ and of ‘new embodied forms of life’ (189). The idea that the 
unknowable can replace the essential and prevent the individual being 
representative of the mass is a powerful argument.  However, if the enigma is to be 
disassociated from any known beginning, it must also deny any association with 
appropriation.  And in this, it must take full responsibility for itself and look to itself 
for its reasons for action.  Unfortunately, there is no reason for absolute blackness 
other than in opposition to whiteness. 
 Along with this, it is difficult to resolve the idea of the enigma with the 
remnants of materiality, the alterity which brings it about.  The doubt remains that 
the enigma is not possessed of any semblance of that to which it aspires.  What is 
not mentioned is the origin of this difference.  In light of this omission it is 
necessary to consider that if the sensuous presentation of the particular fails, then 
what is the equivalence of that failure in dramatic time?  A failure to ask this 
question is to misappropriate or ignore altogether the motivations for alterity.  The 
result of this is a mistaken concentration on the form which is now bereft of any 
content whatsoever as a result of its tragic denouement, as the spotlight moves 
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from the tragic figure to the claim it lost.  It then becomes clear that the lost claim of 
the tragic figure is shocked into becoming the remaining semblance of that 
required by the artist.  Essentially, in believing that the demise of the tragic figure is 
partial, ideas of alterity can only survive as a contradiction in terms.  The Hegelian 
aesthetic is not preserving the alterity of the material, but signalling the complete 
demise of the tragic figure.  This is a contributing factor in the emotional reach of 
the tragic denouement when the character strives for recognition of that which, 
incarnate in her actions, can only defeat her.  Tragedy in its success plays in two 
spotlights, that of the tragic figure and the claim it loses.   
 For a centrality not conceived in any recognisably human terms, and, 
therefore, unrecognisable to itself, the enigma becomes the means by which this 
central datum of self-aggrandizement is able to locate itself in its own prescriptions.  
The enigmatic form risks appearing as the effort to present free activity within the 
prescribed schemes of the controlling power: schemes which it must account for.  
In this context, we cannot say that one is resultant of the other because of the 
regression of human distinctions in both.  They simply share equivalence in a 
relation of power and repression.  Morrison’s presentation of tragedy avoids these 
pitfalls through employing a tragic framework whose essential principle is the 
humanity of the tragic figure and its loss.  Essentially, her character enters the 
tragic scene as human and leaves defeated and bereft, because losing that which 
is treasured above all else means losing everything.  Because of this, any 
remnants of materiality would be those prescribed by power onto this defeated 
figure.  This is vividly expressed by the marks on Sethe’s back which become, in 
Morrison’s aesthetic, the permanent expression of that which replaces what she 
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has lost: the mark which says she is anything her masters wish to say she is.  
There can be no recourse to expressive capacities in remnants of materiality in a 
loss so great, and a signification so overwhelming.          
Goldman (1990) confirms schoolteacher’s and other slave owners’ 
economic motives for their brutal repression of runaways. But the gist of her 
argument is that ‘schoolteacher’s appropriation of milk and ink marks the origin of 
his control’ (326), and his indebtedness to her.  However, it is the appropriation of 
her labour that is at the heart of the argument.  Goldman’s insights are really aimed 
at the effect on Sethe of her appropriation.  Both Goldman and Ziarek consider that 
sovereign power is dependent on the subjugation of slaves, when it should be 
pointed out that the subjugation of the slave is as a result of a power which in its 
operation obliterates any understanding of the individual, human sensibilities of its 
captives.  
This is evident in Hegel’s master-slave narrative.  Applied to Sethe’s 
situation it would entertain the idea that she is seeking, in her manufacture of the 
ink, a ‘recognition’ by schoolteacher of her ‘independence’, something in this 
discussion we have referred to as self-awareness.  However, the recognition she 
may seek, for Hegel, must be reciprocal in that the development of self-
consciousness is dependent on a meeting between two separate beings.  The self-
consciousness of each individual consequent on this meeting is constituted in the 
recognition by them of the other as a self-conscious being: recognition by each of 
self-consciousness in the other person establishes a self-consciousness for each. 
 ‘The process of Recognition’ described by Hegel involves the supersession 
of one independent being by another in order ‘to become certain of itself as the 
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essential being’ (Hegel 1977[1807]:111).  Sethe would be conscious that she had 
done something significant in making the ink, but also able to register that 
schoolteacher recognizes her actions in precisely the same way.  As a 
consequence, Sethe would not consider him as essential because, in this 
reciprocal moment, becoming certain of herself, in Hegel’s words becoming 
essential, she would supersede schoolteacher and her own self in this 
acknowledgement of her own conceptual self from outside.  Recognition of the self 
in another is an elevation in reciprocality: each independent being becoming an 
essential being and self-contained by seeing ‘the other do the same as it does’ 
(112).  Her idea of herself is now established and she no longer needs affirmation 
for this, which is another way of saying she no longer needs him or the person she 
was a moment before.  In this new context, she possesses a true knowledge of 
herself, or a spirit, which, in the extent to which it is ‘for itself’, and ‘out of itself’ 
(112), renders her truly independent in the face of an independence she no longer 
recognizes as determining her.  As independent beings in this ‘play of Forces’ 
(112), ‘they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, 
individuals submerged in the being (or immediacy) of life’ (113).  Although the 
product of a process involving two people, independent being in this sense is now 
extremely private and selective in its certainty of itself, or rather in remaining 
certain of itself. 
Brandom (2008) frames Hegel’s theory within a social context.  He points 
out that ‘the judgements that potentially express knowledge and our intentional 
doings are things that we are responsible for’ (3).  The intentional things for which 
we are responsible are classed by Brandom as normative notions.   A normative 
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notion we can say is a perception that an action relates to or derives from existing 
standards of behaviour within a particular society.  Our commitment to them is 
recognized in our gaining responsibility for them.  It is this commitment which 
allows us ‘to bind ourselves by concepts’ which become normative statuses (30).  
Brandom argues that these are ‘essentially social statuses’ and, in line with Hegel’s 
insights, he points out that those individuals who become self-conscious as a 
consequence of being ‘able to bind themselves to conceptual norms are 
synthesized by reciprocal recognition’ (3).  Reciprocal recognition in these terms 
means that the individual can attain responsibility by doing something which is 
recognised by others as sufficiently fulfilling social norms for them to hold her 
responsible.  Responsibility, then, is manifest in a situation where others can hold 
the individual responsible.  In Brandom’s words, ‘I have to be recognised by them 
as doing something that has normative significance, and I have to recognise them 
as able to recognise me in that way in order for me genuinely to be responsible for 
anything’ (3). 
The significance of this is that the individual becomes bound by conceptual 
norms in the process of forming a self-consciousness within reciprocal recognition.  
This enlarges the idea of the context of recognition by pointing out ‘the social 
character of that normativity’ (3). 
Reciprocal recognition is, then, ‘a social achievement’ which ‘happens 
between ourselves’ (4).  In these terms Sethe would have the authority to be able 
to believe in herself.  This would be a singular achievement in that it is ‘for itself’ 
and not society.  The for itself is accomplished in recognition of its responsibility for 
normative statuses but rises above this to achieve authority in itself, an authority 
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outside the normative concepts which provided it.  However, reciprocality involves 
normative beings committed to ‘how things are’ or to conceptual thinking 
concerning ‘how things are to be’ (4): normative status as a derivative of normative 
attitudes.  Once again we are reminded that autonomy is a result of the individual 
committing herself to and acknowledging the authority from which she derives her 
status as a self-conscious being.  This is implicit in the recognition of her normative 
status she sees in the other being. 
If we are to be satisfied that the relation of Sethe and schoolteacher fits this 
framework, ‘authority and responsibility’ must be ‘commensurate and reciprocal’ for 
the ‘actual normative statuses’ to be instituted (4). If we consider Sethe’s 
production of the ink as something she is forced to do then its significance for her 
must be tarnished.  Additionally, she has to recognise in schoolteacher his ability to 
recognise in her the normative significance of her action.  This cannot be, because 
her action enables him to signify her animal characteristics in writing.  This 
argument, it is true, is closely associated with Morrison’s attempts to disprove a 
master-slave relationship between Sethe and schoolteacher, but it is also indicative 
of the lack of social appropriateness involved in slave actions, and, consequently, 
in their conceptual normative quality regarding reciprocal recognition.  Brandom’s 
assessment is that in these circumstances recognition is actually ‘asymmetric’ 
recognition, producing on the master’s side ‘authority without responsibility’, and on 
the side of the slave, ‘responsibility without authority’ (4).  This means that the 
slave is unable to bind to others by fulfilling normative concepts because as a slave 
she will never be recognised or accepted into the social world which appropriates 
her, body and soul.  The extent of this appropriation is evident in its ability to 
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encumber the natural recognition of one human being by another.  The slaves’ 
appropriation takes place within a society of masters whose conceptual norms are 
closely guarded to the extent that the slaves will become visibly marked to show 
their common lack of them.  
The argument put forward here is that although arranged and presented as 
arising naturally from a real-time situation, Morrison’s treatment of the slave 
experience in a recreation of the past is a fitting and critically valuable exposition of 
the appropriation of the self and not its constitution.  We can support this by using 
Brandom’s insight that ‘Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic of the master and slave 
is an attempt to show that asymmetric re-cognitive relations are metaphysically 
defective’ (4).  He points out that ‘no actual normative statuses are instituted’ 
unless authority and responsibility are ‘commensurate and reciprocal’ (4).  In line 
with this we can say that Morrison’s choice of the ink is to indicate that wherever 
she is or whatever she does, the appropriated slave’s relation with her master is 
framed within his signification of her as anything he chooses: all or any of her 
actions are considered appropriate to this aim.  The ink as a signifier is 
appropriation incarnate.  This is the horrible truth that forms and ferments in our 
contemplation of Sethe’s ability to make good ink, escape, or to be a good mother 
to her children.  
Morrison’s choice of form for Beloved ensures that the reader is unaware of 
Sethe’s production of the ink until she is alone with Paul D in the final moments of 
the novel.  We must assume that the making of the ink took place, unknown to us, 
sometime before Sethe escaped from Sweet Home.  This would mean that the 
motive for her escape, schoolteacher’s recording of Sethe’s animal characteristics, 
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and her making of the ink for that recording, remain unconnected in Sethe’s mind 
as she hears schoolteacher’s instructions to his nephews.  The moment in which 
she regrets making the ink is kept separate from her previous experience in order 
to preserve and prioritise the sense of self-awareness, the best of herself, she 
exhibits at that time.  This is an imperative for Morrison in order to be able to 
express in her narrative exactly what will be lost through appropriation, and the full 
extent of the role of appropriation in this loss.  Tragedy provides the framework 
able to bypass the inclusive and all-encompassing influence of the signifier: Sethe 
destroys herself as the only way to avoid contamination in an act whose depth of 
despair is the measure of its full impact on her. 
 
Schoolteacher’s nephew’s ‘What she go and do that for?’ (Morrison 
2004:176) is a result of two things: an ignorance of the presence of another human 
being and of an absolute, omniscient power which is the source of that ignorance.  
We would take issue with the hidden dependence of power in Ziarek’s (2012) 
argument.  The power which is the backdrop to schoolteacher’s behaviour enables 
him to register his needs in his characterization of Sethe in writing and in her 
physical appearance.  The aim in this is to endorse a consciousness derived from 
unlimited powers: that is to make tangible the individual’s dream world activated by 
power.  It would be more fitting to establish damaged flesh as the behaviour 
manifest in unlimited power; not as the mark of dependence.  The recording of 
Sethe’s human traits and her beating go hand in hand in this sense: the proof of 
who he is in writing and the marking of her body.  It is not that he wishes to 
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appropriate her subjectivity, but that he is the sole measure of it as irreducible 
datum: he will judge what is and what is not. 
 The expressive capacity in Morrison’s work is preserved in the content and 
form used to develop it.  The separation of matter and form is not partial but 
complete in that it is Sethe prostrate on a pink headstone, and Beloved elsewhere, 
which signals her surrender to power and its omnipotence.  If we write of remnants 
of materiality, that is, that which remains after the rejection of a claim to life, then 
we must write about that which has been rejected as if it no longer existed, and as 
if it did not exist to the extent we were claiming.  We must write, instead, the 
exodus, the leaving of life if it is to be preserved for recognition.  Perhaps what 
Ziarek is really calling for, within the remnants of Sethe’s potential, is the return of 
the personal and emotive longing which filled the vacuum created by appropriation 
and expulsion, but which has nothing to do with materiality at all.  
 The arguments put forward here concerning Morrison’s themes inevitably 
move the onus for action onto the slave to prove her humanity in the context of its 
denial.  And yet this would lose sight of the difficulty, with schoolteacher in mind, of 
speaking the unspeakable.  If we remember that it is for him to decide the very best 
she can be, then how could she speak?  This gives a sense of the immovable from 
which African American writing must disengage if it is to rid itself of the need to 
prove its critical faculties.  This is the disengagement we find in Morrison’s work, 
and factored in by her engagement with the sensibilities of her characters.  For a 
true sense of the context in which any claim must take place we must remember 
that the system of power relations within this type of society is ‘a signifying system 
whose key characteristic is the irreversibility which it confers on such a society’s 
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rending of reality’ (Guillaumin 1995:30).  Not only is someone else the judge of 
everything, but that judgement cannot be changed by any appeal because it is 
founded in signs which have no bearing on any reality other than power.  It is a 
judgement delivered in vindication of itself whose consequence is the difference it 
imposes on the others.  Sethe does not make a claim to this majority group but she 
and those like her will be marked as different from a majority who regards itself as 
universal and as incorporating the norm.  What her group does have in common is 
their subordination to the system but this is hidden by their supposed difference.  
Difference labels this subordinated group as a category, a type ‘existing of and by 
themselves’ when in reality ‘they are constructed in the context of a social relation 
of domination and dependence’ (Jutean-Lee 1995:17). 
 The use of signifiers is the result of individuals being appropriated to a 
specific category.  In the case of the slaves, it is the appropriation of their bodies, 
their labour, ‘as well as the products of their bodies and of their labour’ (5): their 
physical, material individuality.  In this context, signifiers are not chosen 
‘haphazardly’ (6) but are the result of an association between an economic 
relationship and physical attributes.  Hence, the assertion that the slaves’ colour is 
a result of them being slaves: ‘slavery as a system was not built on the appearance 
of its agents’ (6).  However, colour as a sign is permanent and lasted as long as 
the social category of slavery existed, if not longer.  Consequently, the labour of 
black bodies came to be associated with their modes of behaviour and with their 
subordinate position.  This meant that individuals of colour were interchangeable in 
their appropriation, implying that all black people were suitable or proper in their 
circumstances for field work, domestic work or any activity their owners devised.  
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The chronological order provided by Guillaumin, that is, first slavery and the 
appropriation of individuality in a social category, then the invention of an ideology 
of representational processes, culminates in the signifier becoming the sign of a 
specific nature.   
 The slaves, then, are appropriated as a class and their individuality denied.  
This means that collective appropriation has taken place before private 
appropriation (Guillaumin: 217-8).  If an individual is appropriated, that person’s 
qualities are judged on their performance of the tasks they are obliged to perform 
under the influence of power.  In this case the overriding consideration is that the 
acquired individuals ‘were not previously explicitly and institutionally destined for 
appropriation’ (218).  This is in contrast to the slave population of whom Guillaumin 
writes as being appropriated, ‘logically ordered... and then characterized by a 
constant symbolic sign’ (218).  Here, then, are the beginnings of the idea of nature, 
developed with a group of people in mind.  Power is no longer present, other than 
to control those already symbolically signed, as nature is assumed to be the 
measure and measurer of everything and accompanies the group and all its 
individuals from birth to the grave.  The class of the marked, so to speak, has at its 
foundation a signifier which refers to a class born out of a social relationship of 
power, and without this relationship it would not exist.  The signifier, then, can be 
seen to emanate from the relationship, and as a concept born of the powerful.  In 
the bizarre ordering of this situation, the dominant group are not representative of 
nature, as that belongs to black slaves, but must be assumed as having developed 
a sophistication out of nature which is then a mark of their superior status above 
and beyond their economic requirements.  For the slave it means the possession 
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of a nature absent in everyone but them.  They alone can be defined as floating in 
‘a universe of eternal essences which completely encircles them’ and from which 
there is no escape, and where, ‘enclosed in their beings’ they fulfil duties that only 
nature assigns them’ (220): they are seen as programmed from within for the life 
assigned to them.  Consequently, if black African slaves are internally programmed 
with natural predispositions, each member of this group becomes simply a 
fragment of the whole. 
 This is the peculiar idea that ‘the actions of a human group or class are 
natural; that they are independent of social relationships, that they pre-exist all 
history and all determined concrete conditions’ (217).  Nature has now superseded 
a certain type of social relationship in the enslavement of people.  We can see that 
the perceptions of reality of the dominant group have been developed by Morrison 
through the presentation of the Garners’ attitudes to slavery, and the culmination in 
schoolteacher of Guillaumin’s idea of the superiority which spawned ‘the 
ideological form of a certain type of social relationship’ (146).  And this ideological 
form is the belief, in perpetuation, that there are natural groups: an ideology that 
insists that its appropriated individuals each possess the identical characteristics 
by which the group is recognised en masse.  That which we see here is a transition 
from the traditional, functional mark of ownership to a ‘deterministic system which 
sees in any object whatever a substance which secretes its own causes’ (142). 
 The situation developed by Morrison has as its protagonists two characters 
who represent, by one means or another, an independence in nature, of thought, 
which resonates in the modern consciousness as possessing in itself its own 
cause.  The most powerful of the two is convinced of his elevation through, we can 
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argue, having developed a natural (no less!) sensibility as a superior being 
representative of his group. The other one is expressive of recognisable human 
characteristics which have been appropriated by the power of superiority.  It is 
pertinent in this context to consider that both characters are representative of their 
respective groups in the eyes of any casual observer and in each one’s 
consideration of the other: as a black group or as a white group.  What is not 
visible is the relationship on which their considerations are based nor the criteria 
each one is assigned.  We are left with colour.  If whiteness equals superiority 
expressed through power, then blackness is the subordination resultant of that 
power.  And with the use of colour the real reason for this situation becomes 
increasingly hidden.  Nature is everything, but if your appearance and actions are 
thought to be different, anything can be said of you and your natural disposition, 
especially in relation to a central datum which adapts the vanity of its wishes 
supremely well to situations such as those in this discussion. 
 In this system, the subordinated individual is observed as practising, 
developing or trying to conceal those traits which are his by the will of those over 
him.  The individual and his/her behaviour is always closely assigned to the group 
because of its signifying mark.  Because of this, the notion of ‘essential nature’ and 
‘biological specificity’ (31) becomes ‘the necessary ingredients’ in a signifying 
system of racism.  The specific and essential nature prescribed for the individual 
will, in its irreversible readings of reality and the gift it has for hiding the relationship 
which constituted it, become the ideological ingredient for signifying the inferiority 
of whole populations thought to be different. 
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 Sethe’s escape from schoolteacher is closely tied to preserving the best of 
herself signified by the kicking ‘fawn’ in her womb.  This is presented in two ways: 
by the fawn of the future in her womb, and the scrape in the ground provided for it 
by schoolteacher, prior to her beating, meant to preserve her white master’s wealth 
and power.  We recognise her beating as the evidence that they are determined to 
keep the best of herself within their jurisdiction.  They feel this to be the right and 
proper order of things of which they are the cause, the proof of which is the society 
they represent and which represents them in perpetuity.  Because their nature has 
become the measure of everything, it must continue to measure everything or else 
it would become invisible and its raison d’être opaque.  The mark given to Sethe 
clarifies or rather makes real an ideology.  Because Sethe’s true situation is hidden 
within the ideological opaqueness which surrounds it, the need to reveal it 
becomes essential to the African American writer at the risk its development will be 
construed as the base nature schoolteacher believes he has left behind. 
 The argument put forward here is that in the presentation of this most awful 
of situations, Morrison ensures that the imposition of difference, the mark on 
Sethe’s back, is schoolteacher’s doing and, more important, that its presentation is 
within the concepts which make up his own false reality.  Her writing here 
torpedoes a reality whose sustenance is appropriation of the individuality of others.  
In this, colour has played little or no part at all because its signification must give 
way to a mark which, consonant with Morrison’s aim must, finally, be put to rest.  
Colour would be something brought to the situation by the slaves themselves and 
would provide an instant and direct conduit for the concept of race, and its 
signification as essentialism.  Morrison’s method is to refuse this and to insist on a 
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presentation of difference which avoids the emblem which race has become.  Her 
use of a mark instead is to underline that the notion of race is founded on a 
majority group’s ‘belief in its own naturalness’ (Guillaumin 1995:50).  In Morrison’s 
work this means that the relations between groups ‘are governed by the definition 
which those who institutionally control power give of themselves’, and ‘value is 
derived from those same characteristics’ (50).  According to Guillaumin, this type of 
system has as its referent, race, and this can be based either on the doctrine of 
appearance or its successor, nature: race remains ascendant but ‘it can be either 
auto-referential or altero-referential’ (50).  The auto-referential system is centred on 
the self, and Guillaumin’s for instance is the defunct aristocracy and its ‘pre-
eminence’, and for whom its race symbolism was specific to them.  Socially, 
everything emanated from this group who saw themselves as different from those 
people who made up the other groups.  Race referred to them and their superior 
position but not to their ‘naturalness’: they were simply different, and race signified 
difference as superiority, a race apart. 
 Conversely, altero-referential racism is centred ‘on the other group or 
groups’ (50).  It manages entirely to place the dominant group outside any frame of 
reference and, consequently, the individual within this group has little awareness of 
belonging to a specific group.  Guillaumin calls this the ‘occultation of the self’ (50), 
which is able to sustain a reality in which the dominated are different but where the 
principles of superiority remain unknown.  This group, in opposition to an auto-
referential group, is blissfully unable to ‘recognise’ or ‘define’ any ‘self group’ at all 
to the extent that while ‘designating others as belonging to one,’ its belief in its 
centrality prevents it from seeing or specifying itself a race (52).  The common 
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factor here is still race, but this time it presents as ‘the signifier of perceived 
difference’ (51) in a subjugated group and is characterized by ‘blindness about 
oneself’ and an ‘obsession with difference’ (52).  Because difference makes an 
appeal to biological criteria, it heralds the complete disappearance of the individual, 
and physical appearance becomes the singular visible sign which he/she has in 
common with everyone else in the group.  The individual is reduced to ‘a mere 
actualization of the species’ (53), a species whose obscure origins are now hidden 
in an unknown past, in contrast to the aristocratic group, who sustained themselves 
through ideas of a knowable past stretching back into a history of titles and the 
accumulation of property: the ‘type’ of ‘race’ which signifies the slave group 
reduces them to a degree of closure in which they are frozen in time, having no 
recourse to the past or the future.  In this situation the significance of skin colour as 
a basis of classification becomes ‘transformed into the expression of a specific 
nature’ (Jutean-Lee 1995:6).  As a contributor to the opaqueness surrounding the 
situation of the slave, it posits the signifier ‘as preceding the classification, as 
causing the classification’, and, eventually, as a sign of the slave’s position, or lack 
of a place, in society (6).  
 In this context, Morrison’s choice of the mark, and the avoidance of colour, 
is the device able to reject notions of an essential nature.  It resists the closure 
dictated by colour, and which identifies black slaves as one ‘undifferentiated mass’ 
(Guillaumin 1995:53).  It is important, in avoiding race as a referent, to establish 
the presence of individuality.  However, if the central cause, appropriation, for the 
formulation of the slave group is hidden, how is it possible to present the men and 
women of the group as individuals whose reactions to their situation are diverse?  
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The sub groups within the group, we can argue, are male and female slaves; field 
slaves; farm slaves; and house slaves whose domestic duties entail a close 
proximity with their masters, his family and the nuances of domesticity. 
 As we have seen with Sethe, her ink-like qualities are contrasted and 
recorded along with her animal characteristics in a construction which specifies her 
essentialism rather than ‘escaping it’ (Juteau-Lee 1995:17).  The point here is that 
the signifier which registers her essentialism will activate, reactivate and dominate 
given even the smallest opportunity.  It is the active ideology which hides the truth, 
and the opaqueness it generates intensifies its ability to disseminate individual 
expression, regarding it as simply a fragment of the permanent and fixed nature 
assigned to the whole.  This will be the situation for all the individuals in the sub-
categorizations in operation under the heading, ‘race’. 
 Placing these considerations alongside Morrison’s methods we find that her 
character Sethe’s experiences and her reactions to them are examined in terms of 
the modalities of her appropriation.  Their distance from accusations of fixity and 
closure is increased in ‘their articulation alongside other forms of subordination’ 
(18), especially in their contrast with the experiences of Paul D.  Significantly, in 
order to avoid ‘fragmenting the subject into multiple identities’ (16), Morrison’s 
method is not to dismiss the signifier as a common denominator of group 
behaviour and fixed properties, but to preserve it in another form.  In this way the 
chokecherry tree remains forever the sign of the appropriation of Sethe’s human 
sensibility and translates into an expression of the subjugation of a member of the 
human race.  In this way Sethe is marked as different, but only in the sense that 
she is different from that which schoolteacher says she is.  His incarnation of the 
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norm is suspect because it cannot embrace anything outside the centrality which is 
its foundation. Finally, because of this, Sethe’s effort must fail in Morrison’s effort to 
sustain the debilitating power of the mark as the background to her demise. 
 The result is that, in terms of method, we have a character who is not 
different in any way at all from any other human being, but is marked as different at 
the behest of a power so great it is impossible to do anything about it in practical 
terms.  Following Jutean-Lee, in this situation to claim the right to be different, ‘be it 
ethically, racially, or sexually’, would simply reinforce the perceptions of the 
dominating group (17), who may pander to these claims to establish them as 
givens, and absolute.  In this sense the marginalized individual would be asking for 
what she/he already has: the controlling power ‘will not take away’ that which 
makes the slaves different (Guillaumin 1995:255).  Not making a claim, then, has 
resulted in the social relations between slave and master, under the arbitrary 
signifier of race, being seen less in terms of fixed categories and more as the 
revelation of the conditions of appropriation.  Underlying the use of a mark at all 
times is Morrison’s refusal to theorize the relations between master and slave, and 
her determination to promote the relationship between master and slave as a 
facilitator of a signifier and not a consciousness.  The mark carried by Sethe, it is 
argued, is Morrison’s device for facilitating an understanding of the relations which 
constitute and construct the categories which signify enslaved individuals as a 
natural species.  For Morrison, ‘identity is the construction of a unity resting not on 
a common substance’ but on an awareness of an individuality which is manipulated 
and classified within a relationship of power (Juteau-Lee 1995:21).  Morrison has 
succeeded in compressing the prejudice of a misguided people onto Sethe’s back.  
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Manifest within the provision of this symbol is a sense of the reality it provides that 
group for its imagined superiority.  Intriguingly, in Morrison’s aesthetic, their scrape 
in their ground will preserve what is best in Sethe for future contemplation, minus 
the mark: a future consciousness fully aware of the appropriation of millions of 
individuals and the subsequent modes of consciousness it generated. 
 A unity, at whose heart is the individuality of the subjects who make it up, 
suggests a unity in time not achievable in a novel which, it is argued, produces 
from the past a fragment of that time conducive to the ‘concerns’ of the present 
(Benjamin 1999:247).  The sense too that this individuality has been manipulated 
and classified by others, lends itself to an introspection not able to be fully realized 
in the singularly motivated character operating within a tragic framework.  The point 
to be made here is that this unity in awareness is expressive of a frame of mind 
desirable in African Americans in real time.  Identity and individuality in this sense 
become interwoven as a characteristic of a group in real time who are cognizant of 
the prescriptive nature of its classification by others, but not confined or defined by 
it.  Morrison can be said to be bent on establishing a class consciousness at whose 
centre is the amalgamation of the exceptional with the universal: a condition lost 
and found as it were in the distance this novel travels from a person who, in self-
consciously adjusting to experiences, sifts and monitors them in relation to a 
received idea of herself, to one bereft. 
 Seth’s final confrontation with schoolteacher at 124 is the presentation of the 
limitless power he exercises over his slaves and their children.  It is the 
confrontation between a group classified by itself as beyond nature, and one 
‘immured in it’ (Guillaumin 1995:230).    We find that the more limitless the 
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domination ‘the more insistent and “obvious” will be the idea of the “nature” of the 
appropriated ones’ (234). 
 This situation is particularly difficult for the artist to circumscribe within the 
confines of a themed narrative.  As we have seen, Morrison’s use of the tragic form 
brings to the situation a recognisable, human being, but also one whose behaviour 
exceeds accepted or reasonable limits.  Many interpretations of this scene 
comment on the extent to which Sethe has been driven to commit such a crime as 
the murder of her own daughter by the circumstances of slavery and inhuman 
treatment.  However, Sethe declares that if she had not killed her herself, Beloved 
would have ‘died’ (Morrison 2004:236).  In a statement redolent with dramatic 
irony, Sethe registers the sixty million and more slaves who died leaving no trace 
of their loss.  However, Beloved survives as the incarnation of Sethe’s personal 
loss, and as such, registers loss.  Rodrigues (1998:155) points out that ‘Sethe’s 
ordeal is told in pieces that are scattered through all sections of Part One’, and 
implies that the unbearable intensity of the scene is relieved in this way.  This is 
certainly the case, but the repercussions of this scene and its aesthetic reach 
attach themselves to other voices and other concerns in a style formed to mitigate 
the views of its observers.  During their comments, Guillaumin’s quote above 
reverberates among the rights and freedoms of those whose recommendations of 
themselves are confirmed by their perceived lack in others.  Schoolteacher 
confirms Sethe’s animal nature by berating the nephew for ruining a useful slave 
who makes ‘fine ink’, ‘irons his shirts’ just so, and has ’10 breeding years left’: 
beating a horse or dog ‘beyond the point of education’ will cause the animal to 
‘revert’ at the most unexpected time and bite ‘clean off’ the hand who reared it 
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(Morrison 2004:176).  The domination, or rather over domination, of a captive slave 
and her reactions to the most debasing circumstances is here shown to reinforce 
the nature prescribed for her by her knowing owners.  All the ‘efforts’ to educate 
this ‘base’ native had failed because, ‘you just can’t mishandle creatures and 
expect success’ (176).  This last comment is schoolteacher’s, ironically delivered 
through a stream-of-consciousness technique developed, we argue, to provide 
insight into the ‘inner being’ of the modern character whose actions, to be 
significant, can only ever relate to a flaw in character or fate.  This line of thought 
allows us to add to Guillaumin’s quote, ‘the more insistent and “obvious” will be the 
idea of the “nature” of the appropriated ones’ (1995:234), the words, ‘in the eyes of 
the dominators’.  Morrison (2004) has succeeded in damning schoolteacher within 
his own consciousness, and his nephew’s repeated ‘what she go and do that for’ 
(176) only adds to the sense of isolation in which they exist and which contributes 
to their inability to relate to anyone else save themselves.  For him, to murder her 
child is an extreme reaction to the beating Sethe received, when in his own 
experience he had received the same if not worse: ‘Hell, he’d been beat a million 
times and he was white’ (176).  His reasoning that for white people a beating is 
more degrading than for someone who is black speaks volumes for the centrality 
he feels he occupies in the world of slaves and masters. 
 The full necessity of Morrison’s designs becomes apparent when we 
register the brief sentences which delineate Sethe’s reasons for the assault on her 
children.  The main point here is that whether it is this scene or others distributed 
throughout the novel, Beloved cannot survive in the presence of the white, 
controlling power.  She will also be rejected by members of her own community. 
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 Sethe’s account of the return of schoolteacher, and his intention once more 
to enslave her and her children, is given as an explanation to Paul D for her actions 
that day; taking place two decades after the event, it nails down in a conversation 
between two peopled scarred by slavery, the extent to which those scars are able 
to dissemble and destabilise any effort to establish a sense of self-awareness for 
themselves.  Distanced from the event, it brings into consideration, during her 
conversation with Paul D, an awareness of the devastating isolation which follows 
the decision to come from behind the veil. 
 In these terms, it is argued, coming from behind the veil expresses the will 
to be free of the chokecherry tree on her back and all that it insinuates about her in 
the eyes of those who manipulate and marginalise her.  As we have seen, her own 
opinions of her worthiness remain to be spoken elsewhere, preserving meanwhile 
her actions in the woodshed as her response to losing ‘every bit of life she had 
made’ (192).  What is at stake here is personal to Sethe, and her response to 
losing ‘all the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful’ is to carry, 
push or drag them ‘through the veil, out, away, over there where no one could hurt 
them’ (192). At the height of her tragic denouement Sethe, marked forever as base 
and animalistic, proves the existence of her precious and fine humanity by killing it.  
In modern literature it is a surrender whose magnitude is cognizant with the 
complex emotional or aesthetic influences at work in the novel.  It signals a void 
where previously a burgeoning individual consciousness had become visible but 
which now registers a nothingness engineered by the demands of the controlling 
power.  It means there can be no individual aspiration or self-awareness beyond 
the veil or its tangible sign, which is the mark of imposition Amy Denver calls a 
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chokecherry tree.  But it leaves behind an individual who seeks, incessantly, to 
disprove its insinuations by attempting to reform what has been obliterated.    
In these terms, Morrison’s avoidance of colour with the use of the mark on 
Sethe’s back becomes the means which not only registers the source of the 
imposition she lives, but which also serves as a permanent reference to the 
difficulty of expressing any human sensibilities other than from behind the veil.  
Guillaumin’s insight (1995) that the result of the ‘natural’ label is that single 
individuals will be seen as representative of the whole is an apt description of 
Sethe’s fate as she steps out from behind the veil.  The comments of 
schoolteacher and his nephew register their view of her actions as simply 
expressing the nature of an undifferentiated mass.  This makes us keenly aware of 
the dilemma faced by the African American artist in their relationship with the 
community, and the desire to write what each member of it has lost at the behest of 
an imposition which dissembles what individuality actually is: imposition and power 
transposes, we argue, the right of free expression into a claim to those human 
qualities possessed only by those in power.  Speaking the unspeakable becomes 
for the slave a parody of white supremacy, a travesty of human qualities.     
 Sethe’s aim is to express her humanity within the world in which she finds 
herself.  Schoolteacher’s is to express his superiority in practising it.  The 
consensus within a vilified group is for each member to regain their self-respect 
without the means to do so other than contemplating a confrontation with those 
forces responsible for their demise.  Implicit in their group awareness is the 
vulnerability manifest in who they are thought to be, and the measures to take in 
opposition to this.  Shared humiliations can only be managed behind a veil which at 
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the same time confirms, in this silence, their continued existence.  Expression by 
the individual without means in this situation is to reject the behind-the-veil 
consensus for recovery and the means to which the majority turn, that is, an 
acknowledgement but not recovery of a past conducive with the pride and moral 
sense the people have lost.  Free expression in the shadow of the veil becomes 
individuality.  And although coveted and recognised by members of all groups, it is 
denied to those deemed as the possessors of a base nature, whose pride and 
purpose can only become them in their enforced isolation.  In those circumstances 
individuality has no reference points, no indulgences or recognitions within those 
social rites of passage which profligate in other groups.  Refutation of the mark is 
impossible, and tearing aside the veil is tantamount to destroying, knowingly, the 
precious idea at the heart of us because the encroaching, permanent mark says it 
cannot be otherwise.  The tragic framework within which this happens is enhanced 
by the reference to the veil which secures for Morrison the full import of the loss 
suffered by Sethe. 
 Its inclusion leaves behind an individual who seeks, incessantly, within the 
void in which she exists beyond the veil, to reform what has been obliterated.  
Morrison’s strategies allow her to differentiate between a consciousness formed in 
human aspiration and one formed in recovering from its loss.  Schreiber (2010) 
refers to the void existing beyond the veil as encountering ‘one’s own nothingness’ 
(17), and as the result of attempting to create ‘a sense of self’ (16).  In this 
argument, a sense of self becomes an impossibility because its ‘imaginary 
wholeness is a virtual one’ in that the subject has constructed it herself.  This 
construction ‘crumbles’ in the face of the gaze of ‘outside forces’ (17), and, 
224 
 
consequently, in Lacan’s terms, that which determines the subject ‘at the most 
profound level...is the gaze that is outside’ (Lacan 1979:106).  Any imaginary 
wholeness at this stage disappears as it is confronted by others outside itself, and 
the reaction of the individual is to attempt to establish a ‘coherent sense of self 
through recognition from the outside world’ (Schreiber 2010:17).  For Schreiber, 
Lacan’s (1979) analysis of subjectivity quickly becomes an ‘identification with 
whiteness’ which ‘results from the desire to be recognized as an authentic self’ 
(17).  Pecola and Pauline in The Bluest Eye (Morrison 1970) ‘exemplify this 
phenomenon’ (Schreiber 2010:17).  On these terms, the black character’s idea of 
herself crumbles because of the ‘lack of any’ recognition from white culture and is 
replaced by an attempt to become white ‘because blacks must identify with 
whiteness’ if they are to avoid nothingness (17).   
 In the sense that Pecola and Pauline (Morrison 1970) can be said to fulfil 
this argument, Morrison’s Beloved moves away from this position, markedly.  
Sethe’s sense of self is intricately woven into the presence of her children and 
when it is challenged by schoolteacher’s instructions to his nephews to write down 
her human and animal characteristics, this does not fragment her understanding.  
Her reaction is to escape from Sweet Home in order to preserve the best of herself.  
That which determines Sethe is her personal and intimate understanding of herself, 
and is immune to outside forces.  Prior to her escape there is an authenticity 
constructed within her which resonates within the outside world of the novel’s 
presence.  
 Frantz Fanon (1967) endorses the idea of the gaze and points out that the 
‘self-esteem’ sought by the ‘black man’ can only be provided by the white man: ‘the 
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other (in the guise of the white man)...alone can give him worth’ (154).  However, 
this is because the claim for self-esteem is made from a position of inferiority.  
Fanon claims that in ‘the man of colour there is a constant effort to run away from 
his individuality, to annihilate his own presence’ in order to become white: 
‘whenever a man of colour protests, there is alienation’, resulting in, we can 
assume, the need to seek verification and acknowledgement in whiteness to 
‘compel the white man to acknowledge that I am human’ (98).  Morrison’s 
character, Sethe, appears, then, to be authentic only in the sense that she seeks 
confirmation of her own image in whiteness as a matter of course.  However, it is 
worth pointing out that Fanon’s comments reveal that he is very aware of the 
extent to which an African American would seek identification through whiteness, 
and the difficulties which arise for the individual in doing this, or in avoiding it.  As a 
consequence, we could posit that if authenticity is an illusion, then how do we 
account for the presence of self-awareness within this conflict (Webster 2002)?  
We argue that the act of annihilation in Morrison’s Beloved is far removed from 
Fanon’s presentation of individual consciousness.  In Fanon’s (1967) reasoning, 
the ‘discrimination’ imposed on him by the white man results in an ‘inferiority 
complex’ which debilitates to such a degree that the superiority driving its 
imposition becomes greater the more severe the imposition becomes.  In this 
situation a ‘dependency complex’ replaces an inferiority complex as the individual 
seeks authentication in the method of his detractors as the only way out.  In 
opposition to this, Morrison’s aesthetic response indicates that annihilation follows 
the will to establish a presence, and her purpose in denying the individual the 
ability to recover into whiteness or anything else, is the fulfilment of Fanon’s wish to 
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present ‘the problems or the potentialities’ of men and women of colour as 
recognisable concerns of the ‘present time’ (108). 
 In Morrison’s tragic framework, far from asking for her humanity to be 
acknowledged, Sethe destroys herself, the best of herself, as the response to the 
power which overwhelms her.  In both Fanon and Morrison the humanity of the 
oppressed is not the issue.  Rather, it is in the reaction to whiteness of the 
oppressed in which they differ.  Fanon points out that prior to any white presence, 
men and women of colour ‘live’ out their idea of themselves within their 
communities as human beings.  With the arrival of the white man, or in the 
presence of the white man, this idea of self is challenged through discrimination 
and marginalization to the extent that men and women have to account for their 
humanity as people of colour.  In Fanon’s words, from this position of ‘brute beast’ 
(98), the appeal to be human must be addressed to white superiority from black 
inferiority.  In order to have his humanity recognised, Fanon says ‘I will quite simply 
try to make myself white...will compel the white man to acknowledge that I am 
human’ (98).  Fanon’s conclusion is that this is a ‘society that proclaims the 
superiority of one race’ (100), but we must add to that and call it a society where 
humanness is coloured white, and a wish to be human is transposed into a wish to 
be white. 
 Morrison, likewise, presents her character as fully human.  However, as a 
tragic figure, Sethe’s appeal is not delivered from a position of inferiority but from a 
highly defined character in a highly defined situation.  Her act of self-destruction in 
this context ensures that her claim is seen as one emanating from a human being 
and not from a black figure seeking fulfilment in whiteness.  Intriguingly, it is 
227 
 
Morrison’s choice of a tragic framework which will advance Fanon’s desire for a 
‘conclusion applicable to the situation, the problems or the potentialities’ of people 
of colour ‘in the present time’ (108).  We argue that for her, ‘the image of the past 
that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to 
disappear irretrievably’ (Benjamin 1999:247).  The words, ‘its own concerns’, shift 
the emphasis onto the images through which human beings will be able to interpret 
their situation and that of those around them in human terms.  The point here is 
that the image cannot express in the present its own concerns other than in the 
human concerns of that particular time, or rather the image is to be constructed 
with the human concerns of the present in mind.  This will mean that, in Morrison’s 
terms, the events which occur at any given time are not the result of that particular 
time but examples of how human beings behave and of what human beings do.  It 
is not a case of history repeating itself over and over again, but simply human 
behaviour: that is, behaviour which remains constant in different contexts.  
Benjamin warns that ‘the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule’, and argues for a ‘conception of history that is in keeping with this 
insight’ (248). 
 Consequently, when we refer to the concerns of the present time, Morrison 
wishes us to see them as the symptoms of the human condition, and to be 
addressed in line with human interests.  In this sense, the attempt to seek 
verification in whiteness is transposed into the presentation of human sensibilities.  
In effect, Morrison has moved away from the idea of a subject seeking ‘the 
establishment of a coherent self through recognition from the outside world’ 
(Schreiber 2010:17) to the ability or inability to recognise other human beings.  The 
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common denominator in Sethe’s successful or unsuccessful attempt is Sethe.  
What does this say about those, who in their rejection of her, fail to recognise her?  
Morrison is pointing out that where there is prejudice and marginalization, the 
presence of human interests will be misread as an appeal to the powerful.  This is 
borne out by Schreiber’s feeling that Morrison’s characters are ‘searching for a 
coherent self that the mirror and the symbolic structure do not provide’ (18): 
reference to the mirror here is Schreiber’s use of Lacon terminology for the 
individual’s construction of an imaginary self which fragments on contact with the 
wider world.  This would mean that, in Schreiber’s terms, human concerns and 
spiritual concerns are imaginary, and that once this phase is over, a new sense of 
self emerges conducive to the conditions in the wider world, all at the expense of 
the individual’s lost humanity.  It can be argued that individuals, in this hegemonic 
society, prioritise their sense of belonging over their spiritual concerns.  Morrison is 
pointing out that this is the situation which fosters the impression that, because 
human concerns are not recognised, any claim made by the outsider is a plea for 
verification in whiteness.  The site of this situation is the hegemonic society whose 
interpretations, concerning the claims of the outsider, mirror the extent to which the 
symbolic structure has replaced its ideas concerning individual spiritual interests, 
and inflected its own writings.  Alongside Morrison’s tragic framework in Beloved, 
Schreiber’s claims concerning the search for an authentic self appear to have 
developed within the logic of a symbolic structure which has forgotten its own role 
in this situation.  An idea of the sea change that has taken place during Sethe’s 
flight from schoolteacher is the vision for the future formulating and incarnate in 
Denver.  This is expressed in a remarkable piece of allegoric writing following 
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immediately on Denver’s birth, and worth repeating in full.  In it is Morrison’s 
presentation in the past of the problems and potentialities of men and women of 
any colour as recognisably human concerns of the present.               
‘Spores of bluefern growing in the hollows along the 
river bank float towards the water in silver-blue 
lines hard to see unless you are in or near them, 
lying right at the river’s edge when the sunshots are 
low and drained. Often they are mistook for insects-
but they are seeds in which the whole generation 
sleeps confident of a future. And for a moment it is 
easy to believe each one has one-will become all of 
what is contained in the spore: will live out its days 
as planned. This moment of certainty lasts no 
longer than that; longer, perhaps, than the spore 
itself.’ 
   (Morrison 2004:99) 
 
 The centre of attention here is the bluefern spores observed by the speaker 
who is situated at the water’s edge.  This is significant in itself because we can 
argue that the presentation of water in this novel is equivalent to the unknown past 
which figures prominently in the slaves’ perceptions as they struggle in vain to 
recover a sense of dignity.  The spores float on the wind involuntary towards the 
water, but cannot be seen if you are not among them.  The water, here, appears as 
an appealing but solitary option for those not recognised by anyone who cannot 
share their concerns.  The water waits for the inevitable arrival of the seeds which 
contain the dreams of a whole generation.  The inference is that, immersed in the 
past, each seed will be fulfilled in its yearning to live out a future concomitant with 
its potential.  However, something that is easy to believe is to be challenged and 
the message is brutal.  For this reason, this piece of writing absorbs, allegorically, 
the bitter truth that the past must be abandoned because it cannot deliver those 
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expectations which have no other means of expression or fulfilment.  The certainty 
it offers, the remedy it claims for emptiness, lasts no longer than a moment.  This is 
the voice of one whose humanity is denied, but in an awareness of her situation 
realises that her dream is the result of something which has been lost already, a 
replacement for it.  For her, the past can no longer substitute for the present, she 
must live in her present the way her ancestors lived in theirs.  Past and present 
simply represent the identical ground of an unchanging human conflict, and 
rejecting the significance claimed for them is the expression of a consciousness 
born out of human considerations of the human condition.  
  The introduction of the bluefern spores marks precisely the moment of 
Denver’s birth and Amy Denver’s determination to make it to Boston to become the 
woman she feels she is.  Arriving at the water’s edge, ‘Sethe couldn’t think of 
anywhere to go but in’, but Amy berates her as ‘the dumbest thing’ and hauls her 
and the half-born baby out of the water before they are both drowned (98).  This is 
significant because it is narration which precedes the interruption of the bluefern 
episode and which returns to the water’s edge only to look back as ‘two women 
struggled under a shower of silvery blue’ (99) to keep the baby Denver alive. 
Throughout, Amy is cast as the estranged white girl who readily and determinedly, 
although saving the lives of Sethe and her baby, fulfils the spirit expressed in the 
bluefern section in her determination to move on to Boston.  With this in mind, she 
is the given example of the consciousness Morrison seeks to express in the 
character Denver as she eventually takes her place in the wider society.  Because 
the narration of past events is framed within a tragic framework which necessarily 
leaves things as they are, as humanity revealed in its loss, Morrison has to gesture 
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towards a consciousness which can only be verified in its becoming.  The 
requirements of the tragic mode fit precisely the claims for humanity visible in the 
tragic form, but those same requirements prevent any inquiry into that form whose 
motivation was ‘in virtue of some inescapable vocation or purpose’: Taylor’s free 
existence (1992:160).  Essentially, the content in the presentation of form and 
content is finite.  The interruption of the bluefern section is Morrison’s method of 
expressing that which is yet to come at the expense of that which is soon to be lost 
in Sethe’s final confrontation with schoolteacher across the other side of the river.  
Morrison’s ‘voice’ facilitates the verification of self-verification in a move which, in 
replacing the spiritualized form, prepares a consciousness in advance of its form.  
This ensures that traces of alterity and materiality are displaced because Denver 
and Amy are the forms able to allude to that which is conceivable but ‘which cannot 
be presented’ (Lyotard 1986:81): consciousness honed to the human condition. 
 Present here are two oppressed beings who have a vision for themselves 
other than that prescribed by the powers they live under.  Their rejection by those 
powers does not lead them to seek verification but to escape.  They seek 
recognition elsewhere in a growing understanding of the false reality inherent in 
that rejection.  Neither Amy Denver nor Sethe are co-opted by the gaze of others.  
Amy’s presence prevents Sethe’s immersion in a ‘before today’ which would 
mitigate the awful challenge of being true to herself.  Morrison is pointing out that 
what is imagined here is not a self that cannot bear the light of day, but an 
imaginary sense of history constructed to dispel the machinations of those whose 
power generates an imaginary reality.  And so we argue that the bluefern voice is 
the voice of a knowing consciousness that is not available to the imagination but is 
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represented in allegory.  Tambling points out (2010:94) that Mary Shelley and 
Emily Dickinson ‘use allegory as a way of evoking what cannot be represented, or 
has no identity which can be publicly validated.’  We argue that this is the sense of 
Morrison’s use of the allegorical in her need to evoke that which Sethe can never 
achieve because of the signifier on her back which facilitates and sustains 
schoolteacher’s story telling.  This knowing consciousness, then, is an 
acknowledgement that the humanity visible in Sethe’s tragic demise ends in that 
demise.  It is a consciousness born out of this realisation and one whose 
knowledge is a product of Sethe’s loss.  It perpetuates this sense into a future 
where, even though verification will be misread or unrecognised, it is known to 
exist: unrecognised it cannot ask or claim, but can only remain the hidden essence 
of the marginalized.  And this is the singular evidence for the knowledge apparent 
in the bluefern voice.  This knowing refers to the coming refusal of the humanity the 
individual recognises in itself when its humanity is denied.  We are moving from its 
representation by Sethe to its ownership by Denver; from the harmony of form and 
content to loss of harmony, hidden content, and silence.  When Denver walks into 
a world dominated by white people, we are aware of the knowledge she owns. And 
reflecting on Fanon’s concerns with the present time, her presence is the presence 
of the consciousness from which Fanon draws his own telling insights.  They 
reciprocate each other’s knowledge in their experience of marginalization, and 
because of this their knowledge is applicable to the presence, at any one time, of 
the vagaries of human behaviour.  They become a class of people who are aware 
of their worldly situation because their knowledge is reciprocally validated in the 
difficulties of the now, not in a before now.  Fanon’s wishes for the future are here 
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now in a consciousness prepared for him which is not available to the imagination, 
but in a moment of reciprocation.  The future becomes now in that moment. 
 Ralph Ellison (1972) has said that ‘the great clashes of social history no less 
than the painful experience of the individual’ are given meaning through the 
imagination and personal vision of the writer ‘who transforms them into art’.  
Meaning is provided, he concludes, because in this transformation they become 
‘imbued with human values’.  The events become, then, ‘what the writer makes of 
them’ (145).  In a different approach, Houston Baker (1980) provides a contrast to 
Ellison’s insights by referring to the theoretical and critical assumptions which 
‘regard the question of artistic function as one occasioning an analysis of the 
content in which works of art exist’ (142).  Because this implies a relationship 
between literature and culture, there has grown up, he says, ‘a sense of an 
essential reciprocity between black art and black culture’.  Consequently, the 
‘evaluation of black art is a reality’ (142).  However, pointing out that ‘white America 
has spent billions of dollars and a great amount of repressive energy to ensure the 
dominance of white meanings’ (130), what if, he asks, ‘the webs of meaning’ 
established in the relationship between black art and culture, different as they are 
from those meanings ‘conceived within’ white creativity, ‘escape the white critic 
altogether’ (154).  And because of his emphasis on the context in which the artistic 
function takes place, he can say that ‘a case can certainly be made for the cultural 
specificity of meaning’ (154).  However, along with the risk of isolation of meaning 
in relation to white critical inquiry, an art whose meanings are derived from its 
production within a collectivity could be described as the expression of a group 
engaging with itself as the possessor of one pervasive, unchanging consciousness.  
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In its particular situation it would be ignored and its individuals defined by their 
chosen sense of expression. 
 On the one hand we have meaning as emanating from the artist’s personal 
vision and imagination, and on the other meaning emanating from an essential 
reciprocity between black art and black culture.  Alongside both of these hovers the 
power of the controlling group whose meanings, we have argued, are sustained, as 
a result of that power, through signification.  Considering Ellison’s comments on 
the artist’s ability to imbue painful experience with human value, cultural meaning 
becomes sidelined by the reciprocity between human experiences whose human 
value is communicable across a range of concerns.  As we have seen, Morrison 
chooses to accentuate in human terms the meanings she wishes to represent.  
When we contrast this with the idea of a relationship between black art and black 
culture, which is warped to the machinations of the controlling power, we find that it 
is able to facilitate meaning through a projection of individual knowledge of that 
warping and the million dollars spent.  We have, as it were, a consciousness 
imbued with human values projected into a group whose adoption by its individuals 
generates a unity between them.  Black art then becomes a presentation of a 
worthy human condition in the presence of its detractors.  Instead of deriving 
meanings from a cultural context, it validates human awareness which is able to 
signify on black culture, making it something which is lived and not inherited.  In 
this sense, the provision of worth for the individual validates her as a member of a 
class, and as a contributor to culture in her own right.  We can say that Morrison’s 
projection validates the individual in the cultural situations that must be addressed, 
and in those occurring in the wider context of the controlling power.                     
235 
 
Fanon’s sense of the anguish generated in the need to survive in a world of 
white power is an indication of the subtlety Morrison must engage with in order to 
delineate the true situation of the individual character whose disparagement is 
more complete the more human her expression.  Sethe’s attempt to express and 
preserve the best of herself results in the imposition of a mark whose power 
dissembles everything.  Simply to speak out is unthinkable and yet verification in 
whiteness is rejected to preserve, outside the veil, a most singular humanity.  
Sethe does, in Fanon’s terms turn away from her own presence to face 
nothingness, but as the price of preventing its disintegration and to signal the 
boundless extent of white power over her and the horrible consequence for human 
kind active in the grounds of its source. In a framework of tragedy, symbolism and 
aestheticism, the murdered Beloved verifies the humanity within a subjugated 
human character.  
 In attempting to maintain the centre of interest and activity on the slave as 
an individual and to write the unwritable, Morrison’s chosen ground is the void 
beyond the veil and not the individual’s situation behind it.  Living outside the veil in 
Morrison’s terms is to have to live bereft of any worth.  This, of course, hovers 
around Du Bois’s presentation of the prejudice afflicting the African Americans of 
his own generation, and their attempts to mitigate its severity. However, in 
Morrison’s hands the distressing effects of living under the gaze, that is, of 
developing behaviours which suit a white presence, are now replaced by a life in 
isolation which is the result of declaring a life force unfettered by white influences 
or one implicated in white centrality.  The images procured through Du Bois’s 
(1994[1903]) veil signalled the condition of a whole people, and their response to 
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marginalization and degradation.  Now, Morrison takes up the veil to discard it in 
order to present an individual who becomes bereft. 
 Although marked and measured as representative of the mass of people 
she is leaving, stepping from behind the veil confirms a refusal to contemplate life 
on white terms.  This means that rejoining the community, as the one option left to 
her, is to replace nothingness with the modal behaviours consonant with life behind 
the veil.  Because the mark on her back and the veil will now be linked to a nature 
imposed from outside, the singularity of her action distances her not only from the 
manipulations of white people, but also from the collectivity developing among her 
own group who, seeking to preserve their self-respect behind the veil, will not or 
cannot contemplate existing in a void of their own choosing.  Implicit in their group 
awareness is the vulnerability of who they are thought to be, and the measures to 
be taken in opposition to this. 
 Refusing to contemplate or deliver any fragment of human sensibility 
complicit with white demands is to lose, through lack of expression, that which the 
individual seeks to preserve.  In Morrison’s use of the mark and the veil, this 
refusal is enacted as self-inflicted in a sign that the individual concerned has no 
wish to exist as anything other than that which they seek to preserve but lose.  In a 
context reminiscent of Nel and Sula (Morrison 1973), this means that in rejoining 
the community, the knowledge gained in any experience cannot be communicated 
to individuals in the community who find it impossible to imagine themselves on the 
outside of that community.   Morrison’s choice of narrative technique means that 
there is no substitute for the expression of a life force stifled within a system where 
humanity and animality are transposed.  Morrison’s requirement in expressing a 
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most personal loss is for the precise delineation of a most personal individual, one 
in whom the extent of that loss must be displayed in action.  Within this 
requirement, the chorus-like urgings of the community cannot provide a sufficiently 
personal conduit through which the individual can communicate her desires, nor 
any indication of the consciousness required in any relations with the white world.  
Morrison’s use of ‘veil’ imagery provides a comprehensive understanding of life 
without its cover.  Instead of the veil facilitating the notion of a double 
consciousness in which the marginalized individual is fully aware of the life force 
which must remain hidden in order for her to survive, Morrison’s imagery implies 
that because there is nothing it can be replaced by, either it is or it is not, it requires 
an act of will for it to be realised.  In existential terms, (Flynn 2006) the individual 
can only know herself in her humanness and, consequently, there can be no sense 
of being in denying it expression.  Sethe’s act of will is Morrison’s aesthetic 
response to the horror inflicted on the individual who is considered as chattel.  
Because the slave’s response to her master’s measuring can only be the 
expression of a life force of which she is deemed unworthy, she can only live in a 
moment of willed expression which lasts no longer than that.  The conflict we are 
faced with, in the contrast between Morrison’s and Schreiber’s reasoning, is the 
difference between an imagined self not surviving in real time, and Morrison’s 
expression of a vibrant sense of self which is stifled by controlling imagined selves 
finding their reality in the machinations of their own powerful group.  In refusing to 
have our cake and eat it too, we must acknowledge that any reality whose vital 
interest lies in its subjugation of others is at heart seeking confirmation of the 
recommendations it awards itself.  This is not the result of the individuals 
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concerned finding their expression in an adjustment to an existing structure, but the 
opposite; that is, the manipulation of reality to confirm an imagined superiority 
practised in the subjugation of others as the natural right of those for whom their 
superiority is self-evident. 
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